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Abstract 
This thesis is a study on Turkey's quest for a Western alliance between the 
years 1945 and 1952 within the framework of alliance theories. Neither of 
these theoretical explanations provide a sufficient answer to the question of 
"why did Turkey ally with the Western bloc but not with the Soviet bloc or 
choose neutrality?" This thesis argues that Turkey desired to join NATO 
because of external and internal reasons. Regarding the external reason of 
Turkey's alliance with the Western bloc, it is commonly argued that because 
of the 'Soviet threat' Turkey entered NATO. However, the argument ofthis 
thesis is that this was not the external reason of Turkey's quest for a 
Western alliance, because there was no 'Soviet threat' against Turkey, but 
only demands in order to realize the historic Russian desire to control the 
Straits and ensure access to the Mediterranean. Therefore, a continuous 
Soviet 'war of nerves' against Turkey was conducted but came to nothing. 
The major external reason of Turkey's entrance into NATO was lessons of 
the past, namely the diplomatic and military isolation, which was very 
costly to the Ottoman Empire. After WW II, the Turkish officials, coming 
from the Ottoman tradition. and having had the experiences of the Ottoman 
era were suspicious that Turkey could again be a bargaining point between 
the great powers. Thus, Turkey as a newly established state and a weak 
power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Western countries, could guarantee its 
security only by tying itself as well as the Western powers into a military 
alliance. The domestic reason of Turkey's alliance with the Western bloc 
was the state policy of Westernization, which was its desire to divorce itself 
from the Arabic sphere of culture and tradition, and its full integration into 
the Western world as an equal, modern, and industrialized state within the 
Western world. The achievement of industrialization depended on the 
continuation of US military and economic aid to Turkey. And, by joining 
NATO, Turkey could distribute the costs of high military expenditures to 
foreign all_ies by which it could complete its civil industrialization program 
by redirecting its domestic budget. 
Ill 
Özet 
Bu tez Türkiye'nin 1945 ve 1952 yılları arasındaki Batı ile ittifaka girme 
arayışını ittifak teorileri çerçevesinde incelemektedir. Bu teorik 
açıklamaların hiçbiri "neden Türkiye Batı bloğu ile ittifaka girdi ama neden 
Sovyet bloğuyla ittifaka girmedi veya tarafsız kalmadı?" sorusuna yeterli bir 
yanıt verememektedirler. Bu tez Türkiye'nin NATO'ya girme isteğinin hem 
dış hem de iç sebeplerden kaynaklandığını ileri sürmektedir. Türkiye'nin 
Batı bloğu ile ittifaka girmesinin dış nedeni olarak genellikle 'Sovyet 
tehdidi' ileri sürülmektedir. Ancak, bu tez bunun Türkiye'nin Batı ile ittifak 
arayışının dış nedeni olmadığını savunmaktadır. Çünkü Türkiye'ye karşı 
'Sovyet tehdidi' yoktu fakat sadece talepler vardı. Bu taleplerle Sovyetler 
Birliği tarihsel bir amaç olan Boğazları kontrol etmek ve Akdeniz'e 
ulaşmayı gerçekleştirmeyi istiyordu. Bu yüzden, Sovyetler Birliği 
Türkiye'ye karşı sürekli bir 'sinir savaşı' yürüttü; ancak, bununla hiçbir 
amacına ulaşmadı. Türkiye'nin NATO'ya girmesinin esas dış nedeni 
geçmişteki derslerdir yani, Birinci Dünya Savaşı öncesinden beri diplomatik 
ve askeri olarak yalnız kalması Osmanlı İmparatorluğu için çok pahalıya 
mal olmuştur. İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra, Osmanlı geleneğinden gelen 
ve Osmanlı döneminin te~rübelerine sahip olan Türk devlet adamları, 
Türkiye'nin tekrardan büyük güçler tarafından bölünebileceği kaygısını 
duymuşlardır. Yeni kurulmuş, Sovyetler Birliği ve Batı ülkeleriyle 
karşılaştırıldığında zayıf bir güç olan Türkiye, güvenliğini sadece kendisini 
ve Batılı güçlerle bir askeri ittifaka bağlayarak sağlayabilirdi. Türkiye'nin 
Batı bloğu ile ittifakının iç nedeni, bir devlet politikası olan Batılılaşma 
politikasıdır. Batılılaşma politikası ile Türkiye kendisini Arap kültür ve 
geleneğinin etkisinden ayırmayı ve kendisini tamamen Batı dünyasına eşit, 
modern ve endüstrileşmiş bir devlet olarak bütünleştirmeyi amaçlamıştır. 
Endüstrileşmenin gerçekleştirilebilmesi Amerikan askeri ve ekonomik 
yardımının Türkiye'ye devamına bağlıydı. Türkiye NATO'ya girerek 
yüksek askeri masraflarını yabancı ittifak üyelerine dağıtabilecek ve 
bütçesini düzenleyerek endüstrileşme programını tamamlayabilecekti. 
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CHAPTER I 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE TURKISH CASE 
1.1 Literature Review of Alliance Theories 
1.1.1 The Concept of Alliance 
Most commonly, alliance is defined as formalized international cooperation focusing 
solely on national security matters, generally in the form of intended responses to 
actual or perceived threats. According to this definition, formal treaties (mutual 
defense pacts) as well as less explicit agreements (nonaggression pacts, neutrality 
agreements, and entent~s) are the components of an alliance. 1 Alignment is also 
defined as a set of mutual expectations, which is not signified by formal treaties, 
between two or more states committed to each other's support in the military 
dimension of international politics. Some scholars include in the term of alignment 
not only security concerns but also political, economic, and cultural dimensions of 
international politics.2 The terms alliance and alignment are sometimes used 
interchangeably since the concept of alliance is regarded as difficult to define and 
measure with precision. Stephen Walt defines alliance as a formal (written treaty) or 
1 Michael Don Ward, Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics, (Monograph Series in World Affairs: 
Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 1982;, p. 5. 
~ Ibid. p. 7; Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," Journal of International 
Affairs 41: I ( 1990), p. 105. Alignment is also defined as "arraying of states or individuals for or 
against a cause. Alliance is a written, formal agreement among two or more states which is designed 
to serve, for a specified term. the interests of those states. or their statesmen and bureaucrats, in regard 
to national security." Roger Dingmun."Theorics of. and Approaches to. Alliance Politics,'' in Paul 
Gordon Lauren. Dir!omacy: New Approaches. New York: Free Press. 1979, p. 2-+9. 
informal commitment (ad hoc agreements) for security cooperation between two or 
more sovereign states against an external threat. 3 
Regarding types of alliances, Walt argues that an alliance can be either 
offensive, which is established to attack some third party or defensive, which is set 
up to provide a mutual guarantee in case of an attack of another state on one of the 
alliance members. Alliances can also be divided as symmetrical, and asymmetrical, 
depending on whether the members have roughly equal capabilities and offer broadly 
identical commitments to each other. Alliances can also be totally expedient 
arrangements between states with very different regimes and political values which 
was the case in the alliance between the USA, the UK, and the USSR during WW II. 
On the other hand, states which have similar strategic interests and ideological 
principles can form an alliance as is in the case of NATO. Alliances· also differ 
according to their level of institutionalization. They can be highly institutionalized, 
like NATO, or they can be ad hoc coalitions like the Axis alliance of 1939-1945. 
Alliances also vary according to their functions. For instance, most of the great 
power alliances were formed in order to aggregate power through which member 
states pool their resources to attain a common goal.4 It is commonly argued that 
"whether offensive or defensive, limited or unlimi~ed, ·equal or unequal, bilateral or 
3 Stephen Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," Survival 39: 1 (Spring 1997), p. 157; Stephen 
Walt, The Origins of Alliances, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 12, 14. 
Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, like Stephen Walt use the term alliance in its broadest sense 
which refers to "a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more states 
and involving mutual expectations of some degree of policy coordination on security issues under 
certain conditions in the future." Barnett and Levy, "Domestic sources of alliances and alignments: the 
case of Egypt, 1962-73," International Organi:.ation 45:3 (Summer 1991 ), p. 370. On the other hand, 
Glenn Snyder, makes a clear distinction between the tenns alliance and alignment since, he defines 
alliance as the only formal subset of alignment "for the use (or nonuse) of military force, intended for 
either the security or the aggrandizement of their members, against specific ocher states, whether or 
not these others are explicitly identified." Ibid., p. 104. Arnold Wolfers defines alliance as a '"formal 
and mutual commitment to contribute military assistance in the e\'ent one of the alliance partners is 
attacked.'' Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliances, balance, and stability:· Imemational Organization 45: 1 
(Winter 1991 ), p. 123. 
4 Stephen Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,'" p. 157. 
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multilateral, alliances must involve some measure of commitment to use force to 
h. I ,,1 ac 1eve a common goa . -
1.1.2 Alliance Theories 
Glenn H. Snyder argues that, "one of the most underdeveloped areas in the theory of 
international relations is alliance theory."6 Alliance theories ·-are dominated by the 
realist and neorealist schools of thought. According to this tradition, the systemic 
structure, that is systemic anarchy and structural polarity, determine the formation of 
alliances. The anarchic nature of the international system leads states to give primacy 
to their external security interests. In this hierarchy of goals of states, external factors 
(perceived threats from another state or states, imbalances of power in the 
international system) rather than domestic factors, play a predominant role in the 
formation of alliances. Facing external threats, in order to enhance their military 
capabilities states seek alliances. As George Liska argued, "alliances are against, and 
only derivatively for, someone or something."7 According to realism, states have a 
hierarchy of goals; among these state security is the primary goal. Therefore, military 
power, security interests and external threats rather than domestic factors determine 
states' alliance formation. Hence, alliances are regarded "as instruments of power 
politics". States choose to ally so as to diminish anarchy's: impact on their security. 
Glenn Snyder argues that besides systemic anarchy, structural polarity-the 
distribution of military power and potential among major states- plays a significant 
role in alliance formation and alliance politics. Therefore, alliances have to be placed 
5 Paul W. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815- I 945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in K. 
Knorr, (ed.) Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1976), p. 227. 
0 Glenn H. Synder, '"Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," p. 103. 
3 
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in the context of system structure and process.8 According to Snyder, in a bipolar 
system alliances are formed much more easily than in a multipolar system: m a 
bipolar world, the structure of the system predominantly determines the formation of 
alliances rather than the preferences of states. The superpowers, have no intention to 
ally with each other because, there is no third state which is strong enough to 
threaten them both. Therefore, generally ·alliances in a bipolar system have less 
independent impact on relations than alliances in a multipolar system because the 
structure of the system determines interests and expectations, and hence formation of 
alignments. Also, alliance management is much easier in a bipolar world than a 
multipolar world since the system structure offers little opportunity or incentive for 
defection. Also, in a bipolar system, the danger of abandonment is low, but, both the 
superpowers and their allies face the fear of entrapment.9 
Neorealists argue that besides their benefits (security ·and nonsecurity), 
alliances entail costs (e.g. the loss of political autonomy, political and economic as 
well as material costs). Therefore, alliances are formed if only member states believe 
that the benefits outweight the costs. 10 Besides this cost-benefit analysis, Ole Holsti, 
Terrence Hopmann, and John Sullivan propose that there is a direct relationship 
between the extent of external threat and alliance cohesion. Since alliances are 
formed against an external threat, the cohesion of alliances diminishes when there is 
7 Jack S. Levy and Michael M. Barnett, "Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third 
World Security," The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 14:4 (1992), p. 22; Glenn H. 
Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," p. 107. 
8 Jack S. Levy and Michael M. Barnett, "Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy and Third 
World Security," pp. 22-23; Glenn Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut,'' p. 107; Paul W. 
Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," p. 228; Serdar 
GUner, "A Game Theoratical Analysis of Alliance Formatic.n and Dissolution. The Case Study of the 
Relationship Among the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, 1949-
1972," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Universite de Geneve, 1990), p. 2. 
9 Glenn Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut." pp. 117-118. 
10 Ibid., p. 452. 
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a reduction in the duration and intensity of the external threat, the disappearance of 
which will be the major reason of their disintegration. 11 
A state facing an external threat has two alternatives: it will either balance or 
bandwagon. Stephen Walt defines balancing as "allying with others against the 
prevailing threat", and bandwagoning as "alignment with the source of danger." 12 
Walt, while accepting the importance of power as a stimulus for a state to ally, 
argues that power is not the only determinant factor for alliance. Thus he introduces 
the Balance of Threat theory as an alternative to the structural Balance of Power 
theory according to which states ally in order to balance against threats rather than 
against power alone. The extent of threat is not solely affected by aggregate power 
but also through geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived 
aggressive intentions. An imbalance of threat occurs when the most threatening state 
or coalition becomes more dangerous than the second most threatening state or 
coalition. On the other hand, the structural Balance of Power theory assumes that the 
distribution of power, which is defined as aggregate capabilities (population, 
economic and military capability, technological capacity, and political cohesion), is 
the only important variable: states ally in response to imbalances of power, that is, 
when the strongest state or coalition becomes more powerful than the second 
strongest in the system. On the other hand, the Balance of Threat theory argues that 
the probability of the vulnerable state to seek alliance increases when threat 
11 Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," International Organization 50:3 
(Summer 1996), p. 450. 
12 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 17. The term band wagoning was first introduced by 
Kenneth Waltz. Waltz uses bandwagoning as the opposite of balancing which refers to allying with 
stronger side, and balancing refers to allying with weaker side. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning 
for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19: 1 (Summer 1994 ), p. 80 . 
.. On the other hand, Thomas Christenson and Jack Snyder argue that. when facing a systemic threat, 
the affected minor powers could enter alliances to either balance against or bandwagon with the threat, 
or they could seek neutrality in order to pass the buck of defending the status quo to other countries." 
Dan Reiter, '"Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past," World 
Politics 46:4 <July 1994). p. 502. 
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increases. Regarding geographical proximity, there is a direct relationship between 
proximity and threat. Accordingly, a small state 13 bordering on a threatening great 
power may choose to bandwagon rather than balance. A vulnerable state may also 
choose to bandwagon if it faces an immediate threat with offensive capabilities. 
However, Walt argues that perceived intentions determine alliance formation rather 
than solely power. Because, if a state is regarded as unchangeably aggressive, other 
states will choose to balance. 
In some cases states may choose to balance the weaker side by allying with the 
stronger side since the former is more dangerous, which indicates that power alone is 
not the sole determinant in alliance formation. Commonly, states when confronted by 
an external threat, choose to balance rather than to bandwagon with the adversary for 
two reasons. Firstly, states are more secure if balancing, allying with the weaker side, 
since no aggressor will be permitted to dominate the other states. Thus, the aggressor 
will face combined opposition. Secondly, balancing serves for the new member as a 
means to enhance its influence within the alliance because the weaker side is in need 
of assistance. Security will decrease if bandwagoning is the dominant tendency: 
when the aggressor is successful, it will attract additional allies through which it will 
aggregate its power while diminish that of its opponents. Bandwagoning is preferred 
for two reasons: firstly for defensive reasons a state allies in order to appease the 
potential threat to protect its independence. Secondly, a state chooses to bandwagon 
for offensive reasons, in that case to "share the fruits of victory." Extremely weak 
states are more likely to bandwagon if they are neighbors of the threatening power 
since they have little means to defend themselves, "they will be the first victims of 
n Robert L Rothstein defines small power as "a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security 
primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of another 
states, institutions. processes, or development to do so." Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small 
Powers, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 29. 
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expansion." The unavailability of allies, and the appearance of the dominant power 
to be appeased also increases the tendency of bandwagoning. 14 
Walt argues that ideological solidarity, foreign aid, and transnational 
penetration (a state's manipulation of another state's domestic political system 
through foreign propaganda, or lobbyists) play only a limited role in alliance 
formation. Although states which share similar domestic ideologies are more likely 
to ally with each other, in reality, there is an inverse relation between ideology and 
external threat, the importance of ideology diminishes when the extent of external 
threat increases. Foreign aid (economic and military), which is one type of balancing 
behavior, is only the result of the alliance but not the aim. It is accepted that as the 
extent of foreign aid increases, there will be a greater chance for alliance formation. 
In addition, especially if an asymmetry of dependence between the donor and 
recipient states exists along with the extent of external threat, and monopoly of the 
donor state on the commodity provided, the donor's leverage over the recipient will 
increase. However, the donor country's efforts to manipulate by foreign aid and to 
with covert penetration are usually responded to with resentment by the recipient 
country. 15 
As a critique of Walt's Balance of Threat theory, Randall L. Schweller 
introduces the Balance of Interest theory according to which, a state's alliance 
14 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp. 5, 17-26, 29-31; Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation in 
Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition," in Robert Jervis and Jack 
Snyder, Dominoes and Bandwagones: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian 
Rim/and, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991 ), pp. 53-54. ··However, Walt only tests for 
balancing and appeasement type bandwagoning among threatened states, while it ignores the behavior 
of unthreatened states that align for reasons other than security and that present the threats that drive 
Walt's theory." Randall L. Schweller, ·'Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back 
In," p. 83. 
15 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp. 33-49, 214-218, 266-269. Ideological solidarity is 
defined "as a tendency for states with similar internal traits to prefer alignment with one another to 
alignment with states whose domestic characteristics are different.'' Ibid., p. 181. Like Walt, Robert 
Rothstein argues that, "a common ideology may facilitate matters, but it is not imperative since 
sufficiently important common interests can overcome the difficulties inherent in conflicting 
ideologies." Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 60. 
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decision is not mainly determined by danger, or security but by opportunities for 
gain, and for profit. Therefore, the promise for rewards rather than the threat of 
punishment motivates a state to bandwagon. Compatibility of political goals rather 
than the imbalances of power or threat leads states to align with each other since the 
alliance members lose some foreign policy autonomy. On the one hand, satisfied 
states (security-maximizers) will join the status-quo coalition, even when it is the 
stronger side, to preserve the status-quo. On the other hand, dissatisfied states 
(power-maximizers) which are motivated by profit more than security will 
voluntarily bandwagon with an ascending revisionist state for profit. 16 
There are four types of bandwagoning: the first type is ')ackal bandwagoning" 
in this type of bandwagoning, a powerful revisionist state or coalition offers to share 
the spoils of victory (e.g. additional territory) in order to attract lesser aggressors: an 
offensive bandwagoning occurs. This enables the prevention or blocking of the 
formation of a strong status-quo coalition. In order to achieve this goal, the 
revisionist leader often allows the members to share the spoils of victory. The second 
type of bandwagoning is called "piling on bandwagoning" which happens at the end 
of wars, when the outcome of a war has already been determined. Thus states 
bandwagon either to claim unearned share of the spoils or, out of fear of being 
punished by the victor. The third type of band wagoning is called the "wave of the 
future," in which states choose to bandwagon with the stronger state because they 
regard it as the wave of the future. Lastly, an external force may create a chain 
reaction for states to bandwagon like dominoes. According to the Balance of Interest 
16 Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," pp. 79, 
88. Randall L. Schweller, criticizes Stephen Walt "because of his consideration only cases involving a 
significant external threat. His selection of cases Walt, ignores the behavior of unthreatened states that 
align for reasons other than security. Therefore, the theory only tests for balancing and appeasement-
type bandwagoning among threatened states. For Schweller, in order to confirm the balancing 
hypothesis a case should be chosen in which a state is not facing directly threatened by a predatory 
state but chooses to balance against it in order to protect its long-term security interests ... Ibid., p. 83 
8 
theory, the balance between the revisionist and status-quo powers determine the 
stability of the system. Thus, when there is an imbalance between revisionist powers 
(power maximizers) and status-quo powers (security-maximizers), that is when the 
former becomes more powerful than the latter, the international system will be 
unstable. 17 
As an alternative to traditional realism, Dan Reiter introduces the Learning 
theory and argues that "state behavior is determined by experiential learning." This 
happens when states decide to ally primarily by drawing lessons from formative 
historical experiences (formative events) rather than merely by external threats. 
Reiter takes the systemic wars (WW I and WW II) as formative events in order 
to understand the alliance preferences of small powers with great powers. He argues 
that systemic wars, as formative experiences, determine small powers' alliance 
choices. Because, referring to the experiences of the past is a way of coping with 
uncertainty. Faced with uncertainty, minor powers have two options: they will either 
enter an alliance or choose neutrality depending on their belief about which one more 
effectively deals with threats. Reiter, unlike Walt argues that the international arena 
is not a zero-sum game. Hence, states may choose neutrality rather than ally with 
one of the sides in a conflict. As Robert Osgood stated, "Every state must have an 
alliance policy, even if its purpose is only to avoid alliances." 18 
Entering an alliance provides security by extending deterrence and military 
assistance in case of war, but carries with it the risk of entrapment. By choosing the 
latter option a state refrains from the risk of entrapment, but may be left with the risk 
17 Ibid., pp. 93-99, 104; Robert Jervis defines domino beliefs as the "expectation that a defeat or 
retreat on one issue or in one area of the world is likely to produce, through variety of mechanisms, 
further demands on the state by its adversaries and defections from its allies. Robert Jervis, "Domino 
Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, (eds.) Dominoes and 
Bandwagones: Strategic Belief~ and Great Power Competition i11 the Eurasian Rimlund. p. 22. 
18 Dan Reiter. ''Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past." p. 50 I. 
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of having no allies to help to deter aggressors or to defend against attacks. Therefore, 
neither of these strategies can always be the dominant strategy. 
Learning theory assumes that minor powers, when trying to decide whether to 
ally with a great power or stay neutral, look to formative events in choosing which 
strategy best protects state security. According to this, a state can choose either 
buck-passing/neutrality or balance/bandwagon to deal with the emerging threat 
according to formative events. Accordingly, if a minor power chose neutrality during 
a systemic war, and was not invaded, then it will choose neutrality, 19 the former 
event offers success. If the minor power was allied with the winning side, and was 
not invaded, this experience is successful. However, it would be a failure if it was 
allied with the loosing side, or if it was on the winning side but was invaded, and did 
not recover its population in postwar territorial settlements. Hence, in a systemic war, 
a minor power may choose neutrality or alliance according to its formative 
experience. This theory also explains the formulation of long-term ideas about grand 
strategies. Even if there is no current external threat, a state can choose alliance with 
a great power since that state experienced success in formative events. However, if 
the state previously experienced failure, then it will opt for neutrality. 20 
19 "Invasion constitutes the failure of neutrality since the primary reason neutrality is chosen is to 
avoid participation in war." Ibid., p. 498. 
20 Dan Reiter, "Leaming, Realism, and Alliances the Weight of the Shadow of the Past," pp. 490-492, 
495-497, 499, 502, 504-506, 519. ''The empirical analysis in this paper is limited to the alliance 
choices of minor powers. A minor power is concerned mostly with direct threats to its security, 
whereas a great power must also consider the security of those proximate and overseas territories and 
countries instrumental to the security of its homeland and national interests. This greater simplicity of 
minor power's foreign interests means that experiences can be more easily coded as successes or 
failures, as a minor power focuses mostly on the question of how its choice of alliance or neutrality 
affected the national security and territorial integrity of the homeland. A great power, on the other 
hand, must assess the effects of an experience- such as a major war or diplomatic crisis- along a 
number of dimensions because of its extended foreign policy interests. Limiting the data set to minor 
powers makes it easier to compose a complete list of possible lessons a state might gamer from a 
formative experience, increasing confidence that the learning hypotheses are a valid test of learning 
theory. Systemic wars are used as formative events, the model focuses on the preference of minor 
powers for alliance with greater powers. For each case, behavior was coded for about the length of a 
generation, 20 years, at 4 points in time: in the post-WW I period, 1921, 1927, 1933, and 1939: in the 
post-WW II period, 1949, 1955, 1961, and 1967." Ibid., pp. 496-498. 506. Kenneth Waltz introduced 
the terms chain-ganging and buck-passing. The former means to an ally chain itself unconditionally to 
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Besides realist and neorealist explanations regarding alliance theories, there are 
also other explanations which emphasize domestic factors as well as external factors 
that lead states to form alliances. These scholars take their cases up predominantly 
with the Third World states. They argue that the realist and neorealist views are 
inadequate to explain the Third World states' alliance formation. Accordingly, the 
Balance of Power theory is not applicable to the Third World, because of its 
distinctive characteristics.21 And secondly by focusing solely on external factors it 
can not explain changes in alignment mainly because of internal factors as in the case 
of the Third World alignments both of which ignore the distinctive characteristics of 
the Third World states. Third World politics takes place in a uniquely dangerous 
context. Therefore, it is argued that "conditions in the Third World require a theory 
of alignment that applies primarily to the Third World." As an alternative to the 
Balance of Power theory, Steven David introduces the theory of Omnibalancing. 
Omnibalancing accepts the realist premises that in an anarchic world where interests 
are bound to conflict, survival is of primary importance, therefore, power, interests, 
and rationality are crucial concerns of international politics. However, this theory 
departs from the Balance of Power theory since it assumes that the Third World 
leadership's need to counter all threats causes Third World-type alignments. Hence, 
while the Balance of Power theory takes into consideration a state's need to counter 
external threats, the Omnibalancing theory focuses both on internal as well as 
external threats to the leadership. Thus, unlike realism, Omnibalancing does not 
reckless allies whose survival is seen indispensable to the maintenance of the balance. On the other 
hand. buck-passing refers to counting on third parties to bear the costs of stopping a rising hegemon. 
Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain gangs and passed bucks: predicting alliance patterns 
in multipolarity,'' International Organization 44:2 (Spring 1990), p. 138. 
21 SLeven David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World, (Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 199 l ), p. 3. Steven Da\·id argues that since, the Balance 
of Power theory came out of the experiences of Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries, it may have no 
universal applicability. Therefore. the Balance of Power theory is not applicable to the Third World. 
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assume that states are unitary actors that pursue national interest. 22 According to 
Omnibalancing, internal threats play a major role. Third World leaders decide to ally 
in order to resist the principal immediate and dangerous domestic opponents that 
they face. Since the nature of Third World politics is unstable and dangerous, the 
decision of the leaders will be determined by which outside state is most likely to do 
what is necessary to keep them in power. The morality rate is assumed to be low, and 
very few Third World leaders worry about losing their state.23 Therefore, the political 
survival of the leadership predominates the survival of the state so, the level of 
analysis is not the state but leadership. Omnibalancing theory assumes that the 
threatened leadership aligns with one threat to deal with the other. That is, leaders 
choose to align with their secondary adversaries in order to focus their resources on 
primary adversaries. Since in the Third World, the source of threat is not only 
external, but is mainly internal, the predominant factor that affects the Third World 
leaders' decision to align is made in order to address the more immediate and 
dangerous domestic threats. Therefore, the leaders align with their domestic 
opponents' international allies, through which they appease their secondary 
adversaries. Hence, this is not bandwagoning but balancing because, in the Third 
World, the foremost goal of the leaders is to balance against both external as well as 
internal threats to their leadership. Omnibalancing theory assumes that the "leaders 
are weak and illegitimate and the stakes for domestic politics are very high." 
Therefore, this theory argues that the foremost determinant of alignment is the drive 
22 Steven David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics 43 (January 199 l ), pp. 233, 
235; Steven David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignmellt in the Third World, pp. x-xi, 6-8. 
Steven David, uses the UN categorization of the Third World as including all countries except the 
US, the SU, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa. the European states, and the 
People's Republic of China. Ibid. p. 11. 
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·
1 Ibid., pp. x-xi, 15-18; Steven David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," pp. 242-245. 
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of Third World leaders to ensure their political and physical survival. 24 In contrast to 
the realist assumption, where the state is assumed to be a unitary actor, in the Third 
World states, where there is neither strong consensus nor an integrated society to 
inhibit conflict.25 Hence, while the Balance of Power theory assumes that the 
decision maker asks, "how does this policy affect the power of the state?" 
Omnibalancing theory assumes instead that the decision maker asks, "how does this 
policy affect the probability of my remaining in power?" And whereas the Balance of 
Power theory assumes that the state's leader asks, "which outside power is most 
likely to protect my state from the threats posed by other states?" Omnibalancing 
assumes that the decision maker asks, "which outside power is most likely to protect 
me from the internal and external threats that I face?" Internal threats are far more 
likely to challenge a Third World leader's hold on power than are threats from other 
states: hundreds of Third World leaders, have been overthrown by their internal 
enemies. In the Third World, the government is neither legitimate nor a protector. 
Therefore, it would not be wrong to consider Third World domestic politics as a 
"microcosm of international politics." As a result, balancing to ensure survival is 
critical for groups within states as it is between states.26 
Jack Levy and Michael Barnett explain Third World states' alliances by 
domestic political and economic factors. They argue that regime stability or survival 
2~ Steven David. Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World, pp. 6-8; Robert L. 
Rothstein, "The 'Security Dilemma' and the 'Poverty Trap' in the Third World," The Jerusalem 
Journal of International Relations 8:4 (1986), p. 14. 
25 
··waltz, recognize that violence and the use of force to deal with it occur as often within states as 
between states. For Waltz, this means that neither the occurrence of violence nor the use of force per 
se can be used as a standard by which to distinguish domestic from international politics. Instead he 
argues, the distinction is marked by government's monopoly on the legitimate use of force to deal 
with violence. Citizens, therefore. need not worry about protecting themselves; they can appeal to the 
government for assistance. In international politics, by contrast, states can only rely on themselves for 
de!Cnse. Thus. international politics, is system of self-help, whereas domestic politics is not." Steven 
David. "Explaining Third World Alignment." p. 251. 
26 Steven David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World. pp. 15-18; Steven 
David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," pp. 238. 242-245, 251: Mohammed Ayoob, "The 
Security Prohlcmatic of the Third World," World Politics 43 (January 1991 ). p. 263. 
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is often at stake while state survival is rarely questioned. According to their view, 
Third World states, as in the case of other states, have two alternatives to provide for 
their security; they will either depend on external alliances or on internal military 
preparations which are frequently determined more by domestic political and 
economic considerations rather than systemic structures and threats. The former 
provides a security guarantee with some loss of autonomy (presence of foreign 
troops or interference in their domestic political affairs) and carries some risks of 
abandonment and entrapment. However, the latter is more costly as well as slower 
than the former. It is argued that these alternative security strategies in the Third 
World states are often determined more by domestic political and economic 
considerations rather than by systemic structures and threats.27 In the Third World, 
the source of internal threat originates from the weakness of the domestic political 
economy rather than merely of the domestic political interests of the leader in power. 
Therefore, internal economic weakness has direct influence on alliance choices, and 
it denies the state to utilize its economic resources necessary for a strategy of internal 
mobilization. It also affects alliance choices indirectly by reducing the level of 
domestic political support for the regime in power and by imposing political 
constraints on further domestic sacrifices. In both cases, there is a common incentive 
for political leaders to ally with an economically more powerful state which can 
provide scarce resources, through which, internal economic and political problems 
may be resolved. Third World leaders try to attain the goals of social welfare, 
economic development, and political stability as well as power, security, wealth, and 
autonomy. Since the costs of internal mobilization can diminish the state's ability to 
realize these domestic welfare goals, Third World states are more likely to ally with 
:: 7 Jack S. Levy and Michael M. Barnett ... Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third 
World Security," pp. 19-20. 26-27. 
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an economically more powerful state which will provide scarce resources that will 
help the resolve internal economic and political problems. Even though Third World 
states would desire to have an independent arms production capacity by which they 
could preserve their autonomy, they do not have a sufficient industrial base, 
economic resources, and technology. Another reason that makes Third World states 
depend on external alliance is the problem of universal conscription. Because of the 
low level of legitimacy and political stability, Third World states avoid mass 
conscription and rely on armies drawn from loyal indi~iduals. By choosing to depend 
on external alliance the state gets economic as well as military aid from its ally and 
uses aid both for its internal and external security needs. Thus, besides providing 
external security, alignments also play the role of a resource securing function 
(economic resources and military equipment) which has crucial importance for Third 
World leaders since it secures their position and power against their domestic 
rivals. 28 
It is also argued that even strong states, which have high legitimacy, extractive 
capacity, and control over production can face domestic constraints which restrict 
their war preparation ability, thus play a significant role in explaining the state's 
security policy. Because, resources for war preparation which are manpower, 
extraction of revenue, and war material are societally controlled resources. Hence, 
the state engages in two kinds of battles when it participates in a war. On the one 
hand, it will try to defend its borders against its adversaries, on the other hand, it will 
try to extract resources even though it may face domestic constraints. Modest levels 
of war preparation endeavors of a state do not lead to political instability; however, 
intensified war preparations do. Since the political costs are high, the state chooses to 
18 Ibid., pp. 26-30, 33; Barnett and Levy, "Domestic sources of alliances and alignments: the case of 
Egypt. 1962-73," p. 373: Levy and Barnett, "Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and 
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preserve political stability over war preparations. Therefore, a state which is highly 
restricted by its domestic context will ally formally or informally in order to 
distribute the costs of its war preparation onto foreign actors rather than increasing 
the costs over its own society while accepting some degree of dependence. 29 
1.2 The Case of Turkey 
In this thesis, the reasons of Turkey's entrance into NATO will be examined. A 
distinction is made regarding the meaning of the words: threat and demand. Although 
these words have the same objective which is the territorial expansion of one state at 
the expense of the other state, there is a clear difference regarding their meanings. A 
state is a threat to another state if it makes war preparations to attack that state. A 
state is also a threat to another state if it creates and/or materially supports militant 
groups in that state for weakening the existing government. On the other hand, 
demand refers to the claims of a state over the territory of another state. A state in 
order to realize its demands can pursue a 'war of nerves' against another state. The 
aim of this 'war of nerves' is the realization of the claimant state's goals by only 
putting pressures over the latter without aiming to wage war. These pressures can be 
continuous radio and press attacks, rumors of troop movements, renunciation of 
existing treaties of friendship between two states as was in the case of the Soviet 
'war of nerves' against Turkey. The aim of these pressures is to weaken the existing 
government of the latter state by creating public discontent. However, this 'war of 
nerves' may lead to the latter's firm public resentment regarding the farmer's 
demands and may lead to the strengthening of the existing government rather than its 
weakening. Hence, 'war of nerves' can turn to be a threat if only it can find internal 
Third World Security," pp. 23-24, 27-28. 
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militant supporters: otherwise, the former's demands came to nothing as was in the 
case of the Soviet 'war of nerves' against Turkey. 
Although there are a variety of explanations within the framework of alliance 
theories, none of these theoretical explanations provide a sufficient answer to the 
question of "why Turkey allied with the Western bloc but not with the Soviet bloc or 
did not choose neutrality?" The realist and neo-realist schools of thought cannot offer 
a full answer to this question since thyy solely concentrate on external factors. 
According to this point of view, a state facing an external threat will either balance or 
bandwagon. It is commonly argued that because of the 'Soviet threat,' Turkey allied 
with the Western bloc.30 However, the extent of 'Soviet threat' against Turkey is 
debatable since there were no known Soviet war aims (to this date) for attacking 
Turkey in order to achieve control of the Straits as well as the Kars-Ardahan region, 
since the Soviet Union was war weary. There was no 'Soviet threat' against Turkey 
but only a perception of it by the Turkish military and civil bureaucrats. Obtaining 
control of the Straits and being the dominant power in the Mediterranean Sea was not 
a new Soviet policy. Russia tried to realize this aim 13 times in wars against the 
Ottoman Empire during the czarist era, which made clear that the Soviet Union was 
following the same lines· of the Imperial Russian policy by adding to this policy 
expansion of the Communist ideology if the situation was favorable. 31 Soviet 
demands on Turkey reached their peak during 1945 and continued until the Fall of 
! 9 Michael Barnett, "High Politics Is Low Politics The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli 
Security Policy, 1967-1977," World Politics XLII:4 (July 1990), pp. 532, 534-537, 543, 562. 
3° Ferenc V:ili, Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey, (Baltimore and London: 
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971) p. 173. V :iii argues that '"the Soviet demands and the manner of their 
presentation left no doubt in the Turkish mind that their aim was not only control of the Straits but 
also submission of Turkey to satellite status. Against such an immediate danger, Turkey sought 
protection in the arms of the West, principally of the US, through the political, military, and economic 
systems of the Atlantic area." Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia," in Robert Jervis 
and Jack Snyder (eds.) Dominoes and Bandwagones: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition 
in the Eurasian Rim/and. pp. 60-63. 
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1946. During these years, the Soviet Union demanded the Kars-Ardahan region as a 
means to gain bargaining leverage against Turkey, in order to bring the latter into 
bilateral talks for revising the Montreux Convention to favor the Soviet Union. Thus, 
there was no Soviet aim of territorial aggrandizement against Turkey. The Soviet 
tactic in these years was a 'war of nerves' which consisted of Soviet radio and press 
attacks against Turkey. There were also rumors of troop movements against Turkey, 
but these were never proven. It was obvious that the Soviet Union would desire the 
establishment of a 'friendly regime' in Turkey. However, there were no militant 
communist elements in Turkey, since the Turkish Communist Party was banned in 
1926 by Atattirk. Communism could not grow in a state like Turkey which was a 
non-industrialized, agricultural country, and composed of predominantly peasants 
and Muslim people. Moreover, the tenets of Communism were completely 
incompatible with the Muslim religion since Communism referred to atheism. 
Besides few people, if any, were aware of Muslim national Communism in the 
Soviet Union of the Mir Sultan Galiev type. Also, there was not a large labor class 
from where Communist ideas would be empowered. The Turkish romantic 
Communists were composed mainly of writers, artists, and academicians. Hence, 
Communism in Turkey was solely an intellectual exercise. Therefore, there was not 
much chance for the Soviet Union to export Communism to Turkey. Facing the firm 
opposition of the US and British governments to its note dated August 7, 1946, the 
Soviet Union, officially did not raise any demands over the Straits with the exception 
of the Soviet Navy's official publication, Red Fleet in April 1950. Hence, while 
Turkey was still trying to join NATO even though facing the opposition of the 
member countries, there were even no Soviet demands over Turkey, let alone threats. 
'' George McGhee. '"T•Jrkey Joins the West." Foreign Affairs 32:4 (July 1954), p. 619; Necmettin 
Sadak, "Turkey Fat:cs the Snviets:· Foreign Affairs 27:2 (April 1949). p. -l-59. 
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Dan Reiter's Learning theory argues that state behavior is determined by 
experiential learning. According to this, minor powers, when trying to decide 
whether to ally with a great power or stay neutral, look to formative events in 
choosing which strategy best protects state security. Hence, formative historical 
experiences rather than solely external threats determine the alliance decisions. 
Accordingly: if the formative alliance choice is successful, then there will not be an 
alteration regarding a state's alliance behavior. Hence, if neutrality proved to be 
unsuccessful, then that state will choose to form an alliance. Turkey, during WW II 
was nonbelligerent, which brought it success. Because, by choosing 
nonbelligerency, it avoided the costs of war, while being secure. However, after the 
war Turkey decided to ally with the Western bloc. For this reason, this theory cannot 
explain the Turkish case. It could explain Turkey's decision to ally after WW II, if it 
did not restrict the historical experiences by only looking to the formative events 
which were systemic wars of WW I and WW II. Because, one of the main reasons 
for Turkey's insistence to join NATO, was the historical experience that came from 
the Ottoman era which was the fact that diplomatic and military isolation cost the 
Ottoman Empire much. In 1911, Italy was offered to take Tripolitania and Cyrenaica 
as a price to renew the Triple Alliance with Germany. In WW I Ottoman Territories 
were apportioned by the secret treaties of Istanbul (March-April 1915), London 
(April 1915), Sykes-Picot (February 1916), and Saint Jean de Maurienne (April 
1917). The Istanbul Treaty was signed by Great Britain, France, and Russia during 
their meeting in St. Petersburg between March 4-April 10, 1915. Accordingly, 
Istanbul and the Straits were left to Russia's control. By the treaty of London of 
1915, Italy agreed to come into the war on the allied side. The 1916 Sykes-Picot 
treaty confirmed the French claim to Syria. The treaty of Saint Jean de Maurienne in 
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1917, contained promises for territorial gains for Italy included the Antalya and 
Aydm provinces of the Ottoman Empire. 32 Since Turkey was a newly established 
state and a weak power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Western countries, as well as 
having the experiences of the Ottoman era, it was suspicious of all powers. After 
WW II, the world was being divided between two great powers. The question for 
Turkey was where its place was to be in this division. Historical experience, as well 
as the continuous Soviet war of nerves against Turkey, made clear that it would be 
for the benefit of Turkey if it entered into a military alliance with the Western bloc to 
guarantee its national security. By this way, Turkey would tie both itself and the 
Western great powers into a military alliance through which it would avoid being 
bargained over or partitioned in a possible sphere of influence agreement between 
the great powers of the two blocs. Turkey did not know whether the USA and Great 
Britain were making concessions to the Soviet Union over Turkey at the end of WW 
II. Because, at the beginning of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, Churchill 
expressed his willingness to revise the Montreux Convention. Also, the US 
government was still regarding the Soviet Union as its war time ally. Hence, in the 
beginning it did not overtly object to the Soviet demands over Turkey. But we do not 
know yet as to how much Yalta and Potsdam discussions were known to the Turkish 
side, if at all. This raised suspicions among the Turkish military and civil bureaucrats 
who came from the Ottoman tradition. And, having the example of the Ottoman 
Empire as well as the recent event of the conclusion of the Spheres of Influence 
Agreement,33 between Churchill and Stalin, by which they divided the Central, 
32 Tevfik B1y1kloglu, "Birinci DUnya Harbi'nde (1914-1918) ve Mondros MUtarekesi S1ralannda (30 
Ekim 1918-11 Ekim 1922) Bogazlar Problemi," Belleten XXV:97-IOO (1961), p. 91; David Fromkin, 
A Peace to End A.II Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle 
East, (New York: Avon Books. 1989), p. 392. 
33 In October 1944. Rumania 90%, Hungary 80%, and Bulgaria 80'7c were conceded to the Soviet 
sphere of influence and Greece 90'7c to the British. Yugoslavia was to be divided equally. Hence the 
20 
Eastern and Southeast countries into spheres of influence, raised the Turkish 
anxieties that Turkey could be divided between these great powers. For Turkey, the 
cooperation of these two historic rivals might refer to its division between these great 
powers. Because, by concluding this agreement, Great Britain accepted that the 
Soviet Union had a sphere of influence along its periphery. And, there was the 
danger of the fact that Turkey could be left to the Russian sphere of influence by 
Britain as it did to Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary. 34 Therefore, as a small power 
Turkey saw alliance with the Western bloc as the only solution to guarantee its 
security. For this reason, even though no official Soviet demands were raised against 
Turkey after the Fall of 1946, Turkey insisted on becoming a member of NATO in 
spite of the hesitancy of the USA and resistance of Great Britain as well as other 
European countries regarding the extension of NATO to Turkey and Greece.35 
By entering NATO, Turkey would also feel secure against any possible Soviet 
aggression (though there were no signs of this) as well as the renewal of any future 
Soviet demands over Turkey. Hence, Stephen Walt's Balance of Threat theory which 
argues that facing an external threat states either choose to balance, ally with others 
against the prevailing threat or bandwagon, align with the source of danger, partially 
explains Turkey's alliance with the Western bloc. In this case, Turkey was not facing 
an external threat but, continuous Soviet war of nerves, which was the external 
reason of Turkey's alliance (balancing) with the Western bloc. 
Randall L. Schweller' s Balance of Interest theory does not offer a complete 
explanation of the Turkish case. Because, according to this theory, the alliance 
British and Russian policies were traditionally same. But, after WW II, Britain was not strong to 
maintain this policy thus, needed the US backing. 
34 Times, "The Balkan Outlook," October, 13, 1944; Times, "Anglo-Russian Aims in Balkans: Turkey 
and Need for Definition," October, 16, 1944. 
35 Nur Bilge Criss, 'Ttirk Dt~ Politikas1 ve Batt (l908-1945)," in Bilanro 1923-1998: Turkiye 
Cumhuriyeti'nin 75 Yilma Toplu Bak1§ Uluslaras1 Kongresi. (Ankara, ODTD Kiilti.ir ve Kongre 
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decision of a state is not determined by its security concerns but, by opportunities of 
gain and for profit. Accordingly, satisfied states which are security-maximizers, align 
and balance to preserve the status-quo, and the revisionist states which are profit-
maximizers choose to bandwagon to gain profit. Turkey, as a territorially satisfied 
state did not ally with the Soviet Union but, in order to preserve the status-quo allied 
with the Western bloc. 
However, Turkey's decision to join NATO cannot be explained by only 
concentrating on external factors. Because, domestic factors also played a crucial 
role. But, the theoretical explanations which emphasize to the importance of 
domestic factors of a state's decision to ally are not applicable to the Turkish case, 
because these theorists took their cases with the Third World states which makes 
their theories incompatible with the Turkish case. Among these theorists Steven 
David introduces the theory of Omnibalancing which argues that Third Wofld 
leaders, in order to provide for their political surviva~, decide to ally. In that case, 
their decision was determined by immediate and dangerous ·domestic threats against 
their leadership. For this reason, these leaders ally with their domestic opponents' 
international allies which makes Omnibalancing completely incompatible. with the 
Turkish case. Because, Turkey is not a Third World state since it has the heritage of 
the Ottoman Empire, and it has neither been a colony of another state, nor has it ever 
been composed of peoples without a state.36 A Western type of modern state was 
established by Atati.irk. And, there are no problems regarding the legitimacy of state 
leaders or social unrest within the state, to the extent that threatens the survival of the 
state. 
Merkezi, 10-12 Aralik 1998) (istanbul: Tarih Vakf1 Yurt Yaymlan. Forthcoming): Nur Bilge Criss, 
"Onsoz," in Melih Esenbel, Tiirk~ve 'nin Batz ile ittifakz, (istanbul: ISIS YaymeYi. Forthcoming) 
36 Suna Kili, Atatiirk Devrim: Bir <;agda~la~11za .\Jodeli, (Ankara: Tiirkiye i~ Bankasi Ki.ilti.ir 
Yaymlan. 1998). p. 127. 
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The main domestic factor which led to Turkey's entrance into NATO was the 
state policy of Westernization. Westernization is the constant foreign policy goal of 
the Turkish state. Therefore, Turkey has always expressed its desire to enter the 
military, political, and economic organizations of the West. After the War of 
Independence, the goal was the integration of the Turkish people into European 
civilization. Because, for Atati.irk Turkey could remain independent only by being a 
part of the Western world. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire was the obvious 
example that indicated what may happen when the ties between the Empire and 
Western Europe are broken. According to Atatiirk, those who failed to achieve 
modernization would eventually be dominated by the advanced nations. Economic 
development and industrialization have been parts of the Westernization policy. 
Atattirk argued that the maintenance of full independence of Turkey was dependent 
on its industrialization. However, first during WW II because of mobilization and 
then facing Soviet war of nerves, Turkey felt the necessity of maintaining large 
armed forces which drained nearly half of its budget which was the main obstacle to 
its industrialization. Therefore, Turkey wanted to distribute its military costs through 
joining NATO. By this way it would find the opportunity to modernize its army, and 
to be an industrialized country. The theorists Jack Levy and Michael Barnett, even 
though take their cases primarily from the Third World, can partially explain the 
economic aspect of Turkey's entrance into NATO. They argue that by choosing to 
depend on external alliance, the state gets economic and military aid from its ally and 
uses this aid both for its internal and external security needs. Unlike the Third World 
states, Turkey was not facing internal security problems since there were no domestic 
rivals to the leadership. However, this theory explains how Turkey's objective to 
distribute the costs of military preparation to provide for its external security needs, 
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played a significant role in its decision to enter NATO. Because, Turkey which was 
already receiving US economic and military aid was concerned about the possible 
reduction of this aid, especially after the establishment of NATO. By joining NATO, 
Turkey would continue to receive US military aid, hence, could distribute the costs 
of its defense expenditures while decreasing these costs to the society. 
In conclusion, both external and domestic factors played a crucial role for 
Turkey's decision to form an alliance with the Western bloc. The external factor was 
not the commonly argued 'Soviet threat' but the Turkish feeling of insecurity, after 
the experiences of the Ottoman Empire, as well as the continuous Soviet war of 
nerves against Turkey, and its desire to guarantee its national security. By joining 
NATO, Turkey tied itself as well as the Western great powers into a military 
. alliance. The Turkish Westernization policy which was also related to its aim of 
achieving industrialization, was the domestic factor for Turkey's entrance into 
NATO. By entering NATO, Turkey would be a member of a Western organization 
as a continuation of its Westernization nolicy this time in the military sense, and at 
the same time, it would distribute the costs of heavy defense burdens on its budget to 
its allies. Hence, it would achieve economic development and industrialization. 
1.3 Synopsis of the Chapters 
In the second chapter, the Soviet demands over Turkey from the Yalta Conference 
(February 4-11, 1945) up to their official end (April 1950) is examined in detail. 
This chapter also contains the content of the Soviet war of nerves against Turkey, its 
tactics to bring Turkey into bilateral discussions to revise the Montreux Convention 
in its favor, as well as the changes and continuities in the policies of the Turkish, US, 
and British governments against the Soviet demands. 
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The third chapter, discusses the extent of Soviet threat over Turkey. Then, it 
focuses on domestic reasons of Turkey's entrance into NATO which was its state 
policy of Westernization and related to this, its goal to achieve industrialization. The 
US economic and military aid to Turkey from 1946 up to the establishment of 
NATO; the alterations in the US foreign policy regarding the changed world 
conjuncture, and their effects on its policy to Turkey are examined. ·· 
The fourth chapter focuses on Turkey's endeavors to join to NATO which 
began from mid-1948 up to February 1952. The policies of the USA and Great 
Britain as well as other NATO members regarding Turkish membership are 
examined. 
The fifth chapter, as a summary makes an evaluation of Turkey's reasons for 
entering NATO and the effects of this membership on Turkey on a theoretical basis. 
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CHAPTER II 
SOVIET DEMANDS OVER TURKEY 
2.1 Introduction 
It is commonly argued that Turkey joined NATO because of Soviet threats. 
However, there was not a Soviet threat against Turkey but only demands. Also, Cecil 
V. Crabb evaluates the Soviet policy toward Turkey after WW II as, "some 
combination of Soviet pressures and intimidation directed against a vulnerable 
country."1 In order to achieve its historic policy goal of controlling the Straits and 
ensuring access to the Mediterranean, the Soviet Union pursued a continuous war of 
nerves against Turkey. This Soviet aim of controlling the Straits became obvious 
during Molotov-Ribbentrop-Hitler discussions, in November 12-13, 1940, in Berlin 
where the Soviet government demanded the revision of the Montreux Convention for 
having a greater freedom of passage for Soviet warships as well as bases in the 
Straits.2 In October 1944, Stalin during his conversation with Churchill, in Moscow, 
raised the issue of revising the Montreux Convention and the latter supported the 
Soviet demand. During the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Stalin once again 
brought up the question of revising the Montreux Convention. Roosevelt was not 
very knowledgeable about the problem, and Churchill favored the revision of the 
Montreux Convention. The USA still regarded the Soviet Union as its war time ally. 
The Near and Middle East region was of secondary importance for the USA, hence, 
1 Cecil V. Crabb, The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy: Their Meaning, Role, and Future, 
(Baton Rouge and London: Lousiana State University Press, 1982), p. l-l-7. 
1 Harry N. Howard, Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1974), pp. 163. 210. 
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it regarded the Soviet policy toward Turkey as an issue to be solved primarily by the 
Soviet Union and Great Britain as it had been in the past. Such exchanges, even if the 
details were not known, raised the anxieties of the Turkish government, having had 
the historical experiences of the Ottoman era, that it could be a bargaining point 
between great powers. This feeling of insecurity became the external factor of 
Turkey's alliance with the Western bloc. Since, especially after the Yalta 
Conference, the Soviet war of nerves was intensified against Turkey in order to bring 
it into bilateral discussions to revise the Montreux Convention in its favor. Within 
this framework, the Soviet Union denounced the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality 
of 1925, demanded the Kars-Ardahan region, continued its radio and press attacks 
against Turkey as well as creating rumors of troop movements as if it would wage 
war against Turkey although there were no signs of this. It took no steps to force 
territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Turkey. Having realized the real 
intention of the Soviet Union, after the Soviet note of August 7 1946, both the US 
and British governments took a firm stand against Soviet demands on the Straits. 
And, facing the firm objection of these two powers, after the Fall of 1946, the Soviet 
Union did not officially raise the revision of the Montreux Convention again. Hence, 
the Soviet war of nerves came to nothing to achieve control of the Straits. 
2.2 The Yalta Conference (February 4-11, 1945) 
During the Yalta Conference, specifically on February 10, 1945, the problem of the 
Turkish Straits once again was raised by Stalin who claimed that "he would like to 
say a few words about the Montreux Convention regarding the Dardanelles." 
According to Stalin, the Montreux Convention was "outmoded" and "needed 
revision" on the grounds that firstly, "the Japanese Emperor played a big part in the 
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treaty, even greater than that of the Soviet Union." Secondly, the treaty was 
connected with the League of Nations which no longer existed just like the Japanese 
Emperor was not present at the Yalta Conference, and thirdly, under the Montreux 
Convention Turkey had the right to close the Straits not only in time of war but if it 
felt that there was a threat of war. And lastly, Stalin mentioned the fact that the treaty 
had been drawn when relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union were not 
good. However, Stalin claimed that "he did not think now that Great Britain would 
wish to strangle Russia with the help of the Japanese." Stalin wanted the treaty to be 
revised in a manner which would consider the interests of Russia, but he did not 
propose anything specific on this issue in order not to prejudice decisions. Stalin 
claimed that "it was impossible to accept a situation in which Turkey had a hand on 
Russia's throat." But he also mentioned the importance of not damaging the 
legitimate interests of Turkey. Stalin suggested that the question of revising the 
treaty could be considered by the three Foreign Ministers at their first meeting since 
they were meeting periodically every two or three months.3 
President Roosevelt, by pointing to the US-Canadian border as an example for 
the solution of the Straits question, showed both his "idealism" and "ignorance of 
the Turco-Soviet relations."4 He said that for over a hundred years, the United States 
had a frontier of over 3,000 miles with Canada where neither any fort nor armed 
forces exist and suggested that the other frontiers in the world should be in this 
manner. 5 
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, 
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1955), pp. 903-904. 
4 Bruce Kuniholm. The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and 
Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 
p.219. 
5 FRUS, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 904. 
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The British Prime Minister Churchill, recalled that Stalin had mentioned this 
question in Moscow in October 1944. However, the Soviet government still had not 
presented its proposal on this subject. Churchill made clear that Great Britain shared 
the views of the Soviet Union regarding the necessity of revising or reconstructing 
the Montreux Convention without harming Turkey's independence. Churchill said, "I 
certainly feel that the present position of Russia-her Black Sea dependent on the 
narrow exit- is not satisfactory. I hope our Russian allies will make their proposal."6 
Hence, on February 11, 1945, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin agreed that the 
question of revision would be considered in London where the next meeting of the 
three Foreign Secretaries would be held. They should consider proposals regarding 
this question whereby it was understood that the Soviet Union would put forward in 
relation to the Montreux Convention and they would report to their governments. It 
was decided that at the appropriate moment the Turkish government should be 
informed that the subject was under discussion. And, 1n case of a change in the 
Montreux Convention, Turkey should be given a joint guarantee of its independence 
and unity. 7 
2.3 The Soviet Denunciation of the Treaty of Friendship and 
Neutrality of December, 1925 
On March 19, 1945, the Soviet Union denounced the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship and Neutrality of December 17, 1925, which signaled the resurrection of 
the Eastern Question. People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, 
Vyacheslav M. Molotov explained to the Turkish Ambassador to Moscow, Selim 
6 Ibid., p. 910. In October 1944, Stalin during his discussion with Churchill wanted Russian warships 
to have the right of passage at all times. And, Churchill claimed that in principle, the British 
government was not against '1 revision of the Montreux Convention. 
7 Ibid., p. 982; Herbert Feis. Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference, (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press. Publishers, 1983), p. 291. 
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Sarper, that the treaty was "out of date and required revision" since serious changes 
took place especially during the course of the Second World War, and this treaty "no 
longer corresponded to the new situation." Molotov mentioned the existing treaty 
between the Soviet Union and Great Britain, and the present diplomatic relations 
with the United States as examples so as to describe the changed world conditions. 
He suggested that the Soviet government wished to conclude a new treaty with 
Turkey which would correspond to the changed world conditions. 8 
The Turkish Ambassador to Moscow, Sarper requested Molotov's views 
regarding the manner by which the present treaty might be "improved." However, 
Molotov did not suggest any opinion and claimed that he would be glad to learn the 
response of the Turkish government on this issue.9 
Beyond this denunciation of the treaty, there was no detailed discussion of a 
new treaty. The Turkish government, expressed its desire to maintain ·and strengthen 
the relations between the Soviet Union and Tlirkey, and declared that it accepted the 
proposition of replacing the denounced agreement with a new one which would 
better serve to the mutual interests of the two countries. 10 
The foremost objective of the Soviet Union by denouncing the treaty of 
December, 1925, was to put pressure on Turkey in order to revise the Montreux 
Convention in its favor. The Soviet policy was being observed by the US 
Ambassador to Moscow, Averell W. Harriman who reported on March 21st to the US 
Secretary of State, 
In view of this Embassy, the main factors underlying Soviet policy 
toward Turkey at this moment are probably (a) the Soviet desire to obtain 
8 FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1969), p. 1223. According to the protocol of 
November 7, 1935 the treaty itself was renewed for 10 years, to be prolonged by tacit consent for 
further 2-year periods unless denounced 6 months before expiry. If therefore the treaty were not to 
remain operative until at least November 7, 1947 it would have to be denounced by one party or the 
other by May 7 of 1945, at the latest. FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, p. 1221. 
9 Ibid., p. 1222. 
10 Harry Howard, Turkey. the Straits and U.S. Policy, p. 216. 
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a revision of the regime of the Straits more favorable to Russian prestige 
and security than the present one and (b) the assumption that such 
revision will probably not be readily acceptable to Turkey and that 
considerable pressure may therefore eventually have to be applied. 11 
The US Ambassador in Turkey, Laurence A. Steinhardt, shared the same views 
with Harriman. He reported to the Secretary of State that "the decision of the Soviet 
government to terininate the Soviet-Turkish treaty of Friendship and Neutrality was 
accepted philosophically by the Turkish government as the forerunner of the 
inevitable request for a modification of the Montreux Convention." Also 
Ambassador Harriman reported that the "denounciation itself was not a surprise for 
the Turkish government." This was also observed by Harriman who stated that "It 
has been anticipated in Turkish circles in Moscow that the Russians would wish to 
denounce the treaty, and the Turkish Ambassador had advised his government to this 
effect 1 or 2 months ago. However, the circumstances in which it took place were 
unexpected."12 By denouncing the Turkish-Soviet treaty of Friendship and 
Neutrality, the Soviet government aimed to achieve bargaining leverage over Turkey, 
by which it would induce Turkey to enter into bilateral discussions to revise the 
Montreux Convention. 
Another tactic of the Soviet Union for gaining leverage over Turkey was its 
radio and press attacks. The Soviet government had already begun its radio and press 
attacks against Turkey immediately after the Yalta Conference, which had been 
increased especially after the denunciation of the Turkish-Soviet treaty of Friendship 
and Neutrality. At that time, the three sides of Turkey were surrounded by Soviet or 
pro-Soviet forces. Bulgaria (end of September 1944) and northern Iran were under 
11 FRUS. 1945, Vol. VIII, p. 1222. 
12 Ibid., pp. 1221-1223. 
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Soviet domination, and the Greek Communists were getting some Soviet support and 
were threatening to overthrow the existing government in Greece. 13 
Both Ambassador Sarper, and Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign 
Ministry, Feridun Cemal Erkin, discussed Soviet policy toward Turkey with 
Ambassador Sergey Alexandrovich Vinogradov on a number of occasions. Sarper 
expressed the desire of the Turkish government to enact another treaty of friendship 
with the Soviet government, "not like the one which had just been denounced." 
However, while Vinogradov accepted the fact that both countries should have some 
kind of treaty relationship, he claimed that the matter should be discussed with 
Molotov and the Foreign Ministry in Moscow, "which the Turkish government 
considered dangerous." 14 
While Turkey refrained from holding bilateral conversations with the Soviet 
Union, it tried to involve the United States and Great Britain by consulting with them 
in formulating its policy toward the Soviet Union. The Soviet aim of bringing Turkey 
to bilateral talks during the potential revision of the Montreux Convention by 
denouncing the treaty of friendship was also acknowledged by the US and British 
governments. 
The British Foreign Office viewed the Soviet termination of the Soviet-Turkish 
Treaty of Friendship as the first step in a Soviet plan to "soften" Turkey in order to 
bring it into bilateral discussions on the Straits. Therefore, the British government 
had advised the Turkish government to remind the "international nature" of the 
13 Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey, p. 172; David M. 
Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed: How Red Army Stopped Hitler, (Lawrence, 
Kansas: University Press of Kansas), p. 221. 
14 Harry Howard. Turkey. the Straits, and US Policy, pp. 216-217. 
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Montreux Convention to the Soviet government and state that Great Britain was also 
interested in the administration of the Straits. 15 
The American Ambassador to Turkey, Laurence A. Steinhardt, shared the 
views of the Turkish and British governments. On March 26, 1945, the Ambassador, 
in his telegram to the Secretary of State mentioned the fact that the Soviet Union 
viewed the control and the administration of the· Straits as a completely "Black Sea 
affair" and resented non-Black Sea powers as signatories of the Montreux 
Convention. The real intention of the Soviet Union was to force Turkey into bilateral 
discussions for revising the Montreux Convention by which it would make a fait 
accompli against Britain. According to Steinhardt, the Soviet Union would follow the 
same policy which it followed in 1939, which was continuous criticism of the 
Turkish government and press and radio attacks against Turkey, and rumors to alarm 
the Turks in order to "soften" the Turkish government and bring them into a bilateral 
mode to change the Montreux Convention in the way that the Soviet government 
wanted. Therefore, according to the Ambassador, the real Soviet aim was not 
territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Turkey but, to attain complete freedom 
of navigation for all types of vessels at all times for the Soviet Union, at the same 
time exclude the non-Black Sea powers from the Straits. Steinhardt enumerated the 
real intention of the Soviet Union regarding the Straits as follows: 
1. Joint free access to and egress from the Black Sea to Soviet vessels of 
every type in times of war as well as in times of peace while denying 
the same to non-Black Sea powers in times of war or threatened 
conflict. 
2. Automatically constitute Turkey an ally of the Soviet Union in any 
future war involving the Soviets. 
3. Oblige Turkey to sustain the first impact of any contemplated attack 
on the Soviet Black Sea ports. 
15 FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, pp. 1228-1229. 
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4. Eliminate Great Britain from any direct voice in the control and 
administration of the Straits. 
5. Enhance Soviet and diminish British prestige throughout the Balkans 
and the Middle East. 16 
Steinhardt also made clear that as a response to Soviet policy he expected that 
Turkey would seek the support of both Great Britain and the USA while resisting 
Soviet demands. The American Ambassador was right in his evaluation since, on 
March 31, during a conversation with Steinhardt, the Turkish Foreign Minister Hasan 
Saka, expressed his views regarding the Soviet policy toward Turkey. According to 
him, the Soviet government would try to bring Turkey into a bilateral discussion 
regarding the future of Turkish-Soviet relations, including the regime of the Straits 
which would be afait accompli for Britain. For Saka, in order to achieve its aims the 
Soviet government would apply to "its customary methods" which would be exertion 
of extreme pressure over Turkey by criticizing and denouncing the Turkish 
government through press, 'radio and by other means. But he made clear that the 
Soviet Union would not resort to force against Turkey since the Soviet losses against 
Germany during WW II were so great that it required large occupation forces in 
Germany, Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria as well as manpower which would be used 
for the reconstruction of Soviet cities, industries, railroads which it would not be able 
to spare. In addition to these, any Soviet attack would create an unfavorable position 
in the eyes of the world, thus, a Soviet attack against Turkey was unlikely. The 
Turkish Ambassador to Moscow, Sarper had also informed the American Charge in 
Turkey, Packer, that he did not believe that the Soviet Union had any desire to 
advance claims to Turkish territory in the Kars and and Ardahan region. For Sarper 
the Soviet government would press Turkey into bilateral conversations to revise the 
16 Ibid., pp. 1225-1228. 
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Montreux Convention but, he did not expect any attempt at coercion from the Soviet 
U . . T k 17 mon agamst ur ey. 
On April 4, 1945, the Turkish government declared its wish of maintaining and 
strengthening good neighborly relations and sincere friendship with the Soviet Union 
and declared its acceptance of the Soviet suggestion of replacing the expiring pact 
with another one which would be applicable fo the present interests of both states. 18 
Meanwhile, the Soviet war of nerves continued against Turkey. There were 
rumors of a Soviet attack against Turkey from Thrace. However, according to the 
British Foreign Office, "these stories were 'planted,' probably by the Russians in 
their current war of nerves since, it was fanciful to consider that Russia would launch 
an act of aggression against Turkey at the present juncture "even though this might 
not be the case in two or three years." 19 
Also, on April 11, 1945, the US Representative in Bulgaria, Maynard B. 
Barnes, reported to the Secretary of State that the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs gave assurances that so far as Bulgaro-Turkish relations were concerned, no 
change was planned. Nicola Antonov, the recently appointed Bulgarian Minister to 
Ankara, also assured the Turkish government that Bulgaria had neither the intention 
of altering its policy of good neighborly relations with Turkey, nor had any desire for 
adventure against Turkey. Antonov stated that there was no increase in the strength 
of Bulgarian and Russian military forces in southeastern Bulgaria. 20 
On June 7, 1945, Molotov informed Sarper, regarding the price of the new 
treaty between the Soviet Union and Turkey. Molotov claimed that to make it 
17 Ibid., pp. 1229-1230, 1233-1234. 
18 Ibid., p. 1231. 
19 Ibid. 
w Ibid., p. 1232. 
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possible for concluding a new treaty, there were some questions that had to be settled 
between the two states. 
The first question was the retrocession of Kars and Ardahan, which had been 
ceded to Turkey on October 13, 1921 21 , to the Soviet Union. Sarper refused to 
discuss any question affecting Turkey's territorial integrity. Molotov then stated that 
"they would lay the question aside for the time being but the Ambassador should 
understand that it remained unsettled." 
The second question was about the Straits. Molotov claimed that the Soviet 
government recognized that Turkey acted with goodwill during the war and 
conducted itself satisfactorily regarding the defense of the Straits. However, Turkish 
goodwill was not enough to guarantee the security of the Soviet Union. It was 
claimed that a people of 200,000,000 inhabitants could not depend solely on the 
goodwill of Turkey in this matter. Sarper asked what this meant: "Did it mean 
bluntly that Russia wished bases in Turkish territory? Molotov replied affirmatively." 
Then Sarper regretted that he could not discuss such a demand. 
The third question was the revision of the Montreux Convention. Molotov 
wanted a prior agreement between the Soviet Union and Turkey that at any future 
international conference for the revision of the Montreux Convention the two 
countries would stand together regardless of the views of other parties. Sarper 
reminded Molotov of the international nature of the Montreux Convention, and that 
there were other parties to the Convention. He claimed any such prior agreement 
would lead to mistrust of the other governments. However, Molotov insisted that 
since the Soviet Union and Turkey were independent countries, it was not necessary 
for them to ask the views of other powers on this matter. During the discussion of 
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this matter, Sarper was given the impression that if Turkey would break away from 
its alliance with Britain, then the Soviet government would not feel it necessary to 
insist on the three points which Molotov had raised. 
On June 18, 1945, during the second conference which took place between 
Molotov and Sarper, the Turkish government gave a firm negative response to 
Molotov since it refused to discuss any question of ceding Turkish territories as bases 
any more than it could agree with the Soviet proposal of concluding a private 
agreement regarding the Straits prior to holding an international conference. Sarper 
claimed that the Turkish government was not prepared to reopen the question of the 
Russo-Turkish Treaty of 1921 because it was freely negotiated. Secondly, he 
declared that the Turkish government could not grant bases to the Soviet Union in 
the Straits. Lastly, regarding the Montreux Convention, Sarper reiterated the 
international nature of the treaty, which made holding bilateral discussions 
impossible between the two states alone. Hence, Sarper indicated to Molotov that 
any treaty of friendship could be based on "mutual respect and esteem" between the 
two states but, could not be based on the questions that were raised by Molotov. He 
made this clear to Molotov by saying that the continuation of Soviet proposals would 
only draw these states further apart instead of creating a better understanding 
between them. Faced with this firm response, the Soviet Union eased its demands 
since Vinogradov informed the Turkish Acting Foreign Minister, Nurullah Sumer, 
that Molotov had "put aside" the territorial question. He also added that the Soviet 
Union did not need any additional territory but the Armenian Soviet Socialist 
Republic did. Siimer indicated the unacceptability of such a statement by the Turkish 
government, and reiterated that the Turkish government would like to draw up a new 
21 The Tsarist Russia took Kars and Ardahan after the war of 1877-78. In 1921 the Soviet Union 
returned these two provices to Turkey. Altemur K1ltry, Turkey and the World, (Washington, D.C.: 
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treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union provided that all territorial and other 
unacceptable provisions were left aside. 22 
On June 21, instructions were sent to the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, 
according to which he was authorized to indicate that "Turkey would attach value to 
a new treaty of friendship drawn up on a proper basis." Also, regarding the revision 
of the Montreux Convention the Turkish government demanded the- views of the 
Soviet Union in order to discuss these with the other interested states.23 
2.4 The Policies of the Great Britain and USA Until the Potsdam 
Conference 
Although at the end of the Yalta Conference the British government supported Soviet 
claims regarding the revision of the Montreux Convention, after the Soviet Union's 
termination of the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, it realized that Soviet policy 
was aimed at making a fait accompli for Great Britain. Since after WW II, Britain 
lost its previous power, it began to seek the cooperation of the USA for supporting 
Turkey and Greece. On June 18, the British Charged' Affaires, John Balfour, stated 
the British government policy regarding Soviet policy toward Turkey. He made 
clear, by emphasizing the Anglo-Turkish Treaty, that the British government 
supported the Turkish position since Molotov was acting in a conflictual manner 
with his statements at Yalta where Stalin had agreed that "appropriate assurances 
should be given to Turkey regarding the maintenance of her independence and 
integrity." Th~ British goverruPent declared its hope of creating a firm joint Anglo-
American approach regarding the problem before the meeting of the Big Three. 
Public Affairs Press, 1959), p. 117. 
22 FRUS, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 19./5, Vol. I, (Washington, D.C.: 
USGPO, 1960), pp. 1018, 1020-1021, 1024-1025. 
23 Ibid .. p. I 025. 
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However, since the Dardanelles was considered of secondary importance for 
US interests, the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (NEA), considered that 
the conversation between Sarper and Molotov was exploratory and was held in a 
friendly atmosphere. The US government regarded that it would be premature to 
protest what only amounted to a "preliminary exchange of views." The US State 
Department declared that it was not aware that any formal demands had been made 
by the Soviet Union of Turkey. The US government indicated that future 
conversations between Turkey and the Soviet Union would be conducted according 
to the principles of the International Security Organization. 24 
On the other hand, on June 20, 1945, the new US Ambassador in Turkey, 
Edwin Wilson, recommended to the Acting Secretary of State that the US 
government should express an interest in this question at the Big Three meeting in 
Moscow since the Soviet proposals were completely incompatible both with the 
spirit and principles of the new world organization in which the Soviet Union was 
expected to have a seat. Wilson expressed his view that he did not expect a military 
action against Turkey on the eve of the Big Three meeting. But, he suggested that the 
USA should firmly express its views regarding the matter.25 
After this inactive policy of the US government, Turkey began to claim that the 
Soviet Union was a threat to it on a number of occasions. On June 25, 1945, Sarper 
expressed his views to the US Ambassador in Moscow, Averell W. Harriman. Sarper 
indicated that the Soviet Union was not bluffing, and Soviet policy was designed to 
make Turkey a satellite of the Soviet Union like Poland. 26 
24 Ibid., pp. I 027-1028; David Alvarez, Bureacuracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United States 
and Turkey, 1943-1946, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studes, 1980). pp. 55-56. 
25 FRUS, The Potsdam Conference, 1945, Vol. I, p. 1023. 
26 Ibid., pp. I 029-1030. 
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Meanwhile, rumors of troop movements were continuing. On June 26, the 
Acting Foreign Minister, Nurullah Sumer, told the US Ambassador Wilson that the 
Soviet Army units were withdrawing from Poland and Hungary to Bulgaria and 
expressed that these military movements looked like potential threats. However, 
when Wilson asked him whether he really thought that the Soviet Union would take 
military action against Turkey on the eve of the Big three meeting, "he said frankly 
he doubted but Turkey could not be caught unprepared. "27 
The US regarded Soviet policy toward Turkey clearly as an issue between 
Britain and the Soviet Union and on June 29, 1945, declared its policy toward 
Turkey in a report. According to this report, because of its geographical position, 
Turkey had always been "an area of diplomatic, economic and military conflict 
between Britain and the USSR." This raised Turkish anxieties that Turkey could be 
abandoned by the West and might be divided between the two blocs; This feeling of 
insecurity which came from the time of the Ottoman Empire, was one of the main 
reasons for Turkey's insistence to join NATO by 1949. Because, in this way Turkey 
aimed to tie itself as well as the West into a military alliance, in order to avoid being 
a possible bargaining point between the powers. 28 
On June 27, 1945,.the US government declared that the foremost US interests 
in this problem w~re "(a) freedom of commerce and (b) the establishment of a 
regime of the Straits which would effectively promote the cause of world peace in 
accordance with the principles of the International Security Organization to which 
the US government was pledged." The US government on the one hand declared that 
it did not object to minor changes in the Montreux Convention regarding the transit 
and navigation of warships from the Straits and their right to sojourn in the Black 
27 Ibid., p. I 031. 
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Sea. On the other hand, the US government also declared that there was no 
justification for the USSR to propose major changes in the Convention because, the 
Montreux Convention had proved that it was a successful regime. The problems that 
occurred during WW II were the result of the Axis control of the region but not 
because of the shortcomings of the Convention. The US government argued that any 
major change in the Convention required the free consent of the Turkish government. 
Otherwise it would be violation of Turkish sovereignty, and the Convention which 
was drafted during the League of Nations' tenure could be easily adapted to the 
International Security Organization. The US government declared that it would not 
remain silent in case any state took steps against the independence and integrity of 
Turkey at the Big Three meeting.29 
On June 30, 1945, the US government put forth in Potsdam its preferences 
regarding possible changes in the Montreux Convention: 
1 . In time of peace the Straits would be open to commercial vessels of all 
nations. 
2. In time of peace the Straits would be open for ingress or egress of war 
vessels of Black Sea powers. 
3. In time of peace there should be certain restrictions upon the aggregate 
strength in the Black Sea at any one time of the war vessels of non-
riparian Black Sea powers. 
4. During a war in which one or more of the Black Sea riparian powers is 
involved, no war ships of any non-riparian power shall be admitted 
into the Black Sea without the consent of the riparian power or powers 
at war, unless they are moving under the direction of the UNO. 
5. During time of war, regardless of whether one or more of the Black 
Sea powers is involved, the war vessels of the Black Sea riparian 
powers shall have free ingress and egress through the Straits in the 
absence of contrary directions of the UNO. 
6. No power other than Turkey shall be granted the right to have a 
fortification on the Dardanelles or to maintain any bases in the 
Dardanelles without the free consent of Turkey. 
7. Regardless of the points above, if Turkey is at war or threatened with 
imminent danger of war the passage of warships shall be left entirely 
28 Ibid .• pp. 1016-1017; David Alvarez, Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The US and Turkey, 
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to the discretion of the Turkish government unless the course taken by 
Turkey under this provision is interdicted by the UN0.30 
Ambassador Wilson was urging the US government to pursue a more active 
policy since it was necessary to take the demands of the USSR into consideration 
regarding the Kars and Ardahan provinces (Kars and Ardahan were lost to Russia in 
the war of 1877-1878) as well as bases in the Straits ... According to Wilson "it was a 
matter of prestige for present Soviet government to recover what Czarist regime 
formerly held." Furthermore these territories had high strategic value because of their 
geographical position. The fact that the Straits could be controlled by air power 
based on the Greek Islands made the Soviet demand of bases in the Straits invalid. 
Hence, he expected that the Soviet claims related to its security could be extended to 
the Aegean and in this case the whole debate could be extended from the Black Sea 
to the Mediterranean, Suez, and Gibraltar. Wilson also mentioned the fact that 
Eastern Europe had been lost to the Soviet Union, arid the US interests in the Middle 
East as well as its interests in world cooperation and security required support for 
Turkey to resist these demands which would affect its independence. 31 
On July 17, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), in a memorandum to the 
-
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), drew attention to Soviet policy 
in Poland, the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Ruthenia, and indicated that the Soviet 
Union would seize by the use of force what was not granted to it by agreement. 
However, it accepted that its current demands and proposals were not exactly in the 
same category, and that it was war-weary, over-extended by great efforts and in need 
of years to reestablish its economy, a process which required US support and 
assistance. Therefore, the JCS offered that the policy should be revision of the 
30 Ibid., pp. 1014-1015. 
31 Ibid., pp. 1033-1034, 1041-1042. 
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Montreux Convention along the lines which were proposed by the State Department, 
and support for the demilitarization of the Straits, and if this failed, the USA should 
refuse to grant to any other state other than Turkey, to have bases or other rights for 
direct or indirect military control of the Straits. 32 
2.5 Turkey's Response Toward British and US Policies Until the 
Potsdam Conference 
The Turkish government feared of abandonment by the USA and to be left as a 
matter to be solved between Great Britain and the Soviet Union, expected from the 
USA to pursue a more active policy regarding the Soviet desires on Turkey. For this 
reason, the Turkish government criticized US policy on a number of occasions. For 
instance, on June 2, 1945, Prime Minister Siikrii Saracoglu expressed his views 
regarding US policy. He said that he could not believe that the USA required from 
Turkey to continue further discussions with the USSR on issues regarding the 
cession of Turkish territories and bases. He made clear that Turkey was ready to 
discuss the revision of the Convention, but it would fight in case the Soviet Union 
made any attempt against the independence of Turkey. He gave Bornholm, Trieste, 
Albania, Greece, Iran, and Turkey as examples of Soviet tendency towards world 
domination and required the establishment of a firm policy by the USA and Britain 
against the USSR. Regarding the discussions with Molotov, Saracoglu emphasized 
the fact that Molotov had left the door open in conversations with Sarper in order to 
have a chance to retreat if it was necessary. Since Molotov did not explicitly raise the 
question of bases on the Straits, during the conversation he talked around the 
question of security it was Sarper who asked if he meant bases. Then, Molotov 
replied affirmatively. Also, Molotov did not mention specifically Kars and Ardahan 
'
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but, claimed that the treaty of 1921 had to be rectified, because it was negotiated 
when the Soviet Union was weak. 33 The door was left open by which the Soviet 
Union would gain bargaining leverage over Turkey during a possible negotiation. 
On July 7, 1945, the Turkish Ambassador to the USA, Hiiseyin Rag1p Baydur, 
talked with the Acting Secretary of State, Joseph Grew, during which Baydur 
criticized US policy toward the Soviet demands against Turkey. Baydur asked Grew 
if the Soviet government demanded from the US to cede to it the cities of Boston and 
San Francisco, would the US still consider such a demand not a threat but a matter of 
negotiation. Grew replied definitely in the negative. Then, Grew asked whether the 
Soviet government specified the nature of the frontier rectification which it desired 
and whether its demands were yet of such a concrete nature as to be regarded as open 
threats." Baydur repeated the Soviet desire for the rectification of the treaty of 1921, 
by claiming that when it was concluded the Soviet Union was weak. This pointed to 
the obvious desire of the Soviet Union for the return of Kars and Ardahan. Baydur 
made clear that Turkey would not cede any territory to the Soviet Union. 34 
On July 11, 1945, Foreign Minister Hasan Saka, in his conversation with 
Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Minister, characterized the Soviet policy toward 
Turkey as "sinister" since he believed that the fourth but unspecified demand which 
was mentioned by Molotov was aimed to bring Turkey economically and politically 
into the Soviet orbit. Eden mentioned the bargaining tactics of the Soviet government 
as often expressing demands in extreme terms. When Saka asked whether the 
revision of the Montreux Convention and related matters would be a matter of 
discussion at the Big Three meeting, he was told that that was planned but, it could 
not be foreseen how these discussions would develop. However, it was felt that the 
33 FRUS, The Potsdam Conference, 19-15, Vol. I, pp. 1034-1036. 
34 Ibid .. pp. 1044-1046. 
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question of the revision of the ~fontreux Convention and the question of bases and 
territorial changes should be kept separate and be dealt with separately.35 
Meanwhile, Soviet war of nerves was continuing against Turkey. There were 
rumors of large increase of Soviet troops in Bulgaria which was regarded by the 
British Foreign Office as a part of war of nerves on Turkey. The Foreign Office did 
not think that there would be further Soviet diplomatic maneuvers against Turkey 
before the Big Three meeting.36 
2.6 The Potsdam Conference (July 17-August 2, 1945) 
During the plenary session on July 22, 1945, the subject of the Straits came up when 
Churchill claimed that he agreed with Stalin for a revision of the Montreux 
Convention. He also made clear that he was ready to accept the free movement of the 
Russian ships of all types through the Black Sea and back. Hence, Churchill opened 
the discussion in a friendly manner. But, he also warned the Soviets not to alarm 
Turkey since the Turkish government was quite alarmed by the concentration of 
Soviet troops in Bulgaria, by the continuous press and radio attacks against Turkey 
as well as Soviet demands of territory and bases from Turkey during the Molotov-
Sarper conversations. Churchill said that he had understood that these were not 
demands on Turkey by the Soviet government since the Turkish government asked 
for an alliance with the Soviet Union Molotov had stated the conditions for such an 
alliance. But, the Turkish government was alarmed by the conditions that were put 
forward by Molotov. Molotov claimed that it was the Turkish government which 
took the initiative and had proposed an alliance. Stalin declared that the Soviet 
government would not object to the conclusion of a treaty of alliance if the two 
35 Ibid., p. I 050. 
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conditions were met which were the retrocession of the treaty of 1921, and the 
revision of the Montreux Convention. Stalin also indicated that after solving these 
two questions, the Soviet Union was ready to settle any questions which would be 
raised by Turkey. However, if Turkey was not prepared to make an agreement on 
these two questions, the Soviet government would take the initiative and would make 
an agreement on the Straits alone with the Black Sea powers.37 
The Soviet delegation proposed that the Montreux Convention should be 
revised as it no longer corresponded to the present time conditions. Secondly, the 
determination of the regime of the Straits should be decided by Turkey and the 
Soviet Union since they were chiefly concerned and able to ensure the freedom of 
commercial navigation and the security in the Black Sea Straits. And thirdly, Turkey 
and Soviet Union should prevent through their "common facilities" the use of the 
Straits by the other states for purposes which were inimical to the Black Sea powers 
which referred to the establishment of Soviet military bases in the Straits in addition 
to Turkish military bases.38 
Churchill stated that this proposal went far beyond the discussions between 
Eden, himself, and Stalin. Molotov pointed to the existence of similar treaties of 
1798, 1805 and 1833 which existed between Russia and Turkey. Churchill made 
clear that the British government was not prepared to push Turkey to accept the 
Soviet proposals. 39 
On July 23, 1945, Churchill stated that the British government could not accept 
the establishment of a Soviet base on the Straits, and claimed that he expected that 
Turkey would also refuse such a demand. However, Stalin reiterated that "Turkey 
36 Ibid., p. I 043. 
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was too weak to guarantee the possibility of free passage in case any complications 
arose, the Soviet Union would like to see them defended by force." Stalin gave the 
Panama and the Suez Canals as examples in order to convince that force was 
necessary, and suggested some other base where the Soviet fleet could protect the 
Straits would also be acceptable to the Soviet Union in cas;;: the naval bases on the 
Straits were·-unacceptable to the Turkish government. 
President Truman argued that the Montreux Convention should be revised in 
a way which would guarantee that the Straits would be a free waterway open to the 
whole world which should be guaranteed by all "of us." He drew the attention to the 
fact that all the wars of the last 200 years had originated in the area from the Black 
Sea to the Baltic and from the eastern frontier of France to the western frontier of 
Russia, and in the last two instances peace in the whole world had been overturned. 
According to him, it should be the business of the Potsdam Conference and of the 
coming peace conference to prohibit the occurrence such wars again. According to 
Truman, this could be achieved by providing free passage of goods and vessels 
through the Straits as had also been the case in American waters.40 Therefore, the 
Montreux Convention had to be revised which would provide freedom of intercourse 
in all that section. Truman claimed that he would like to see Russia, Britain and the 
USA have access to all seas in the world. He regarded the territorial dispute (Kars 
and Ardahan) between the Soviet Union and Turkey as a problem that could be 
settled between these states, but the question of the Black Sea Straits was a question 
which concerned the USA and the whole world. Churchill said that he completely 
agreed with Truman.41 At that time, the US concern was the creation of an 
39 FRUS, The Potsdam Conference. June 18-August 2, 1945, Vol. II, pp. 256-258. 
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economically sound Europe in which the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France as well 
as other countries could trade profitably. 42 
On July, 23, 1945, the US delegation submitted a proposal of "free and 
unrestricted navigation of international inland waterways." Accordingly, 
The establishment of interim navigation agencies for the Danube and the 
Rhine which would provide the restoration and improvement of 
navigation facilities on the river concerned, the supervision of river 
activities in the interest of equal treatment for various nationalities and 
the establishment of uniform regulations concerning use of facilities, 
rules of navigation, customs and sanitation formalities, and other similar 
questions. Membership on these agencies should include the US, the UK, 
the USSR, France and the sovereign riparian states recognized by these 
governments.43 
Stalin's main objective was to control access to the Mediterranean by getting a 
military base in Turkey. And, for that purpose, he was ready to make concessions 
regarding the place of such a base. At a banquet, Stalin asked Churchill "If you find 
it impossible to give us a fortified position in the Marmora, could we not have a base 
at Dedeagatch (in Eastern Thrace)?" Churchill replied carefully as he claimed "I will 
always support Russia in her claim to the freedom of the seas all the year round."44 
On July 24, 1945, Stalin replied to the US proposal concerning "inland 
waterways" negatively by retorting that it did not deal with the Turkish Straits but 
dealt with the Danube and the Rhine. According to Stalin, the US proposal was too 
broad since it offered the joint control of the US, the UK, the USSR, France, and 
other riparian powers. Therefore, Stalin asked to postpone the question of the 
Turkish Straits because the question was not ready for discussion. The necessity to 
hold discussions with the Turkish government was also agreed to by the Big Three. 45 
42 Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference, p. 298. 
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On August 2, 1945, the Potsdam Protocol provisions concerning the "Black 
Sea Straits" were signed at Berlin. Accordingly, 
1. The US, UK, and USSR agreed that the Montreux. Convention should 
be revised since it failed to meet present-day conditions. 
2. It was also agreed that as the next step this matter should be the subject 
of direct conversations between each of the three governments and the 
Turkish government.46 
The Potsdam Conference, despite its inconclusive results was a turning point in 
the debate over the Straits. Truman made clear that the USA was ready to assume 
responsibility for the resolution of the problem. Although, the US policy was 
"vague," it at least indicated to the Soviet Union that the USA would be an obstacle 
to Soviet ambitions. Britain welcomed American participation, which would create 
an obstacle to the Soviet Union in the region. Turkey also welcomed US 
participation since it always regarded the USA as an unselfish friend, hence, it sought 
US involvement in the problem from the beginning.47 
On August 9, 1945, Truman reiterated the US policy that had been formulated 
during the conference in a report according to which 
One of the persistent causes of wars in Europe in the last two centuries 
has been the selfish control of the waterways in Europe. I mean the 
Danube, the Black Sea Straits, the Rhine, the Kiel Canal, and all the 
inland waterways of Europe which border on two or more states. 
The US proposed at Berlin that there be free and unrestricted navigation 
of these inland waterways. We think this is important to the future peace 
and security of the world. We proposed that regulations for such 
navigation be provided by international authorities. 
The function of the agencies would be to develop the use of the 
waterways and assure equal treatment on them for all nations. 
Membership on the agencies would include the US, Great Britain, the 
Soviet Union, France, plus those states which border on the waterways. 48 
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The Turkish Prime Minister, Siikrii Saracoglu, declared that the Turkish 
government would accept the internationalization of the Straits if this would not 
impair Turkish sovereignty and if there would be an alteration in the Soviet attitude 
toward Turkey as a result. Although the US proposal of "inland waterways" was not 
satisfactory, Turkey did not reject it since it needed the assistance of the USA and 
Britain. The rejection would result in the isolation of Turkey "in the face of the 
USSR."49 
On September 3, 1945, the US submitted its draft proposal to Turkey and the 
UK. According to this: 
1. the Straits would be open to merchant vessels of all nations at all 
times, 
2. the Straits would be open to the warships of Black Sea powers at all 
times, 
3. the Straits would be closed to the warships of non-Black Sea powers at 
all times, except with the specific consent of all of the Black Sea 
powers, 
4. creation of minor changes to bring the Montreux Convention in line 
with present day conditions, such as the substitution of the UN from 
the League of Nations and the elimination of Japan as a signatory.50 
The US Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, stated to Truman that the USA 
should not recommend the neutralization of the Turkish Straits, because if the USA 
requested from Turkey to dismantle its fortifications and agree to the neutralization 
of the Straits, it should also guarantee to give assistance to Turkey in case it would be 
attacked. He also reminded that reliance on the UN was not sufficient because with 
the veto power of the permanent members in the Security Council such action could 
be denied. 51 
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On September 25, 1945, Ambassador Wilson, reporting to the Secretary of 
State, stated that, the development of air power made possible control of the Straits 
by air power based on the Greek Islands, e.g. Crete which could deny effective use of 
the Straits to the Soviet Union. Therefore, according to Wilson the real aim of the 
Soviet Union was not related to the revision of the Straits but, to bring Turkey under 
.. its domination by changing its internal regime. He emphasized the fact that Turkey 
was the only country which bordered on the Soviet Union and was not governed by a 
"friendly" to Moscow regime. A "friendly" regime in Turkey under Soviet 
domination referred to the actual control of the Straits by the USSR which would 
mean the termination of the Turkish-British alliance and the end of western liberal 
influences in Turkey as well as in the Middle East. Wilson regarded the Soviet troop 
movements, and the radio and press attacks against Turkey as a means to "soften up" 
Turkey, because these led Turkey to maintain large mobilized forces which caused 
high economic burdens. But, none of these tactics were successful. However, 
Wilson warned that any agreement which would give the S~viet Union a privileged 
position in the Straits would be dangerous for the security of Turkey and lead to the 
downfall of the present regime whereby it would eventually become a satellite of the 
.. 
USSR.52 On October 23, 1945 he pointed out that the Soviets might have already 
decided to use force against Turkey at an early date. But implementation of this 
decision would be based on opportunism rather than the expiration of the treaty in 
1945.53 
Meanwhile, the Soviet war of nerves was continuing against Turkey. On 
October 8, 1945, the US Charge in Moscow, George Kennan, reported to the 
Secretary of State that the Naval section of the US military mission reported that at 
52 Ibid., pp. 1248-1249. 
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three Moscow factories workers had been informed that the Soviet Union might have 
to fight Turkey. According to Kennan, ''domestic agitation might be designed to 
distract public attention from internal conditions, to explain continued military 
production and to increase factory output." Kennan also mentioned that these might 
be tactics to soften up Turkey. However, on the other hand, he also warned that "the 
reports deserve careful attention" and they could not be ignored as "only ··idle 
·4 gossip."' 
The US did not expect an armed attack against Turkey by the Soviet Union. 
The US Ambassador in the USSR, Harriman, evaluated Soviet policy regarding 
Turkey and indicated that the immediate effect of the expiration of the treaty on 
November 7 would be intensification of the war of nerves against Turkey.ss 
On the other hand, the Turkish government was very anxious over Soviet 
concentration of troops in Bulgaria and Rumania since the day of the expiration of 
the treaty was approaching. Saka, while admitting that these troop movements were 
components of the Soviet war of nerves against Turkey, also mentioned the real 
possibility of a sudden military action against Turkey. The Turkish government 
consulted with the USA and UK regarding these troop movements. The British 
Ambassador, Sir Maurice Peterson, evaluated the situation as the continuation of the 
Soviet war of nerves. He claimed that the Soviets might feel their troops were 
unpopular in the Balkans, hence they should be kept on the move from one country 
to another. However, he also added that the possibility of a Soviet attack should not 
be ignored. 56 
According to Wilson, it would be illogical for the Soviets to attack Turkey. 
However, there were factors which could lead to an illogical decision such as the 
54 Ibid .. p. 1252. 
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Turkish refusal of the Soviet demands, which might make the situation difficult for 
the Soviet government to retire gracefully and save political face since the Soviet 
government was continuing its claims on Turkey. 57 
As a response to the anxieties of Turkey, Molotov stated to Harriman that the 
Soviet Union did not have any intention of attacking Turkey, "it was unthinkable that 
there should be a war between the Soviet Union and Turkey and he was surprised 
·s that people would print such a rumor."' 
On November 2, 1945, the US government formally presented an American 
note to Ankara, London, and Moscow regarding the agreement reached at Potsdam 
and the principles enunciated by Truman. Accordingly, the Montreux Convention 
required revision and this problem should be left to direct conversations between 
each of the three. governments of the USA, UK, USSR, on the one hand, and the 
Turkish government on the other. According to the US government, the problem of 
the Straits could be solved by promoting international security and taking into 
consideration the interests of Turkey and all Black Sea riparian states and by 
securing the free use of this important waterway to the commerce of all nations. The 
US government proposed that the Montreux Convention was subject to revision in 
- -
1946 in a conference in which the USA was willing to participate if it would be 
invited. The USA proposed the following principles as a basis for equitable solution 
of the question of the Straits: 
I. The Straits to be open to merchant vessels of all nations at all times; 
2. The Straits to be open to the transit of the warships of Black Sea 
powers at all times; 
3. Save for an agreement limited tonnage in time of peace, passage 
through the Straits to be denied to the warships of non-Black Sea 
56 Ibid., pp. 1260-1262. 
57 Ibid. 
58 !hid .. P- 1263. 
53 
powers at all times, except with the specific consent of the Black Sea 
powers or except when acting under the authority of the UN; and, 
4. Certain changes to modernize the Montreux Convention, such as the 
substitution of the UN system for that of the League of Nations and 
the elimination of Japan as a signatory.59 
On November 5, 1945, Erl<in discussed the US proposal on the Straits in which 
he saw three difficulties with the British Ambassador. The first difficulty was that 
there was no indication of how the Black Sea powers would decide whether or not 
warships of non-Black Sea powers were to enter the Black Sea Secondly, Turkey 
might find the whole Soviet and possibly satellite navies in the territorial waters of 
Istanbul at one and the same time, and lastly, with the American proposals the Black 
Sea would turn to be a Russian naval base from which the Soviet navy could make 
hit and run expeditions into the Mediterranean without danger of pursuit. However, 
Erkin indicated that the US proposal would be more acceptable for Turkey than the 
earlier ideas of demilitarization and internationalization.60 Therefore, on November 
12, 1945, the Turkish government declared that in principle it accepted the US 
suggestions, and details were subject to discussions at the conference. Erkin, 
regarding the first point said that Turkey completely supported the freedom of 
passage. However, in time of war, in case Turkey was belligerent, "it would be 
difficult to expect Turkey to permit the passage of the merchant vessels of neutral 
powers carrying munitions and supplies destined for country at war with Turkey." 
Regarding the second point, Erkin claimed that the complete freedom of warships of 
the Black Sea powers at all times could result in Soviets' sending their overwhelming 
naval force through the Bosphorus for a surprise attack on Istanbul. Therefore, he 
suggested that there should be a formula regarding the tonnage of warships of other 
59 Harry Howard, Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy, pp.235-236; FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, pp. 1265-
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Black Sea powers for transit through the Straits. Also, the second point could lead 
the possibility of the Black Sea powers to send their navies through the Straits to 
attack some port in the Mediterranean and take refuge in the Straits where non-Black 
Sea powers could not pursue them. Regarding the third point, there would be 
procedural difficulties for obtaining the consent of the Black Sea powers for the 
passage of warships of non-Black Sea powers through the Straits. 61 
The USSR, while continuing its war of nerves against Turkey, did not present 
its proposal regarding the Straits. The Soviet government, informally expressed the 
. view that the US proposal did not change the Montreux Convention, and declared 
that it should have more than "paper guarantees" in the region of the Straits. 
According to Vinogradov, the US proposal failed to offer security to the Soviet 
Union. Since, the Soviet view was that Turkey was too weak to deny the passage of 
warships through the Straits of non-Black Sea powers, it could not trust Turkey to 
fulfill this obligation. Vinogradov reiterated Soviet policy during the Potsdam 
Conference, and demanded bases on the Straits.62 
The British government, even though it questioned the idea of excluding the 
passage of non-Black Sea warships into the Black Sea, on November 21, declared to 
Turkey that it agreed witq. the. US proposals. Accor9ing)o the British government, 
revision of the Convention was necessary but was not "particularly urgent." 
However, Britain indicated that it would participate in a conference if the Soviet 
Union and Turkey wanted to hold a conference. 
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Despite misgivings, on December 6, 1945, Saracoglu stated that the Turkish 
government accepted the US proposal as a basis for discussion if the independence, 
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Turkey would not be damaged. 63 
The Soviet Union was continuing its war of nerves. On December 20, 1945, 
two Georgian professors who were members of the Soviet Academy of the Georgian 
Republic wrote in Pravda, Izvestia, and Red Star and argued that the Turkish 
territories of Ardahan, Artvin, Oltu, Turtum, Bayburt, Gumushane, Giresun, and 
Trabzon belonged to the Georgian Republic. This was followed by the 
announcement of the Soviet Union that it would grant facilities to Armenians abroad 
who wished to immigrate to the Armenian SSR. According to Wilson and Acheson, 
the Soviet plan was intended to bring a large number of people to the Armenian SSR 
by which they would then reinforce for annexation of eastern Turkish provinces. 64 
During the Moscow Conference on December 16-26, 1945, the Straits problem 
was not formally discussed but, Bevin stated to Byrnes that Britain could not be 
"indifferent to the Russian threat to Turkey and would stand by her." It was 
unacceptable for Britain to give bases to the USSR on the Straits and cession of Kars 
and Ardahan to the Soviets. 65 
On August 7, 1946, the Soviet Union sent its note to Turkey regarding the 
revision of the Montreux Convention. The Soviet government gave four instances of 
Turkish "neglect" during WW II which made it necessary to revise the Montreux 
Convention as proposed at Potsdam. "First one occurred on July 9, 1941, when 
Turkey allowed a German craft named "Seefalke" to pass through the Straits to the 
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Black Sea. The second one happened in August 1941, when an Italian "auxiliary 
ship" named "Tarvisio" passed through into the Black Sea. The third one occurred 
on November 4, 1942, when the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara warned the Turkish 
government that 140,000 tons of German shipping (auxiliary warships disguised as 
merchant ships) were about to pass through the Straits, and lastly, in June 1944 the 
Soviet Ambassador in Ankara protested the passage, in May and June of 1944, of 
eight ships of the "Ems" type and five ships of the "Kriegs transport" type, from the 
Black Sea-where they were used for military purposes-into the Aegean Sea."66 
According to the Soviet government's interpretation what was agreed at the 
Berlin Conference (Potsdam Conference) was that direct negotiations between each 
of the three powers and the Turkish government would be held. However, in reality, 
it was agreed that bilateral conversations but not bilateral negotiations would be held 
between each of the three powers and the Turkish government. 
The Soviet government proposed that: 
I. The Straits should be always open to the passage of merchant ships of 
all countries. 
2. The Straits should always be open to the passage of warships of the 
Black Sea powers. 
3. Passage through the Straits for warships not belonging to the Black 
Sea powers shall not be permitted except in cases specially provided 
for. 
4. The establishment of a regime of the Straits, as the sole sea passage, 
leading from the Black Sea and to the Black Sea, should come under 
the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea powers. 
5. Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers most interested and 
capable of guaranteeing freedom to commercial navigation and 
security in the Straits, shall organize joint means of defense of the 
Straits for the prevention of the utilization of the Straits by other 
countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea powers.67 
66 Ahmet Si.ikri.i Esmer, "The Straits: The Crux of World Politics," Foreign Affairs 25:2 (January 
1947), p. 298; FRUS, The Near East and Africa, 1946, Vol. VII, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1969), 
pp. 827-828. 
67 Ibid .. p. 829. 
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On August 9, 1946, the US government commented that the Soviet proposal 
ignored the existence of the UN and did not admit the interest of the non-Black Sea 
powers in the Straits. Regarding the accusation towards Turkey during WW II, 
according to the Montreux Convention, any surface vessel under 100 tons was not 
recognized as a warship. Hence, the "Ems" class boats which were 40 to 50 tons 
were fiot warships according to the Montreux Convention. The "Kriegstransport" or 
"Mannheim" class boats were about 800 tons but, according to Steinhardt's telegram 
on June 15, 1944, "neither type of vessel was specifically covered by the Montreux 
Convention" which made clear that the Montreux Convention's definition of war 
vessels was out of date. Hence, Turkey did not violate the Convention because, in 
general, the Turkish government policy in the period of Axis ascendancy was stiffly 
correct, favoring neither side and only Allied fortunes led Turkey to interpret the 
Montreux Convention more and more in favor of the Allies. It was the German 
occupation of the Greek Islands that created an obstacle to the passage through the 
Straits during the war, not the letter of the Montreux Convention. The Soviet 
government did not propose the revision of the Montreux Convention, but the 
establishment of a new regime which excluded the non-Black Sea powers and the 
UNO by proposing the defense of the Straits would be only be a Turkish-Soviet 
responsibility. 68 
Saka said to Wilson that without consulting the USA and UK, Turkey would 
not reply to the Soviet note.69 According to Wilson, the real objective of the Soviet 
Union was not to revise the Montreux Convention, but to destroy Turkish 
independence by introducing to Turkey its armed forces with the ostensible aim of 
enforcing the joint control of the Straits and establishing a "friendly" regime to it and 
68 Ibid., pp. 830-832. 836. 
69 Ibid .. p. 83-k 
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make Turkey its satellite. Hence, the maintenance of Turkish independence was a 
vital interest for the USA, because if the former fell under Soviet control the last 
barrier would be removed and the Soviet Union would easily advance to the Persian 
Gulf and Suez. For Wilson, luckily the "Turks were tough obstinate people, 
determined to defend their position. They represent great asset in struggle 
maintaining peace, stability Middle East and the US should ·n.ot permit this asset to be 
frittered away."70 The Acting Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, also shared the same 
views that of Wilson since he said that in case the Soviet Union succeeded in its aim 
to obtain control over Turkey it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to prevent 
the Soviet Union from obtaining control over Greece and over the whole Near and 
Middle East. Therefore, the establishment of Soviet bases in the Straits would lead to 
the fall of Greece, the whole Near and Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean 
under Soviet control. Since the Near and Middle East was strategically important 
from the point of view of resources, mainly oil, and for communications, it would be 
the vital interest of the USA not to permit the USSR to realize its unilateral plans by 
force or by threat of force regarding the Straits and Turkey. Acheson declared that 
the USA was prepared if necessary to meet aggression with force of arms in order to 
deter the Soviet Union. If the UN was unsuccessful in stopping Soviet aggression, 
the USA would not hesitate to join other nations in order to meet armed aggression 
by force of American arms. 71 
On August, 14, 1946, the British government made clear that points one 
through three were in general accord with the US proposal. However, points four and 
five were not acceptable. The fourth point excluded all other non-Black Sea 
signatories as well as the USA from the responsibility of the Straits regime in the 
70 Ibid., pp. 836-837. 
71 Ibid., pp. 840-842. 
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future. The fifth point meant the establishment of a the Soviet bases in the Straits 
which was also unacceptable. The British government indicated that the question 
should be solved by an international conference by all interested parties but not by 
direct discussions between Turkey and the USSR. 72 
On August 19, 1946, Acheson stated to the Soviet Charge, Orekhov that the 
first three points in the Soviet proposal were generally, but not entirely, in accord 
with the US proposal of November 2, 1945. However, regarding the fourth point in 
the Soviet proposal, the Soviet government did not seem to require a revision of the 
Montreux Convention but the establishment of a new regime which would exclude 
all the non-Black Sea powers. The US government declared that the regime of the 
Straits was an international question which would be solved by all interested states, 
including the USA. Regarding the fifth point, the US government declared that 
Turkey should be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits. If an attack 
occurred to the Straits this would be a threat to international security and thereafter 
would be a matter of action for the Security Council of the UN. The Soviet proposal 
was also criticized for not mentioning the UN. The US proposed that the matter 
should be brought completely in consistence with the .Principles and aims of the UN. 
The US also reiterated its willingness to parti~ipate in a conference to revise the 
Montreux Conventi6n if invited. 73 
On August 22, 1946, the British government replied to the Soviet proposal 
stating that at the Potsdam Conference it was agreed that there should be direct 
conversations between each of the Three powers and the Turkish government for 
revising the Montreux Convention. However, the Soviet proposal suggested that 
there should be direct negotiations between each of the three powers and the Turkish 
; 2 Ibid., p. 842. 
7~ !hid .. pp. 847-848. 
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government. The British government, like the USA, criticized the Soviet proposal for 
not mentioning the UN. Britain indicated that any revision in the Montreux 
Convention should be in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN. 
Regarding the fourth proposal, Britain declared that the future of the regime of the 
Straits should be a concern of all interested powers, not solely of the Black Sea 
powers and Turkey. Regarding the fifth proposal, Britain stated that Turkey should 
continue to be responsible for the defense and control of the Straits, and lastly, that it 
would like to participate in an international conference for the revision of the 
Montreux Convention if all the interested parties agreed. 74 
On August 22, 1946, the Turkish government denied the Soviet allegation that 
Turkey had allowed the Axis Powers to use the Straits during the war. In the 
Montreux Convention there was no provision regarding ships which were less than 
100 tons. Also, these ships were commercial ships and not warships. The "Seefalke" 
which was a 37 ton motorboat was an unarmed commercial ship hence, on July 6, 
1941, its passage was permitted. The "Tarvisio" was unarmed and was permitted to 
pass in June 1941; however, when it was discovered that it had been registered as an 
auxiliary warship, its permission to pass was denied for a second time on August 9, 
1941. On August 25, 1941, the Soviet government had expressed its appreciation for 
the decision of the Turkish government. The aggregate sum of the German 
commercial ships that passed through the Straits from January 1943 to January 1944 
amounted to 19,476 tons but not to 140,000 tons which was claimed by the Soviet 
government that in October 1942 140,000 tons of German ships passed through the 
Straits. In fact, no German ship had passed through the Straits during November and 
December of 1942. The "Ems " and "Kriegs transport" types of ships were not 
defined under the Montreux Convention since they were commercial ships. But, 
~-1 !hid .. p. 85 I. 
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when the Turkish government was warned by the British that they were being used 
as an auxiliary vessels for transporting troops, Turkey prohibited their passage. The 
Turkish government stated that the first three points were more of less the same with 
the US proposal of November 2, 1945. Turkey indicated that the Montreux 
Convention was valid until 1956, and it had been negotiated and signed by the Black 
Sea as well as the non-Black Sea powers. Hence, Turkey refused the fourth and fifth 
points. It was unacceptable to exclude the non-Black Sea powers from negotiations 
for the revision of the Convention, because, the non-Black Sea powers' interests 
could not be overlooked. Regarding the fifth point, the proposition of joint common 
defense of the Straits was also unacceptable to Turkey which would limit Turkish 
sovereignty on the Straits, and would upset international security. 75 
On August 23, 1946, the US JCS reported that the possession of bases in the 
Dardanelles would not provide effective defense of the traffic through the Straits if 
these rights would not be extended to the area for several hundred miles in all 
directions, which would lead to the Soviet military penetration in the Aegean. In 
addition to this fact the Soviet bases would lead to Soviet dominance of Turkey, 
which would make Turkey a satellite. The JCS stated that from the strategic point of 
view, Turkey was the foremost important military factor in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Middle East. It was the only state that followed a firm policy 
regarding the Soviet policy of expansion in the area. Hence, Turkey would be 
militarily supported by the USA since successful opposition to the Soviet efforts 
rested on the maintenance of the will of the Turkish government and people so as to 
pursue a firm policy against Soviet demands. 76 
75 Ibid., pp. 852-855; Ahmet Siikrii Esmer, "The Straits: The Crux of World Politics." pp. 299-300. 
76 FRUS, 1946. Vol. VII. pp. 857-858. 
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On September 9, 1946, Saka said to Wilson that he expected three possibilities 
regarding Soviet policy toward Turkey. The first possibility was a Soviet attack on 
Turkey. However, Saka regarded this as the most unlikely option since the USSR 
was both unready for war at the present time and did not want to take the risk of a 
general conflict. The second possibility was taking steps to convoke an international 
conference to revise the Montreux Convention. However, having realized that their 
fourth and fifth points would not be accepted, it would be unlikely to convoke an 
international conference which would put an end to Soviet claims. The last and the 
most probable possibility was allowing the problem to remain in "status quo" and 
waiting for a more favorable time to press Soviet claims against Turkey. For Saka, 
this was the most likely policy that the Soviet Union would pursue.77 
On September 24, 1946, the second Soviet note was presented which was 
softer than the previous one, according to Erkin. The Soviet government refused to 
accept the Turkish response regarding Soviet allegations of the "misuse" of the 
Straits by Axis powers during the war. The Soviet government gave the British 
warning regarding the "Ems" and "Krieg transport" vessels as an example that the 
Montreux Convention did not prevent the enemy powers to use the Straits during 
war. According to the Soviet government, the Montreux Convention did not provide 
for the security of the Black Sea powers. Regarding the Turkish refusal of the fourth 
point, the Soviet government called the attention of the Turkish government to the 
special situation of the Black Sea as a closed sea which made it different from the 
Suez Canal and Gibraltar. Hence, it was normal for the Black Sea powers that were 
the most interested powers to have priority in controlling the regulation of the Straits 
regime. Regarding the Turkish refusal of the fifth point, the Soviet government stated 
that the former was in contradiction with its desire to reestablish friendly relations 
.. !hid., p. 859. 
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based on confidence with the Soviet Union, and reiterated that only these two states 
by a joint defense could provide the security as well as freedom of commercial 
navigation in the Straits. The Soviet government stated that its proposal was in 
conformity with the principles of the UN since it would provide assurance to the 
general interests of international commerce as well as maintenance of the security of 
the Black Sea powers hence, contribute to the consolidation of general peace. The 
Soviet government reiterated that there should be direct pour-parters between 
governments in order to revise the Montreux Convention before calling a conference 
on the Straits.78 
On October, 9, 1946, the US government responded to the second Soviet note. 
The USA stated that it adhered to the position that was outlined in its note of August 
19, 1946 to the Soviet government, and reiterated that at the Potsdam Conference it 
was decided to revise the Montreux Convention because it failed to meet present day 
conditions. And, as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct 
conversations between each of the three governments and the Turkish government. 
The USA also stated again that the revision was not solely of concern for the Black 
Sea powers but also for other powers including the USA. The US government 
declared that Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of 
the Straits and in case the Straits were attacked this should be a matter of action for 
the Security Council of the UN.79 
On October 9, 1946, the British government replied to the Soviet note. By 
following the same policy of the USA, Britain made clear that there should be direct 
conversations between each of the three governments and the Turkish government 
preliminary to the conference that would be held for revising the Montreux 
78 Ihid., pp. 860-866. 
79 IhiJ., pp. 874-875. 
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Convention, but not direct negotiations. The British government also declared that it 
would follow the same policy as it was stated in its note of August 21 regarding the 
fourth and fifth points of the Soviet proposal. Britain would attend to a conference in 
which the USSR, the USA, and France would participate as well as all the signatories 
of the Montreux Convention, except Japan for the revision of the Convention. 80 
·-
On October 18, 1946, the Turkish government replied to the Soviet note. It 
reiterated its note of August 22. Regarding the Soviet objections against Turkey's 
policy in the Straits during WW IT, Turkey made clear that no signatory power of the 
Montreux Convention ever raised objections on the matter. The Turkish government 
suggested the revision of Annex II that defined warships since it did not respond the 
present conditions and technical concepts regarding to differentiate between war and 
commercial vessels. Secondly, the provisions of the Montreux Convention related to 
the League of Nations should give way to the system that would be established by 
the UN in its task of preserving world peace. And, lastly, Japan should be removed 
from the list of contracting parties and the USA should be a signatory of the revised 
convention. The Turkish government stated that within this framework it would not 
object to the revision of the Convention. Turkey made clear that it would like to be 
represented at a conference for revising the Convention. The Turkish government 
stated that it could not accept "unfounded complaints tending to justify this revision 
on the basis of an alleged responsibility on its part, born of pretended violations of 
the regime of the Straits in the course of the WW Il."81 The suggestion about the 
direct conversations to be held proved not to be useful and advisable. Hence, the 
Turkish government reiterated that it was ready to attend a conference to revise the 
80 Ibid., p. 876. 
Kl Harry Howard, Turkey. the Straits and U.S. Policy, p. 254. 
65 
Montreux Convention where the USSR, the USA, the UK, France, and the other 
signatories except Japan would participate. 
2. 7 The End of the Soviet Demands Over Turkey 
On October, 26, the Soviet government stated that it did not share the British 
government's view regarding direct conversations which were envisaged at the 
Potsdam Conference. Because, according to the Soviet Union, it was premature to 
discuss establishing a new regime of the Straits by calling a conference. In reality, 
the Soviet Union, faced with the firm opposition of Turkey, as well as the USA and 
Great Britain, felt the necessity to back down. Therefore, after October 26, 1946, the 
Soviet Union did not formally raise the issue of the revising the Montreux 
Convention again. According to Article 29 of the Montreux Convention, its revision 
could arise within a five year period which corresponded to 1951. Only on April 19, 
1950, Krasnii Flot (Red Fleet) which was the official organ of the Soviet Navy 
Ministry, mentioned the necessity of the revision of the Convention in favor of 
Soviet interests. However, the Soviet Union did not raise the question of revision 
. 82 
agam. 
From a general perspective American Cold War psychology corresponded to 
Turkey's long-term policies. If one of these policies was to avoid military and 
diplomatic isolation, another one was its quest for Westernization. 
8 ~ lhid., pp.258-260. 264-265: Kamuran Giiriin. Tiirk-Soi:\·et i/i~·kileri f !9:!0-19531. pp. 308-309. 
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CHAPTER III 
WESTERNIZATION POLICY AS AN 
FACTOR FOR TURKEY'S ALLIANCE 
WESTERN BLOC 
3.1 Introduction 
INTERNAL 
WITH THE 
Institutional Westernization, m the sense of belonging to significant Western 
institutions, which was a state policy, is one of the domestic reasons of Turkey's 
desire to enter into NATO. Turkey did not want to be isolated from the Western 
world because it was trying to be a part of Europe and to become an industrialized 
state. However, faced with the Soviet war of nerves, Turkey felt the necessity to 
maintain large armed forces, a heavy burden on its budget, hence, an obstacle to 
economic development. It received US military and economic aid especially after the 
Truman Doctrine, but, the achievement of economic development required the 
continuation of this aid since, the amount received did not lead to a significant 
reduction in its defense expenditures. Moreover, Turkey's noninvitation to NATO as 
a member raised its anxieties that the US aid would come to an end, because, the 
continuance of this aid was dependent on US Congressional approval. Turkey 
desired to distribute the costs of its defense expenditures to foreign allies by being a 
member of NATO. Hence, by joining it, Turkey would feel itself secure because, by 
entering NATO, it would avoid being a bargaining point between great powers. 
Moreover, it would be part of the Western world as an industrialized modern state. 
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3.2 The Extent of Soviet Threat Over Turkey 
Immediately after WW II, the Western countries regarded the Soviet Union as their 
wartime ally. Therefore, the Western governments did not realize the Soviet Union's 
objective of enlarging its own sphere of influence at that moment in time. The real 
intention of the Soviet Union became obvious during the San Francisco Conference, 
when it acted contrary to the points that were agreed at the Yalta Conference on the 
issue of Poland. However, the USA and Great Britain still thought that cooperation 
with the Soviet Union was possible, since they did not regard it as a dangerous 
adversary. 1 Therefore, they did not take a firm stand against Soviet intentions which 
led to Turkey's feeling of insecurity when faced with Soviet pressures, because there 
was no firm support for Turkey by the West. Based on the historical experiences of 
the Ottoman Empire, Turkey thought that it could again be a subject for bargaining 
between great powers. This feeling of insecurity, which was one of the main reasons 
for Turkey's alliance with the Western bloc, continued up to Turkey's entrance into 
NATO. By tying itself with the Western countries a military alliance, Turkey 
guaranteed its territorial integrity and independence from any possible division 
between the great powers. 2 
It now seems obvious that the Soviet Union could not wage war, since, it was 
war weary and yet did not posses atomic power. Although Stalin suggested to the 
Yugoslav Minister in the postwar Tito government, Milovan Djilas, that the Soviet 
Union would impose its social system as far as its armies could reach, he was aware 
1 Mehmet Gonltibol-Haluk Otman, et.al. "Sav~ Sonu Dtinyasmda Ttirkiye'nin Durumu," in Olay/aria 
Tiirk D1$ Politikas1, (91h ed.) (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996), p. 192; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now 
Know, (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1997), p. 32; Deborah Welch Larson, The Origins of 
Containment: A Psychological Explanation, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1985), pp. 325-326. "Truman demanded that elements of the London Poles join the Polish government 
and that elections be held immediately. However. Molotov protested, that he had never been talked 
like that." James Nathan and James Oliver, US Foreign Policy and World Order, (Glenview: Scott, 
Foresman, 1989). p. 32 
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of the fact that the Soviet Union could not wage a war against the USA and its allies 
since their military power was consolidated.3 This was also realized by Winston 
Churchill who claimed during his "iron curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri, on 
March 8, 1946 that "the Soviets did not want war but rather the fruits of war and the 
definite expansion of their power and doctrines." Therefore, according to Churchill, 
the proper response was to show military strength.4 
The Soviet Union wanted the establishment of "friendly" regimes around its 
periphery as far as the West would permit, without having to go to war. Therefore, 
the Soviet Union after WW IT, increased its pressures over Turkey in order to change 
the Montreux Convention in its favor. In order to bring Turkey into bilateral 
negotiation on this issue, it denounced the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of 
1925, demanded Kars-Ardahan provinces and, continued its radio and press attacks 
as a means to gain bargaining-leverage over Turkey. Fortunately, Turkey's case was 
quite different from the Greek and Iranian cases. In Turkey, there were no effective 
militant Communist elements since the Turkish Communist Party was banned in 
1926 by Atati.irk. Communism never became a mass movement and remained as an 
intellectual exercise. Communist elements and active organizers, who were 
predominantly composed of artists, writers and academicians, were consistently 
suppressed and imprisoned. Since Turkey was an agrarian, non-industrialized 
country, there were neither proletariat nor capitalist classes. Its population was 
predominantly composed of peasants. Moreover, upward social mobility was open to 
all classes through a military or bureaucratic career. The Russian army had 
2 Nur Bilge Criss, "Onsoz," in Melih Esenbel, Tiirkiye 'nin Bati ile ittifakz; Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge 
Across the Bosporus, p. 103. 
:; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 30; Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, (New York: 
Harcout, Brace & World, Inc .. 1962), p. 62. "Three quarters of its industrial plant destroyed and 20 
million dead." James Nathan and James Oliver, US Foreign Policy and World Order, p. 31 
4 James Nathan and James Oliver. L'S Foreign Policy and World Order. p. 50. 
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disintegrated by 1917. There was non such threat as far as the Turkish military was 
concerned. Turkey did not have a revolutionary organizer like Lenin and his 
collegues. Therefore, the Marxist premise of Socialist Revolution was incompatible 
with Turkey. Marxism foresaw a Socialist Revolution in industrialized countries 
which had a large proletariat class, and, it foresaw that from the clash between the 
proletariat and capitalist classes a Socialist Revolution would occur. Also, the 
Turkish Communist party, like the other foreign Communist parties was the client of 
the Comintern. They got their orders from the Soviet government which provided 
financial aid. This led to public resentment of such parties since Turkey had always 
been suspicious of Russian intentions due to its past experiences. Also, even though 
both Islam and Communism shared the idea of social justice, Communism was 
identified with atheism and it could not find a support base in Turkey. George 
Kennan, in his Memoirs:· 1925-1950, also questioned the ability of the Russians to 
disaffect and dominate the entire Muslim world, because their ideology was in 
conflict with the Muslim faith. For all these reasons, Communist parties in Turkey 
which were established after WW II, such as isci ve Ciftci Sosyalist Partisi and 
Ttirkiye Sosyalist Emekci ve Koylti Partisi could not get public support. Not that 
they feared domestic Communism but, Turkish leaders leery of any dissent. 
Moreover, after WW II, the age old Turkish Russophobia was combined with anti-
communism. The public discontent with the leftist elements arose when several 
magazines and newspapers offered a reconciliation with the Soviet Union. This 
caused attacks by the Turkish university students on pro-Soviet publications Yeni 
Diinya and Tan as well as bookstores that were selling Soviet literature on December 
5, 1945.5 
5 Bilal ~en, Cumhuriyetin ilk Yt!larrnda TKP ve Komintern ili~kileri. Belgelerle Bilinmeyenlerin 
Oykiisii, (istanbul: Kilyerel Yaymlan, 1998), pp. 49, 91; George McGhee, ;;Turkey Joins the West," 
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On the other hand, the Soviet Union could find active Communist elements in 
Greece and Iran as an instrument for the seizure of power in these countries. It 
supported the Greek Communist guerrillas during the civil war and refused the 
withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Iran, and built the Tudeh (Communist) Party in 
Iran. Therefore, Turkey was the least vulnerable and threatened country, on the 
periphery of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union wanted to realize its policy that 
came from the time of Czarist Russia, which aimed to control access to the 
Mediterranean. Since it had no intention of fighting, the Soviet Union tried to realize 
this goal by pursuing continuous war of nerves against Turkey. The Soviet 
government tried to exploit the situation of Turkey at the end of the war, which was 
the lack support by the West while it faced Soviet pressures. Therefore, it can be 
argued that there was no Soviet threat against Turkey but, there were Soviet demands 
from Turkey, the realization of which would not be permitted by the USA and Great 
Britain. There was no actual Soviet threat but, when a big country even makes 
sugestions to a smaller neighbor about a change in status-quo this 'may well be 
perceived as a threat. During 1946, having realized the real Soviet intentions, the 
USA and Great Britain began to take a firm stand against the Soviet Union. In 
January 1946, when Soviet pressures increased against Turkey, Truman stated, 
There isn't a doubt in my mind that Russia intends an invasion of Turkey 
and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean. Unless 
Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language, another war is in the 
making. Only one language do they understand-"How many divisions 
have you?" 
p. 620; Frenc Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey, p. 67; Mete Tunc;ay, 
Tiirkiye 'de Sol Akzmlar (1908-1925), (3rtl ed.) (Ankara: Bilgi Yaymevi, 1978). p. 376: George Kenan. 
Memoirs: 1925-1950, (New York: Pantheon, 1983), p. 317: Aclan Say1lgan. Sohm 94 r11z 1871-1965 
Tiirkiye'de Sosyalist Komiinist Faaliyetler, (Ankara: Mars Matbaasi. 1968), pp. 9-12. 13 I. 328-329. 
407--W8. 422, Ttirkiye Sosyalist i~i Partisi, was established on 24 May. 1946 Tiirkiye Sosyalist 
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I do not think we should play compromise any longer. I'm tired of 
babying the Soviets.6 
The situation in Iran as well as the increased war of nerves against Turkey, 
convinced the US government that the Soviet Union was aiming to dominate the oil 
rich Middle East region which would mean the disruption of the free world economy. 
The USA, in order to make clear to the Soviet Union that it would not permit the 
domination of the Middle East region, sent the battleship Missouri to Istanbul in 
April 1946. From then on, it became the cardinal policy of the USA not to permit 
Soviet domination of this vitally important region. On August 15, 1946, the USA 
announced that it would send its navy to the Mediterranean. One month later, the US 
government announced that it would have a permanent naval presence in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.7 In the eyes of the USA, Turkey was gaining importance since 
Turkey, with its firm stand in the face of Soviet demands, suggested that it was a 
barrier to Soviet expansion in the Near and Middle Easr region. However, Soviet 
pressures continued, and that made it necessary to maintain large armed forces in 
Turkey even though these forces were a heavy burden on its economy. This heavy 
burden was an obstacle to Turkey's industrialization efforts. Therefore, Turkey 
requested both_ military and economic aid from the USA. The latter, in order to 
provide the maintenance of Turkey's firm stand against the Soviet Union, from 1947 
onwards extended economic and military aid programs to Turkey by the Truman 
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. 
6 Harry Howard, Turkey, the Straits and US Policy, p. 239. 
7 John C. Campbell, The Defense of the Middle East, Problems of American Policy. (New York: 
Harper & Brothers, l 960), pp. 5, 32; Mehmet Gonliibol-Haluk Ulman. et. al. "Amerika Birle~ik 
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3.3 Westernization as a Turkish State Policy 
The second reason of Turkey's entrance to NATO was part of the state policy of 
Westernization. The Westernization attempts started during the Ottoman era. In the 
17rh century, the Ottoman armies were technologically behind the European armies . 
The technological improvements of Europe were not followed by the Empire at all 
and this ended up with the defeats of the Ottoman armies vis-a-vis the European 
armies.8 Therefore, Westernization was regarded as a means of achieving the 
Empire's previous strength, hence, its survival. As, Bernard Lewis describes the 
Ottoman Empire during the 17th century, 
Fundamentally, the Ottoman Empire had remained or reverted to a 
medieval state, with a medieval mentality and a medieval economy-but 
with the added burden of a bureaucracy and a standing army which no 
medieval state had ever had to bear. In a world of rapidly modernizing 
states it had little chance of survival.9 
Westernization, which first started in the military realm, was extended to the 
political and social areas of the Ottoman Empire during the Tanzimat era (1839-
1878). This extention was the result of the spread of Western ideas through which 
educational, judicial, and bureaucratic modernization were achieved to some extent. 
The Young Turks became successful.in establishing a new system in education. They 
set up secular primary and secondary schools, as well as teachers' training colleges. 
The educational opportunities were extended to females. Judicial reforms were also 
made. A new Family Law was adopted which extended the rights of women (1915). 
Religious courts that were concerned with family and personal status were put under 
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. This was also a step that was taken in the 
Devletleri'nin TUrkiye ' yi Desteklemeye Ba~lamas1," in Olay/aria Tiirk Dt$ Politikas1, p. 207 ; James 
Nathan and James Oliver, United States Foreign Policy and World Order, p. 52. 
8 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (2"d ed.) (Oxford : Oxford University Press , 
1968), p. 26. 
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way of secularization. This modem secular authority was above the religious 
hierarchy. 10 To some extent social and political modernization was achieved but, the 
constitutional government did not develop. Bernard Lewis evaluates this era as, 
The record of the ten years from 1908 to 1918 is a black one. The high 
hopes of the Revolution were swiftly disappointed, and the orderly 
progress of constitutional government was ended in the wretched cycle of 
plot and counterplot, repres.sion and sedition, tyranny, humiliation, and 
defeat. 11 
In this situation, Westernization attempts could not save the Empire from 
collapse. Because, even though there was unanimity on the question of "how this 
Empire could be saved" there was no single answer to this question. It was mostly 
argued that the solution was Westernization of the Empire. 12 However, since there 
was no agreement on the answer to the question of "to what civilization did the Turks 
belong-and in what civilization did their future lie?"1J Westernization had different 
meanings for each person. This was the one of the main obstacles to being able to 
achieve modernization in all .areas during the Ottoman era. 
There were mainly two groups who proposed solutions: the Islamists and the 
Westernizers. But, even among these groups there were divisons. The Islamists were 
divided as "four-square fundamentalists" and "moderate Islamists." The first group 
argued that the derogation form the Holy Law and the faith were the causes of the 
decline of the Empire. On the other hand, the moderate Islamists argued that Islam 
was not an obstacle to modern civilization. For them, the abandonment of Islam led 
to the Empire's decline. Therefore, looking to the West for political and social 
improvement was unnecessary because, the means for development could be found 
9 Ibid., p. 36. 
10 Ibid., pp. 229-230. 
11 Ibid .• p. 227. 
I' . ~ Tank Zafer Tunaya, Battl1/asma Hareketleri, I. (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Yaymlan, 1999), pp. 48, 94. 
I.· Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of .Hvdern Turkey, pp. ::!33-234. 
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in the Islamic past. They argued that only technology should be taken from the West. 
But, in political, judicial, educational, and social areas Islam should remain 
dominant. 14 This viewpoint ignored the fact that in the judicial arena, the Empire had 
never been theocratic, because the Shari' at was confined to family and personal law 
and not even to criminal law in the sense that was practiced in Arab world. 
Customary law (Orfi) and Political Law (Siyasa) was practiced all along. 15 
There was no unanimity among the Westernizers. The extreme Westemizers 
argued the necessity to adopt the West with its all structures. For them 
Westernization, which referred to European civilization, "was not a matter of choice 
but of survival." As writer Ahmet Muhtar wrote in 1912, "either we Westernize, or 
we are destroyed." 16 On the other hand, there were moderate Westemizers like Celal 
Nuri (ileri), who argued that there were two kinds of civilization: technical and real. 
Although the West reached the highest point of technical civilization, it did not and 
could not reach real civilization. Therefore, he argued that only the technical 
developments should be transferred to the Empire. And, it was useless to imitate the 
West in its entirety because Islam was superior. 17 
The collapse of the Empire proved that it was not possible to achieve 
Westernization within the existing traditional Islamic-Ottoman structures. Successful 
Westernization required the establishment of a secular nation state. Therefore, the 
foremost goal of Atattirk was the establishment of "an independent Turkish nation-
state on the European model." 18 The basis of identity in the Turkish Republic was the 
Turkish nation, not the Muslim community. Hence, it was the victory of the nation 
14 Ibid., pp. 234-235. 
15 Hal ii inalc1k, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, I 300-1600, (London: Phoneix, 1995), pp. 
70-75. 
16 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 235-236. 
17 Ibid., p. 235. 
18 Oral Sander, Tiirk~ve 'nin D1$ Politikas1, (Ankara: imge Yaymevi, 1998), pp. 76-77. 
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state against the multi-religious empire. And, it was based on national sovereignty 
and independence. 19 The Turkish War of Independence was fought against the 
European imperialist powers but not against Western civilization.20 Therefore, after 
the War of Independence, the. policy of Westernization became the foremost goal of 
the new Republic. The goal was the integration of the Turkish people into European 
civilization. "Because according to Atattirk, there was only one civilization and this 
was the Western one. Therefore, becoming a member of the European community of 
nations on an equal status became the national goal of Turkey."21 Westernization 
attempts during the Ottoman era were quite different from the achievements of the 
Kemalist Republic. Because, Atattirk saw the necessity of the adoption of political, 
economic, judicial, social structures, and culture besides technological developments 
of the West into Turkey. The lack of one of these factors would lead to the failure of 
Westernization in Turkey as had happened during the Ottoman era. With the 
abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate, secularization at all levels of administration, 
educational and judicial reforms, adoption of the European alphabet and calendar, 
and the new dress code, Turkey would become a part of the Western world. 
Atattirk, after establishing the Republic pursued a realistic foreign policy 
because he refused the adventurous ideas of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism. 
Nationalism in the Republic was not based on religion or race, "but like that of 
Europe, on common citizenship within realistic and defensible borders, and on 
national consensus." Therefore, Atattirk pursued a peaceful foreign policy which was 
"peace at home and peace abroad" which facilitated its acceptance as an equal 
member by the Western community. For Atattirk, Turkey could remain independent 
19 Niyazi Berkes, Tiirkiye'de Cagda:;la:;ma. (istanbul: Dogu-Bau Yaymlan, 1978), pp. 511-513; 
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 233. 
~0 Niyazi Berkes, Tiirkiye 'de <;agda:;la:;ma, p. 514. 
~ 1 Ferenc V<ili, Bridge Across Europe: The Foreign Policy of Turkey, pp. 56. 70. 
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only by being a part of the Western world. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire was 
a clear example indicating what would be the result of cutting ties between the 
Empire and Europe. 1:herefore after the War of Independence, the separation of 
Turkey from ancient Asian-Arabic sphere of culture and tradition and its 
transformation into a Westernized nation began. Because, for Atatilrk those who 
.. 
failed to achieve modernization would eventually be dominated by the advanced 
nations. Atatilrk's endeavors of modernizing the Turkish society led to the 
strengthening of the ties between Turkey and the Western community. Thus, Turkey 
followed a Western oriented foreign policy.22 
Kemalist reforms were not static but were based on the continuous adoption of 
developments of the West to Turkey. This would provide the maintenance of 
Turkey's independence within the Western world. With its level of industrialization, 
Turkey lagged far behind the Western countries which began industrialization in the 
l 81h century. Turkey had to fill this huge gap because, according to Atatilrk, the 
maintanence of full independence of Turkey depended on its economic development 
which referred to industrialization. Hence, the concepts of development, 
industrialization and Westernization were all interrelated. Without achieving 
industrialization, it was impossible to achieve Westernization, thus it was not 
possible to be totally independent. For this reason, industrialization became one of 
the major national goals as a means to achieve Westernization.23 However, the 
development of industrialization necessitated foreign aid to Turkey. Therefore, in the 
late 1940s and throughout the following decade, Turkey successfully raisedthe issue 
of the Soviet threat, however exaggerated. The argument fits well into the US policy 
22 Oral Sander. Tiirkiye 'nin D1~ Politikas1, p. 77. 
23 Suna Kili, Atatiirk Devrimi, Bir <;agda~la~ma Modeli, (6 111 ed.) (Ankara: Tilrkiye i~ Bankasi Killtilr 
Yaymlan, 1998), pp. 34. 50, 115-118, 163, 171, 179, 279; Niyazi Berkes. Tlirkiye'de (.:agda~la~ma, 
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of containment, but one should bear in mind that Turkey's goals were first and 
foremost economic development and joining Western institutions. Diplomatic and 
military isolation had to be avoided at all cost, even at the cost of developing a viable 
left opposition. Repercussions of this policy became apparent only in the 1970s24, but 
priorities of the previous decades were different. Because of Soviet pressures Turkey 
had to maintain large armed forces which was a heavy burden on its budget, and this, 
in tum, was an obstacle for industrialization and Westernization. 
3.4 US Economic and Military Aid to Turkey 
Although, the Turkish economy was not devastated by WW II, Turkey was faced 
with two problems: the first problem was that prices of Turkish export commodities, 
which were high during the war, fell to a normal level with the end of the war. The 
second problem was Turkey's endeavors to pursue industrialization and maintaining 
a large armed force, at the same time. The transformation of Turkey from an agrarian 
to an industrialized country was one of the state's objectives. Even then agricultural 
production was conducted by primitive methods and poor transportation facilities. 
Although Turkey was rich in mineral resources, there were not sufficient facilities 
for their extraction and exploration of new resources. Thus, it was obvious that, the 
purpose of industrializing Turkey, which began from the time of founding the 
Republic, could not have been achieved singlehandedly. On the other hand, faced 
with the Soviet war of nerves, Turkey felt itself obliged to maintain large armed 
forces which cost approximately half of its budget. There were no signs of an 
economic collapse since Turkey had gold and foreign exchange reserves amounting 
to 245 million dollars. However, Turkey was keeping these reserves in order to use 
2~ Hasan Ccmal, Kimse K1zmasm. Kendimi Yazd1m, (91h ed.) (istanbul: Dogan Kitap91hk, 1999) 
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them in case of a Soviet attack, even though there were no signs such an event.25 As 
a contingency measure, Turkey sought foreign military and economic aid. 
In October 1945, President Inonu requested 500 million dollar credit from the 
Export-Import Bank for the realization of industrial development as well as 
infrastructure projects. It was obvious that the sum in question could only be 
obtained from the USA.26 However, only 25 million dollars were offered to Turkey 
despite the endeavors of Ambassador Wilson who argued that not to exceed 
Eximbank's 25 million dollar aid, would be a severe shock to the Turkish 
government. Thus, he suggested that the State Department might take the following 
points into consideration before giving its final decision on Turkish loan policy: first, 
since the Turkish position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union was critical, an unfavorable 
loan treatment could lead to misunderstandings in the Turkish government. 
Secondly, even though Turkey was not devastated by WW II, it was in need of 
financial assistance in order to make certain economic readjustments. Lastly, Turkey 
was in need of modernizing its agriculture, minerals development, transportation and 
communications so as to bring its economy to a better situation, all of which 
necessitated more credits.27 However, on May 23, 1946, the Director of Office of 
Near Eastern and African Affairs, Loy Henderson, made clear to the Turkish 
Ambassador that because of the Bank's shortage of funds as well as its previous 
commitments, the chances of giving a 25 million dollar loan to Turkey was high but, 
enhancing it to 50 million dollars was not possible. And on July 3, 1946, Eximbank, 
with the approval of the National Advisory Council, gave only 25 million dollars in 
25 Mehmet Gonlilbol-Haluk Ulman, et.al. "Truman Doktrini ve Marshal Plam," in Olay/aria Tiirk Di~ 
Politikas1. p. 212; Altemur K1lu,:, Turkey and The World, p. 142; George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: 
Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971, (Standford, California: Hoover 
Institution on War, Revolution and Peace Standford University, 1972), pp. 24-25. 
~6 George Harris, Troubled Alliance. pp. 20-21. 
~ 7 FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII. pp. 903-904. 
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exporter credits to Turkey for fiscal years 1946 and 1947.28 Obviously, this amount 
was insufficient for Turkey since the Turkish government aimed both at the 
maintenance of large armed forces against Soviet pressures as well as the 
realization of its state policy of industrialization. 
During 1946, the policy of the US government was that it would not supply 
any military equipment to the Middle East countries, in order not to be charged as a 
provocator by the other powers. Therefore, when Turkey requested credit from the 
USA for purchasing airplanes, the US government made clear that it could only 
supply items of a general character such as trucks. On November 5, 1946, Byrnes 
stated that the US government was ready to help Turkey and Greece only 
economically, and he suggested that the Turkish government should look to its ally, 
Great Britain, in order to obtain military aid. The US government, while pursuing a 
nonprovocative policy by turning down all of the Turkish government's requests for 
military aid, was also concerned not to give the impression that its support of the 
territorial integrity and independence of Turkey was limited to w0rds. Hence, the US 
government suggested that in case Britain was not able to offer military supplies to 
Turkey, it was ready to furnish them to Britain. In that case, Turkey would get 
military aid indirectly. Thus, the USA was reluctant to furnish arms to Turkey not 
because of its ignorance of its strategic importance, but because it was concerned of 
being accused as a provocator by the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Turkish 
government had been discouraged to request military aid from the USA.29 
28 Ibid., p. 907. "Tenn "exporter credit" means that Eximbank will participate up to 25 million dollars 
in financing projects put forward jointly by Turkish government and US suppliers, or put forward by 
US suppliers with approval Turkish government. In any event, since Turkish government notes or 
Turkey guarantee would be required before Bank would make advances under credit, no advances 
could be made without Turkish government's approval." Ibid., p. 911. 
29 Ibid., pp. 916-917. 
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The dilemma of the Turkish government was that on the one hand, the 
maintenance of a large armed forces was a heavy burden on the Turkish economy, on 
the other hand, it was difficult to sell the idea to the army of reducing military 
expenses while facing a Soviet war of nerves. This situation was also accepted by 
Henderson who asked for another 25 million dollars from the Export-Import Bank 
for Turkey, even though tllere were no signs of an economic collapse.30 
Meanwhile, National Advisory Council (NAC), on November 6, 1946, 
approved an action of Maritime Commission that it could consider extention nearly 
5 million dollar credit to Turkey for purchasing 6 ships.31 By criticizing the US 
reluctance, the US Ambassador, Wilson, was suggesting that the USA should 
indicate to Turkey that it was able and willing to give Turkey support either by 
military equipment or by providing credits for economic purposes, the reverse would 
hamper Turkish morale, vital so far as the Soviet·war of nerves was concerned. 32 
Although, the USA was pursuing a hesitant policy regarding to furnish 
economic and military aid to Turkey, its policy on the Straits did not alter. On 
January 20, 1947, Byrnes declared the US policy towards the Straits problem, 
according to which, Turkey was and should be the primary power responsible for the 
defense of the Straits. An attack by an aggressor would be a matter for action on the 
part of the Security Council since this would constitute a threat to international 
security. 33 
On February 21, 1947, the British government informed the USA that it could 
no longer bear the major share of burden of rendering financial and military 
assistance to Turkey and Greece, and that present assistance would cease on March 
30 Ibid., pp. 918-919, 922. 
31 Ibid., p. 919. 
~~ FRUS, The Near East and.1/i-ica. 1947, Vol. V, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1971), pp. 7-8. 
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31, 194 7. The British government asked whether the US government could undertake 
the major share of the burden, because these countries would not survive 
independently without this aid which would mean the fall of the Middle East under 
Soviet control. The British Chiefs of Staff, in their examination of the strategic 
importance of Turkey as well as the state of the Turkish armed forces, emphasized 
the necessity of assisting Turkey. According to this report, the independence of 
Turkey was vitally important and should be maintained. However, the Turkish armed 
forces were unable to resist aggression from a first class power. Therefore, the 
Turkish Army was in need of large measure of reequipment. This task could not be 
handled by the British government because of the shortage of manpower and 
productive capacity. But the US government could undertake this task since it had 
the capacity to do it. The Turkish dilemma was also mentioned in that Turkey could 
maintain its existing industry without getting financial aid, but in order to finance an 
extensive program of industrialization or "meet any substantial foreign exchange 
demands ·for armaments", it should either draw on its gold resources or find foreign 
assistance. Since Turkey was unwilling in the first instance and unable to realize both 
aims simultaneously, it had to choose either economic and industrial development or 
strengthening its military by purchasing armaments. For their realization, it was 
suggested that Turkey should look for external financial assistance. Since the British 
government was unable to offer financial aid, Turkey should request aid either from 
the US government or from one of its lending agencies such as the Export-Import 
Bank, the International Bank or the IMF. 34 
After these British notes, the US government realized that it was the only 
country that could and should assume the task of aiding to Greece and Turkey. 
'~ Ibid .. pp. 35-37; Mehmet Gonliibol-Haluk Ulman, et.al. "Truman Doktrini ve Marshall Plam," in 
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Since, it became clear that the British government could no longer maintain its past 
imperial structure, hence, at the first meeting of the special committee studying 
assistance to Greece and Turkey, Henderson and the Deputy Director of European 
Affairs, John D. Hickerson suggested that the US government should accept the 
responsibility.35 Henderson and the US State Department officer, John Jernegan 
declared that the Executive Branch of the US government was of the opinion that the 
political and territorial integrity of Greece and Turkey should be maintained and for 
this reason it was decided that the US government would make every effort to extend 
aid for that aim as well as to develop a "sound economy." It was also declared that 
the British government was expected to continue to the extent of its ability to 
cooperate in supporting the political independence and territorial integrity of these 
two countries.36 Regarding Soviet policy, the US government did not expect an 
imminent Soviet attack against Turkey. But, the war of nerves was expected to 
continue indefinitely. The Soviet Union, by continuing this war of nerves against 
Turkey, aimed to disrupt the Turkish economy in the long run since the latter would 
feel itself obliged to keep a large standing army. Thus, Acheson stated that the US 
government would actively take part in meeting the economic and military needs of 
Turkey and Greece. But since the latter was in a more difficult situation, Greece 
would be the object of the first round of attention.37 The Subcommittee on Foreign 
Policy Information of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, declared as the 
cardinal aim of the US foreign policy "a world in which nations shall be able to work 
out their own way of life free of coercion by other nations". On March 12, 1947, 
Truman declared, 
35 FRUS, The Near East and Africa, 1947, Vol. V, pp. 45-47. 
31
' Ibid., p. 72. 
'~ Ibid .. pp. 90-91, 95. 
83 
It is the policy of the US to give support to free peoples who are 
attempting to resist subjugation from armed minorities or from outside 
forces. The US will, within the framework of the Charter of the UN, 
assist in assuring the ability of peoples, who are now free, to work out 
their own destiny .. .l believe that our help should be primarily through 
economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and 
orderly political processes ... Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in 
this fateful hour, the effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to 
the East. We must take immediate and resolute action.38 
It was the Greek civil war which led to the declaration of the Truman 
Doctrine. Thus, only a bare mention of Turkey was made since it was not in 
immediate danger like Greece. However, the USA did not want to ignore a possible 
Soviet takeover of Turkey. Therefore, Truman approved a policy according to which 
the USA would extend all possible aid to Greece and to a lesser extent to Turkey. 
The US aim was to prevent Greece from succumbing to a Communist regime and 
also aimed at strengthening Turkey. During the end of 1946 and the beginning of 
194 7, the USA realized the real intention of the Soviet Union which was aggressive 
and this created a national consensus in the USA that it was the only power to act as 
an obstacle to the Soviet Union. It was feared that if Greece fell under Soviet 
domination, not only Turkey but also Italy, France and the whole of Western Europe 
hence, the security of the USA might be affected. 39 In 194 7, Undersecretary of State 
Acheson, pointed to this fact during a Congressional meeting, 
In the past eighteen months, Soviet pressure on the Straits, on Iran, and 
on northern Greece had brought the Balkans to the point where a highly 
possible Soviet breakthrough might open three continents to Soviet 
penetration. Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the 
corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east. It would also 
carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe 
through Italy and France, already threatened by the strongest domestic 
Communist parties in Western Europe. The Soviet Union was playing 
one of the greatest gambles in history at minimal cost. It did not need to 
win all the possibilities. Even one or two offered immense gains. We and 
JS Ibid., pp. 76-77; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, (New 
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we alone were in a position to break up the play. These were the stakes 
that British withdrawal from the eastern Mediterranean offered to an 
eager and ruthless opponent.~0 
Since Turkey was a natural barrier to any Soviet advancement to the Eastern 
Mediterranean as well as to the Middle East, the fall of Turkey under Soviet 
domination was regarded as a vital security concern for the USA.41 Therefore, it .. 
should not be let to fall under Soviet control. This led to extentions of US aid to 
Turkey. On March 12, 1947, Henderson criticized that "Turkey obtained only 25 
million dollars from the Export-Import Bank on a request of 250 million 
reconstruction loan." The State Department envisaged long-term military assistance 
to Turkey. 42 
According to the report of the JCS, the Soviet Union had no desire to wage war 
against Turkey. However, it would try to achieve its goals through continuous war of 
nerves. Therefore, it was suggested that Turkey should be given assurances including 
concrete assistance. It was stated that "economic and direct military assistance, even 
if furnished m small quantities, indicates a will on the part of the western 
democracies to support the Turks in a situation where otherwise they might 
reasonably estimate that they have no recourse but progressive aquiesence to the 
probable progression of Soviet demands."43 There were two objectives of US 
military aid: The first objective was to stiffen the Turkish will to resist firmly Soviet 
pressures. And, the second objective was the improvement of the Turkish armed 
forces hence, in case of a war it would resist with force any Soviet aggression and by 
having the maximum possible military capability it could undertake a holding and 
delaying action in its territory. Therefore, it was decided that, 
~0 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, p. 219. 
41 FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, pp. 110-114. 
42 Ibid., p. 109. 
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l. The greatest emphasis should be placed on the ground army and on 
defense against air attack. 
2. The organization and the equipment should be designed for effective 
defense action in Turkish terrain. The equipment should in general be 
of types readily manned and operated by the Turks and, to the greatest 
degree practible, be capable of manufacture in Turkey. 
3. Most serious consideration should be given to a program by which 
Turks are assisted to attain arms and equipment through operation 
and development of their own arsenals. In this connection, about 80% 
of.the present equipment in the Turkish army is of German design. 
4. Economic aid for Turkey should be integrated with a program of 
military assistance, not only for the purpose of enabling the Turks to 
provide their own equipment but also for the purpose of improving 
selected communications and logistical facilities in the country. With 
improved transportation equipment the Turks may feel free to reduce 
the strength of their mobilized forces, thereby relieving some of the 
present strain on the economy of the country.44 
After the Truman Doctrine, which is regarded as a "turning point m US 
history," the USA openly devoted itself to providing economic and military aid to 
protect the Middle East and the Mediterranean. After British withdrawal, the 
question for the USA was whether to leave Greece and Turkey to their own devices. 
The JCS declared that effective US assistance to Turkey which would involve 
political, economic, and psychological factors as well as military factors was 
crucially important for the security of the US. Hence, the Truman Doctrine signaled 
the evolution of the US interest from "benign indifference to intense concern."45 
On March 12, 1947, the Congress approved the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill which 
provided loans to Greece and Turkey up to 400 million dollars, over a period ending 
on June 30, 1948. It was anticipated that 100 million dollars of this loan would be 
given to Turkey, and in addition the USA furnished military and naval equipment all 
of which were provided as a gift. In addition to that fund, a limited number of US 
43 Ibid., p. 110. 
44 Ibid., pp. I I0-114. 
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military as well as civilian personnel would be transferred to these countries in order 
to assist in an advisory capacity, which was realized.46 
On May 15, 1947, the Secretary of State, George Marshall stated that the 
maintenance of the present strong Turkish resistance to Soviet aggression required 
the continuation of a strong and well-equipped Turkish Army and the maintenance of 
economic well-being of the Turkish economy in order not to open a way to social 
unrest and to any Soviet-Communist penetration as the basic objectives of US 
assistance to Turkey. For Marshall, the strength and productivity of the Turkish 
economy had to be increased so as to promote the general welfare of the Turkish 
people while permitting Turkey to maintain its necessary defense forces. 47 This firm 
US commitment policy was approved on May 22, 1947 by the Congress, which 
approved Public Law 75, the Act to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey at 
the 801h Congress. The aid program was fully devoted to urgent military needs of 
Turkey, and it was hoped that the economic program could be financed by the 
International Bank and other sources. 
Hence, US foreign policy began to change by the end of 1946, especially after 
January 1947, with the departure of the Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes. US 
policy toward the Soviet Union became firmer, when the supporters of the firm 
policy gained ground. By the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, the USA assumed 
the responsibilities which had been abandoned by Great Britain. And, the 
containment policy of the US, which was formulated to restrict to the Soviet 
46 Ibid., pp. 153-154, 525; Mehmet Gonlilbol-Haluk Ulman, et.al. ''Truman Doktrini ve Marshall 
Plan1;·• in Olay/aria Tilrk D1~ Politikas1, p. 215; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 222-223, 
225: Altemur Ktlu;, Turkey and the World, p. 138. On April 22, 1947, the Senate passed the Greek-
Turkish Aid Act by a vote of287 to 107, and the House on May 9, 1947, by 67 to 23. "Turkish armed 
forces consist of 41 ground divisions, 7 fortress commands, an air force having some 300 operating 
aircraft, and a negligible navy, with a total mobilized strength of over 600.000 men. And, 80% of the 
present equipment in the Turkish army was of German design." Ibid., p. 113. 
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influence in the boundaries of the Soviet Union started. The Truman Doctrine meant 
for Turkey that the USA would be the principal backer of Turkey in the West. 
During 1947, only George Kennan objected to the US policy of assuming the role of 
Britain. For Kennan, it was not rational to provide a special aid program for Turkey. 
Because, the situation of Turkey was different from that of Greece since, "there was 
no serious Communist penetration in Turkey- no comparable guerrilla movement. 
Therefore Kennan claimed that the Turks had nothing to fear but fear." For Kennan, 
if Turkey was surrounded by pro-Soviet states, it would be harder for the Turks to 
continue their firm stance. Thus, aiding Greece was crucially important. However, 
Kennan argued that there was no necessity for a special aid program for Turkey. 
Importance should be given to domestic morale and firmness of diplomatic stance, 
but not to military preparations. Kennan suspected that the real intention of the 
Pentagon was military aid, thus the Pentagon was exploiting a favorable set of 
circumstances to inflitrate an aid program and transform it into a political and 
economic program which was prepared for Greece. Some of the officers argued that 
providing large scale US military aid to Turkey and Greece might be seen as 
provocative to the Soviet Union. 48 However, despite these criticisms, the US 
government continued to provide aid to Turkey. 
In June 5, 1947, European Recovery Program (ERP), which was the official 
name of the Marshall Plan, was proclaimed by the Secretary of State, George C. 
Marshall during his famous speech at Harvard. The purpose of this plan was to assist 
the W estem European countries in their endeavors to recover their economies. It 
47 FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, pp. 172-173. "The Greek-Turkish Aid Act passed the House by a vote of 287 
to 107, and the Senate by 67 to 23. The President signed it on May 22." Dean Acheson, Present at the 
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saved the war-weary Western European countries from economic as well as political 
chaos. Marshall stated, 
It is logical that the US should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the 
return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can 
be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy directed not 
against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, 
and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the 
world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in 
which free institutions can exist... Any government which maneuvers to 
block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. 
Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to 
perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or 
otherwise will encounter the opposition of the US.49 
With the Marshall Plan, the USA began to use foreign aid as an instrument of 
foreign policy against the communist expansion. The war-weariness of the Western 
European countries as well as the drought which destroyed most of the 1946 wheat 
crop, and the severe winter in l 94 7 increased the possibility of economic collapse in 
Western Europe. The situation strengthened the communist parties in France and 
Italy which exploited these unacceptable conditions of life. In Europe people were 
faced with the problem of inadequate food, shelter and clothing. Because of power 
shortages and the lack of raw materials, factories were shut down. There were not 
enough foreign exchange reserves to buy raw materials. 50 Membership in Communist 
parties of Europe increased. "For instance, the Belgian Communist Party grew from 
9,000 in 1939 to 100,000 in November 1945; in Holland from 10,000 in 1938 to 
53,000 in 1946; in Greece from 17,000 in 1935 to 70,000 in 1945; in Italy from 
5,000 in 1943 to 1,700,000 at the end of 1945; in Czechoslovakia from 28,000 in 
May 1945 to 75 ,000 in September 1945. In Italy, France and Finland the Communist 
49 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 233. 
50 Theodore A. Wilson, The Marshall Plan. an Atlantic venture of 1947-1951 and how it shaped our 
world, Headline Series 236. (June 1977), (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Library of 
Congress Catalog No. 77-89364). pp. I 0. 19 . 
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vote was already 20% of the electorate in 1945."51 Therefore, the purpose of the 
Marshall aid was to prevent Western Europe from falling under the domination of the 
Soviet Union as well as creating profitable markets for the USA by reconstructing 
their economies. Obviously, this plan was faced with the severe criticisms from the 
Soviet Union which regarded the Marshall Plan "as blatant American imperialism." 
After the Paris Conference of 16 European countries in July, 1947, the Soviet Union 
in order to provide economic aid to Eastern Europe, declared the Molotov Plan. 52 
In May, 1947, a US mission headed by General L. E. Oliver visited Turkey in 
order to determine needs for the allocation of funds that was authorized by the 
Congress. According to Oliver, Turkey was not in need of additional economic 
assistance since it was believed that Turkey's needs were met by the Truman 
Doctrine. The Oliver group expected that Turkey would be self-sufficient after 
receiving military aid for five years. Turkey's· economy was sound, it was not war 
weary, and it was considered as a contributor to the ERP and as an agricultural 
country it could provide agricultural products to Western European countries. Hence, 
Turkey was regarded as a contributor rather than being a recipient of foodstuffs. 
Because, in 1947 the serious problem in Western Europe was shortage of food. The 
postwar recovery in agricultural production was inadequate. The population 
increased by 17 million, however, the postwar level of agricultural production 
dropped to 20-25% below the 1938 levels. However, Turkey could not have been a 
contributor· but a recipient to the ERP, because of the continuation of its heavy 
military expenditures. 53 
51 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and 
the Cold War, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 7. 
52 Theodore Wilson, The Marshall Plan, pp. 19. 
53 George Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 31-32; Leyla ~en, "Highway Improvement & Agricultural 
Mechanization: Turkish High Priority Economic Development Projects in the Framework of "Free" 
World Recovery Program & Their Repercussions," (Unpublished M.A. Thesis to Bilkent University, 
June 1997), pp. 6-7. 
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However, Turkey was in need of aid hence, in July 1947, during the Paris 
Conference, it requested 615 million dollars for economic development against its 
heavy defense burden. But, only 10 million dollars in credits were given to Turkey in 
mid-March 1948 by the USA. On July 12, 1947, an agreement between Turkey and 
the USA was signed according to which military aid would be given to Turkey.54 By 
this agreement although Turkey got military aid, its dependence on the USA began. 
Because, according to the 4th article of this agreement, 
Determined and equally in interested to assure the security of any article, 
service, or information received by the government of Turkey pursuant to 
this agreement, the governments of the US and Turkey will respectively 
take after consultation such measures as the other government may judge 
necessary for this purpose. The government of Turkey will not transfer, 
without the consent of the government of the US, title to or possession of 
any such article or information nor permit, without such consent, the use 
of any such article or the use or disclosure of any such information by or 
to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the government of Turkey 
or for any purpose other than that for which the article or information is 
furnished. ss 
This article would be the source of the deterioration of the relations between 
two countries by the Cyprus crisis in 1964. The Johnson letter pointed to this article 
and argued that Turkey should ask the approval of the USA in order to use this 
military aid for purposes other than decided in this agreement. 56 Also, according to 
the 61h article, this aid could be withdrawn upon the request of the Turkish 
government, or the US government, or if the Security Council or the General 
Assembly of the UN considered that this aid was unnecessary. Moreover, the 3rd 
article required that the aid program would be observed and reported by the 
5~ Mehmet Gonliibol-Haluk Ulman, et.al. " Truman Doktrini ve Marshall Plaru:' in Olaylarla Tiirk 
D1~ Politikas1, pp. 221-222; Duygu Sezer, "TUrkiye"nin Ekonomik ili~kileri." in ibid., p. 440. 
55 FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, pp. 190-192. 
56 Sezai Orkunt, Tiirkiye-ABD Askeri ili~kileri (istanbul: Milliyet Yaymlan. 1978). pp. 98. 195: 
Haydar Tunc;kanat, ikili Anla~malarin ly_viizii, (Ankara: Ekim Yaymevi. 1970). p. 32. 
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representatives of the US Press and Radio. 57 Hence, the pnce was the loss of 
autonomy to some extent in return for US military aid. 
In September 194 7, the Turkish government declared its desire to reduce its 
armed forces from about 485,000 to about 330,000 men. And, it also required an 
additional 100 million dollars from the USA. The partial demobilization of the armed 
forces did not lead to resentment of the American and British governments. The 
British government argued that the Soviet pressure over Turkey would continue and 
was conditioned on the probable action of the other powers regardless of the size of 
the Turkish armed forces. Hence, as long as the American and British policy was 
maintained the reductions in the strength of the Turkish army would have no effect. 
58 But, the US government suggested in order not to encourage the Soviet Union, 
Turkey should handle the reduction in a way to give impression that it was 
reorganizing its armed forces, and should demonstrate that there was no change in 
its policy toward the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Washington refused to furnish 
additional 100 million dollar aid to Turkey. 59 
During 1948, Turkey was still in need of aid. Because, despite the US aid there 
was not too much difference in the situation of Turkey from the time of the 
enactment of the Public Law 75. Because, in order to maintain the equipment that 
was given to Turkey, nearly TL 400 million was spent. Hence, despite the aid there 
was no significant reduction in the defense expenditures. In addition to this fact, in 
order to get auxiliary materials for this equipment, Turkey was faced with the 
problem of finding foreign currency. Payments for these materials cost higher, in 
57 FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, pp. 190-192. 
58 Ibid .. p. 351. 
59 Ibid .. pp. 352-353, 364, 525-526. 
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fact, approximately 4 or 5 times the normal price.60 On January 23, 1948, the 
Acting Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey, Walter Wilds, argued to the Under 
Secretary of State, Robert A. Lovett, that the funds which had been given were not 
sufficient to modernize and strengthen the Turkish army. Since, the Turkish position 
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union was dangerous, he emphasized the fact that American 
..• 
support was vitally important to strengthen the morale of the Turkish people as well 
as to discourage Soviet aggression. The Turkish army could not hold out against a 
Soviet attack until outside assistance came, because funds were not adequate. Also 
the maintenance of such a large am1y was a big burden on the Turkish economy 
which was curtailing its economic productivity as well as capital improvement which 
were necessary for raising the living standard of the Turkish peasant and workmen 
and the reverse of this would weaken Turkey's resistance to any Soviet aggression or 
inflitration of Communist ideas. Therefore, direct US support, which would create a 
firm, public commitment was necessary for Turkey's resistance to Soviet pressures. 
Wilds suggested that the future US aid could be in the form of firm public 
commitment of guaranteeing the national integrity of Turkey, or providing 
additional financial aid to Turkey to maintain the strength of its armed forces as well 
as its public morale. Financial aid was regarded as more flexible since it would 
remain limited, and thus was more acceptable to the US Congress and the public.61 
The US Turkish special agreement was signed on July 4, 1948, which entitled 
Turkey to achieve Marshall aid. According to the Foreign Assistance Act, the USA 
extended aid to Greece and Turkey, amounting to 225 million dollars. 75 million 
60 Mehmet Gonliibol-Haluk Oiman. et.al. "Truman Doktrini ve Marshall Plam," in Olay/aria Turk Di$ 
Politikas1, p. 220; Duygu Sezer. "Tiirkiye'nin Ekonomik ili~kileri:· in ibid .. p. 440; Haydar 
Tun<;kanat. iki/i ,,.J.n/a.pnalann i1,-yidi, pp. 29-30, 34. 
Cd Ihid .. pp. 34-35. 
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dollars were given to Turkey.62 In October, 1949, the US Senate approved the 
Mutual Defense Assistance Act which provided 500 million dollars to NA TO 
members. A special budget was created for Greece and Turkey which amounted to 
211,370,000 dollars. Also, by Point Four, Turkey received the US technical 
assistance. However, this aid was not enough for Turkey's realization of its goal of 
industrialization. And, after the establishmerit of NATO on April 4, 1949, Turkey 
both as a part of its Westernization policy of being a part of the Western world, as 
well as providing the maintenance of the US aid, began its endeavors to be a member 
of that organization. 
62 Mehmet Gonliibol and Haluk ihman, et.al ·'Truman Doktrini ve Marshall Plan1:· in Olay/aria Tiirk 
Dt§ Politikas1, pp. 218-222; Sezai Orkunt, Tiirkiye-ABD Askeri lli§kileri. p. 143. Of this 75 million 
dollar aid 29 million dollars were furnished to the ground forces, 36 million dollars to air forces, and 
I 0 million dollars to navy forces of Turkey. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TURKEY'S ENDEAVORS TO JOIN NATO 
4.1 Introduction 
The Coup in Czechoslavakia which took place on February 25, 1948, led to 
discussions between the Western European states and the USA regarding the 
establishment of a defensive alliance. The result of these discussions was the signing 
of the Brussels Treaty on March 17, 1948 by Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, and Luxembourg. This mutual assistance pact was directed against the 
Soviet Union. However, without American military support this accord could not be 
effective. Therefore, a debate on linking the USA to the Brussels Treaty began. On 
March 17, 1948. Truman, pointing to the increasing Soviet threat to Western Europe, 
suggested to Congress that the USA should give its full support to the Western 
European countries, especially those that were signatories of the Brussels Treaty. 1 
The Berlin blockade of June 24, 1948, ended remaining expectations for 
cooperation with the Soviet Union. From July 1948 up to April 1949, the debate was 
about the extension of the Brussels Treaty into a North Atlantic defense arrangement 
with the inclusion of the USA. 2 On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was 
signed by which, the world was divided into two blocs not only economically and 
politically, but also militarily. The signing of this treaty was a turning point for the 
1 James Nathan and James Oliver, US Foreign Policy and World Order, pp. 63-64. 
2 Ibid. pp. 68, 70-71. "Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-
Defense (Brussels Treaty), signed March 17, 1948, and put into effect August 25, 1948, establishing 
the Western Union of France, Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands. and Luxembourg." Thomas 
Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, (eds.) Containment: Documents on American Polic_v and Strategy, 
1945-1950, New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 145 (ff.) 
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USA. Because, originally, containment policy relied only on economic assistance. 
The Marshall Plan did not require US military commitment. George Kennan argued 
that since the Soviet Union had no aim of waging war, it was not necessary to furnish 
military assistance. Economic assistance could be the primary instrument of the 
containment policy. The aim of the Marshall Plan was to provide for the economic 
recovery of Western Europe, so that the Soviet Union could not benefit from a 
possible economic and political chaos. Kennan did not regard Europe and Asia in the 
American sphere of influence. For him, these regions would be independent centers of 
influence both from the USA and Soviet Union. "Kennan hoped for a world order 
based not on superpower hegemony but on the natural balance only diverse 
concentrations of authority, operating independently of one another, could provide."3 
He argued in the "X" article, that in the end a self-confident Europe would provide the 
best possible bulwark against Soviet aggressive tendencies; by 1947 he and other 
influential policy makers had become convinced that without American help in 
rebuilding Europe's war-shattered economies such self-confidence would never 
develop.4 
However, the Czech coup and the Berlin blockade made clear that furnishing 
only economic assistance was not enough to provide security for Europe, which faced 
an overwhelming Soviet military presence. At that time the USA was providing 
military assistance on a country-by-country basis to Turkey, Greece, China, the 
Philippines, and certain Latin American countries.5 Therefore, the NSC 1411, dated 
July 1, 1948, "The Position of the US with Respect to Providing Military Assistance 
3Thomas Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, (eds.) Containment: Documents 011 American Policy and 
Strategy, 1945-1950, p. 31. 
4 Ibid., p. I 0 I. 
~ Ibid., pp. 90. 
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to Nations of the Non-Soviet World," argued that the USA should provide military 
assistance. 
The success of certain free nations in resisting aggression by the forces of 
Soviet directed world communism is of critical importance to the security 
of the US. Some of these nations require not only economic assistance but 
also strengthened military capabilities if they are to continue and make 
more effective their political resistance to communist subversion from 
within and Soviet pressure from without and if they are to develop 
ultimately an increased military capability to withstand external armed 
attack. Although they possess considerable military potential in 
manpower and resources, these nations are industrially incapable of 
producing intricate modern armaments and equipment in the necessary 
quantities. Consequently if they are to develop stronger military 
capabilities it is essential that their own efforts be effectively coordinated 
and be supplemented by assistance in the form of military supplies, 
equipment and technical advice from the US. Such military assistance 
from the US would not only strengthen the moral and material resistance 
of the free nations, but would also support their political and military 
orientation toward the us ... 6 
Regarding the territorial scope of the North Atlantic Security Pact, on 
November 23, 1948, report of the Policy Planning Staff PPS 43, "Considerations 
Affecting the Conclusion of a North Atlantic Security Pact," stated that the scope of 
the pact had to be restricted to the North Atlantic area since enlarging it beyond this 
region would have undesirable consequences. It was argued that "the admission of 
any single country beyond the North Atlantic area would be taken by others as 
constituting a precedent, and would almost certainly lead to a series of demands from 
states still further afield that they be similarly treated. Failure on our part to satisfy 
these further demands would then be interpreted as lack of interest in the respective 
countries, and as evidence that we had 'written them off to the Russians."7 On April 
4, 1949, parties to the North Atlantic Treaty declared that: 
6 Ibid., pp. 128-129. 
7 Ibid., p. 155. 
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They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and 
civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, 
individual liberty, and the rule of law. 
They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic Area. 
They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the 
preservation of peace and security.8 
4.2 Turkey Seeks US Military and Economic Guarantees 
From mid-1948 until its entrance to NATO, Turkey sought from the USA to provide 
formal guarantees for its security. After the Czech coup and the Berlin blockade, the 
USA's primary concern was the establishment of a formal collective security 
arrangement for Europe without mention of Turkey. Discussions about the 
establishment of a Middle East pact had already started. The Greek Ambassador to 
Washington, Vassili Dendramis, on February 4, 1948, suggested the establishment of 
forming an entente between Greece, Italy, Turkey and the Arab states under the 
leadership of the great powers, mainly the USA and, Great Britain which could "give 
the necessary support and encouragement."9 However, Turkey was doubtful about the 
establishment of such a pact on three grounds. Firstly, the Middle East pact was such 
a "grandiose" concept that could not be realized, and even if it was realized on paper 
it would not have any real value or effectiveness. Secondly, it might provoke the 
Soviet Union and its satellites since it would be considered that it was established 
against them. Therefore, the establishment of such a pact would not provide security 
but insecurity, since this could be used as pretext to take action against Turkey and 
Greece. And, lastly, the extent of the US military support to the Eastern 
Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries was not clear. 10 Turkish doubts were 
confirmed on April 23, 1948. The US Undersecretary of State, Robert Lovett, argued 
that the USA was not against such proposals, but made clear that it was neither 
8 Ibid., p. 335. 
9 Ibid., p. 41. 
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prepared to make any promises nor take any initiative about the proposed pact. The 
US Department of State regarded the prospect of including Arab states suspect, 
hence, suggested a trilateral Italian-Greek-Turkish declara~ion which seemed more 
advantageous. 11 
On May 11, 1948, the Turkish Ambassador Baydur, criticized US policy toward 
Turkey, because the USA was giving certain guarantees to Western European 
countries against aggression without any mention of Turkey. Baydur mentioned the 
existence of a small minority who were pro-Soviet in Turkey arguing that for such a 
small country like Turkey, it was hopeless to resist the Soviet Union. Hence, Turkey 
should voluntarily enter the Soviet sphere of influence. Baydur argued that the present 
American policy, which gave the impression that the security of Western Europe was 
more important than Turkey's, would not only encourage the Soviets to increase their 
pressures against Turkey, but also strengthen this minority group while undermining 
public morale. He also expressed the disappointment of the Turkish public regarding 
reduction of the European Recovery Program (ERP), assistance to Turkey. 12 
At the end of the Washington Security Talks which were held during July 6-
September 9, 1948, between the representatives of Belgium, Luxembourg, France, the 
UK, Canada, and the USA, "the Washington Paper" was drafted. It explicitly 
recognized the existence of a tie between European security and the USA, and 
"denigrated the possibility of "peaceful coexistence" with Soviet communism, and 
surveyed the practical problems of defining a North Atlantic security area." 13 
On the same day, the Turkish Ambassador to the USA, Feridun Cemal Erkin, 
reiterated Turkey's desire to adhere to the western union or to some other regional 
10 FRUS, 1948, Vol. IV, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1974), pp. 71-72. 
11 Ibid., p.79. 
12 Ibid., pp. 83-85. 
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arrangement within the framework of the Vanderberg resolution. He argued that the 
Soviet propaganda line aimed at political and economic difficulties in Turkey. The 
fact that the USA gave security guarantees to West European countries while not 
giving the same guarantees to Turkey would weaken public support to the leaders 
who pursued a firm policy against Soviet pressures. Hence, in order to overcome this 
political difficulty, Erkin suggested a regional arrangement which would include 
Greece and Turkey with the support of the USA and Great Britain. He also expressed 
his personal view that the US government could declare its interest in Turkey bolder 
than it had declared in the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill. But this request was refused by the 
Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs (NBA), Joseph C. Satterthwaite, who 
argued that Soviet foreign policy was being conducted by a "gangster system" which 
cost very little. However, the USA having assumed enormous responsibilities, had to 
make large expenditures in the Far East, which meant reduction in the expenditures 
for Europe. 14 Meanwhile the Greek government proposed a Greek-Turkish-Iranian 
pact with association of the USA. Egypt's inclusion was also considered. 15 
Turkey was being left alone in the political arena. Moreover, it faced the 
problem of the reduction in US military and economic aid. By the Truman Doctrine 
13 Thomas Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, (eds.) Containment: Documents on American Policy and 
Strategy, 1945-1950, p. 144. 
14 FRUS, 1948, Vol. IV, pp. 148-149; George McGhee,ABD-Tiirkiye-~\:4TO-Ortadogu. (Ankara: Bilgi 
Yaymevi, 1992), p. 111; Feridun Cerna! Erkin, D1~irferinde 34 rd, Cilt, 1, (Ankara: Tiirk Tarih 
Kurumu Bas1mevi, 1986), pp. 15-16."In 1948, NSC-9 recommended that the US approach the 
members of the Brussels Pact about concluding a collective defense agreement for North Atlantic Area. 
It noted that, because it was an election year, Congress would not be in session long enough to consider 
American membership in the proposed alliance in 1948. But preliminary steps could be taken. The 
document suggested a resolution declaring it to be the sense of the Senate that the US policy should 
favor regional and collective arrangements under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which the Brussels Pact 
was. US policy also should manifest a willingness to associate with such arrangements. To obtain a 
show of bipartisan support for the new policy the administration wanted the resolution introduced by a 
Republican. Vanderberg agreed to do it, and he and Lovett drafted Senate Resolution 239 "the 
Vanderberg Resolution." The Vanderberg Resolution, pointed the way toward a US military alliance 
with Western Europe and was the forerunner of unprecedented American participation in NATO in 
1949. The Senate adopted the resolution, 64 to 4." Robert J. Donovan, Conflict & Crisis: The 
Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948, pp. 365-366. 
15 FRUS, 1948, Vol. IV, p. 173. 
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which was implemented on the basis of Public Law 75 and Title III of public Law 
472, during the 801h Congress, limited military assistance would be provided until the 
end of 1948 to Turkey for modernizing its army while releasing manpower for 
productive work. This should have sufficed to enhance confidence among the Turkish 
public facing Soviet pressures. And, even though Secretary Marshall requested the 
maintenance of additional appropriations for the fiscal year 1949, continuation of this 
aid was not clear. Because, the appropriations were requested by the Congress on a 
year-by-year basis. At that time, the US government was hesitant to include Turkey 
and Greece in its long-range strategic interests. For this reason, the US Department of 
State requested from the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee 
(SANACC), to submit proposals to the National Security Council (NSC), in order to 
decide whether assisting Turkey and Greece militarily through providing equipment 
as well as advisory personnel was justified, and whether the continuation of this aid 
was advised when the long-range security interests of the USA were taken into 
consideration. It was stated that "there is involved the question of priority of such 
assistance in conformity in comparison with other strategic demands, relationship to 
the US policies with respect to the so-called "Western Union" countries, any "Eastern 
Mediterranean Bloc" which may develop, possible plans for defense of the Persian 
Gulf oil area, and policies of the UK." 16 
The Director of the office of NEA, Satterthwaite, on October 26, 1948, like 
Erlcin, mentioned the danger of publicly declaring that the USA would come to the 
assistance of Western European countries in case of an armed attack against them, 
while not extending the same guarantee to countries that were threatened equally and 
have little means to defend themselves compared to the Western European countries. 
Because, this situation would give the false impression that the USA was not 
16 Ibid., pp. 158-160; George McGhee, .-IBD-Tiirk~re-:\'.-JTO-Ortado[!u. p. 110. 
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concerned with the security of these countries, and it was refraining from making any 
commitment to defend them in case of an attack. This would increase the possibility 
of the Soviet Union to increase its pressure over these countries and might even lead 
to use of force. Moreover, this would also damage to political leaders in these 
countries who were supportive of Western powers and might lead to the reversal of 
their policies by following a pro-Soviet line. Therefore, the NEA argued that public 
assurances which were given regarding the defense of Western European countries 
should also be given to the countries that were threatened by the Soviet Union. 
However, it was argued that this would not necessarily require "a close mutual 
assistance pact of the type of that contemplated for the North Atlantic region," nor 
would it require to provide military assistance to those countries. 17 
The US government gave foremost primacy to Western Europe, while Acheson 
defined Western Europe as "the keystone of the world." 18 However, it was accepted 
that the Middle East region was also vitally important and had an "auxiliary 
relationship to Western Europe" by holding the largest oil sources and offering bases, 
for "airfields on which the US and British strategic plans depended." 19 For the USA, 
the Middle East region was a peripheral ar_ea, of secondary importance which would 
be utilized for the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan.20 The American 
objective was "to bring nations into a US-led orbit in order to insure that they would 
cooperate strategically in wartime and allow Western corporations to develop and 
control their petroleum resources in peacetime." However, these objectives were 
difficult to attain because, this region was characterized with "poverty, strife, 
17 FRUS, 1948, Vol. IV, p. 174. 
18 Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the 
Cold War, p. 277. 
19 Ibid., pp. 237-238, 310. 
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nationalist fervor, and regional hatreds."21 This was realized by the US planners who 
stated in early 1949 that the USA could not defend the Middle East. 
On November 24, 1948, the JCS declared that the security of the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Middle East were vitally important for future US security. 
Greece and Turkey were the two countries with strategic importance that would stand 
against any Soviet expansion. Therefore, it was accepted that neither of these 
countries should fall under Soviet domination. Both Turkey and Greece offered bases 
which could be used by the Soviet Union during an operation against the islands of 
Crete, Rhodes, and Cyprus as well as against communications in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Middle East. Strategically, Turkey was more important than 
Greece, because, it dominated the main "air, land, and sea routes from the USSR to 
the Cairo-Suez area and to the Middle East oil fields." 22 
Although Turkey was regarded as important to US security concerns, on 
December 15, 1948, Robert Lovett argued that Turkey was neither in Western Europe 
nor on the Atlantic, therefore it was doubtful that Turkey could be regarded as a 
geographical part of the North Atlantic group. Thus, Turkey was advised not to insist 
on inclusion in the North Atlantic group. At the same time, in order not to discourage 
Turkey, the USA reiterated the continuation of its military aid program as well as its 
diplomatic support as clear evidence of the fact that Turkey had a special place in US 
foreign policy. The exclusion of Turkey from this pact opened the possibility of the 
establishment of a possible Mediterranean security arrangement with other 
Mediterranean countries as an alternative. However, Turkey could not get US support 
on this issue. As a response to the Turkish proposal of a Mediterranean Pact, Lovett 
11 Ibid., p. 286. 
21 Ibid., pp. 191-192. 
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expressed that he was neither encouraging nor discouraging the establishment of such 
a pact, while suggesting that the Turks should be patient and not be discouraged. 23 
During February 1949, Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak actively explored the 
possibilities for establishing a Mediterranean Pact. Therefore, he journeyed to 
London, Paris and Brussels but, he could not achieve any results. The USA insisted 
that it was neither for nor against to such a regional grouping. 24 
Meanwhile, Turkey was still needed the continuation of US financial aid. 
However, the ECA aid was reduced. Therefore, on February 19, 1949, Sadak 
expressed the anxieties of the Turkish government about the reduction of aid to 
Turkey in the ECA's recent requests of the Congress. However, Averell Harriman, 
argued that parts of the development program were beyond the scope of ECA 
financing. Therefore, he suggested that Turkey should push the negotiation to obtain 
World Bank funds in order to finance some of these projects. Sadak reiterated 
Turkey's need for the continuance of foreign assistance. Because, 48% of the 
Turkish budget was devoted to defense purposes which drained sources to be spent 
for constructive purposes.25 
On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. The Turkish 
government expressed its willingness to join the treaty. Because, its exclusion might 
indicate the reduction of US strategic interest as well as reduction of US aid. 
Although the American and British ambassadors informed Turkey that the 
arrangement was a geographical one, which contained only countries of the North 
Atlantic region, Turkey learned that Italy, which was a Mediterranean country, as well 
as territory in North Africa comprising the Algerian departments of France, would be 
included in the scope of the North Atlantic Pact. This led to increased Turkish 
23 Ibid., p. 214. 
2~ FRUS, 1949, Vol. VI, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977), p. 1669. 
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objections and deep uneasiness in the Turkish public. Turkey felt itself abandoned, 
because the USA pledged itself to come immediately to the aid of the Western 
European countries in case of an attack, but such a guarantee was not offered to 
Turkey. Therefore, it was feared that the USA would no longer maintain a powerful 
interest in the maintenance of Turkey's independence and territorial integrity against 
potential Soviet pressures. On April 12, 1949, Sadak told Acheson that he was unable 
to explain this situation to the Turkish Parliament and public, and requested his help. 
Acheson rejected the idea that the USA had abandoned Turkey, and he reminded 
Sadak that the American government had not lost its interest in Turkey which could 
be obviously seen by statements during the beginning of 1946, made by Truman and 
Acheson regarding the Soviet Union's claims over the Turkish Straits. Secondly, the 
USA provided military assistance to Turkey, and in a few days a new military 
assistance bill would be presented to the Congress. In addition to this, Turkey 
benefited from the ERP for its economic development. Regarding the invitation of 
Italy, Acheson stated that France argued that throughout history, Italy was the back 
door into France by which attacks were made upon it; thus, it was necessary to 
include Italy in this arrangement. However, the USA did not give any guarantees 
about the extention of the Atlantic Pact or support of a possible Mediterranean Pact of 
which Turkey would be a member. When Sadak asked whether the US would come to 
the assistance of Turkey in case of an attack, Acheson stated that "one of the most 
marked characteristics of President Truman was that once his word was given there 
was no going back on it; it was therefore doubly important to be prudent and sure of 
our ground before undertaking to give assurances. "26 
25 Ibid., pp. 1643-1644. 
26 Ibid., p. 1652. 
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Facing this stalemate, the Turkish government was trying to ensure the 
maintenance of US economic aid to Turkey. On April 14, 1949, Sadak in his meeting 
with Assistant of State for Economic Affairs, Willard Thorp, requested enhancement 
of US financial aid since the defense burden problem of Turkey continued and 
created an obstacle for internal contributions to financing ECA and anticipated IBRD 
projects. Therefore, Sadak requested an additional 30 million dollars under the 
military aid program so as to finance current consumption items. 27 However, this 
request was refused and Turkey was advised to submit its proposal to the 
Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), by which it would be 
possible for the ECA to increase its allocation to Turkey.28 But, the Turkish 
government thought that the OEEC countries would not be sympathetic to additional 
Turkish request or ECA aid, because this would mean a reduction in their own shares. 
Therefore, Sadak requested from Acheson that Turkey be judged by the same criteria 
as Greece for political reasons. 29 However, Thorp stated to Erkin, under Public Law 
75, the Greek-Turkish Aid Act of May 22, 1947, the USA granted 100 million dollars 
for military, naval, and air force modernization and training programs, as well as a 
limited public roads program. Under Public Law 472, additional allotment was 
provided with an estimated value between 50,000,000 and 75,000,000 dollars. In 
addition to this, the USA welcomed Turkey's participation in the ERP, and a limited 
amount of ECA funds were being made available on a credit basis. Turkey, by 
entering the war late, had escaped from the destructions of the war; therefore, it had 
no reconstruction problems. In addition to this, it had gold reserves. Hence, it was 
assumed that Turkey could contribute to the European recovery by increasing 
production and export of foodstuffs and minerals. The Turkish government was 
17 Ibid., p. 1653. 
28 . Ibid., pp. 1657-1659. 
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advised to take measures to attract foreign as well as domestic private investments. 
Also, unlike Poland and Rumania, there were no native communist elements in 
Turkey, it was oriented toward western democracies, and it was determined to resist 
to the Soviet Union. Turkey with all these qualifications played a stabilizing role in 
the Middle East, therefore Thorp maintained that the USA was determined to continue 
its assistance, to prevent any Turkish hesitation about resisting Soviet pressures. 30 
Meanwhile, the US government was still reluctant to undertake actions which 
gave credence to the Soviet thesis that the North Atlantic Treaty was aggressive in 
intent and operation. For this reason, on April 15, 1949, the Department of State did 
not approve the construction of airfields and the stockpiling of aviation gasoline in 
Turkey, since this action would cause doubts on the defensive character of the North 
Atlantic Treaty.31 
The American attitude toward Turkey increased Turkish anxieties as to whether 
the US was at the verge of abandoning it. As a response to the Turkish doubts 
regarding US policy, on April 26, 1949, Truman assured Inonu by reiterating his 
address to the Congress of March 12 by which he tried to make clear that the signing 
of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT), would not reduce the interest of the USA in the 
maintenance of the independence and integrity of Turkey as well as other countries 
outside the Atlantic area. Truman argued that Turkey's security would be enhanced 
by strengthening the collective security of the Atlantic Treaty countries. He stated, 
... the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in no wise diminishes the 
concern felt in the US for the maintenance of the independence and 
integrity of Turkey and other free nations outside the Atlantic area; but 
rather, by strengthening the collective security of the Atlantic Treaty 
countries, the creation of this pact serves to enhance Turkey's security as 
29 Ibid., p. 1659. 
30 Ibid., pp. 1660-1663, 1665-1667, 1669; Feridun Cemal Erkin, D1~iJ!erinde 3-1 ril, pp. 107-113, 131-
132. 
31 FRUS, 1949, Vol. VI, p. 1655. 
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well. Through it, the principles first enunciated with respect to Greece and 
Turkey are further implemented with respect to other freedom-loving 
peoples of the community of nations.32 
On May 5, 1949, the US Department of State declared that the foremost aim of 
the USA in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East was promotion of peace and 
stability. Turkey was recognized as an obstacle to Soviet expansioq_ in the Near East 
hence, a vital strategic area which could be used as a base by the USA and its allies in 
case of war. Turkey's firm resistance against Soviet pressures led to the continuation 
of US military and economic aid. This stance led to debates whether to provide 
security commitment to Turkey either by inclusion in NATO or by the establishment 
of a regional defensive arrangement.33 
During Secretary Snyder's visit in July 18-20, 1949, to Ankara, Inonu argued 
that since both countries had a common cause, which was defense against the Soviet 
Union, military aid was not sufficient, but financial aid should also be extended to 
Turkey, because Turkey would suffer from financial difficulties in the next two or 
three years. Financial remedies which could be provided by national means was 
doubtful, since the deficit in the national budget was growing, and once the financial 
equilibrium was upset, the Turkish economy would worsen, and, the armed forces 
could not subsist. 34 
The National Security Council (NSC), drew attention to the strategic importance 
of Turkey and Greece so that they would not fall under Soviet domination, and that 
this necessitated the continuation of US aid to Turkey. Since strategically Turkey was 
more important than Greece, the USA had long-range strategic interests in its military 
establishments. Therefore, if Turkey fell under Soviet domination, the security 
32 Ibid., pp. 1656-1657. 
33 Ibid., pp. 1660, 1669-1670. 
·
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interests of the USA in the Middle East as well as the Mediterranean would be 
hampered. For this reason, the National Security Council (NSC), suggested that the 
USA should take these facts into consideration while providing military aid programs 
to Turkey by which it should strengthen Turkey's position against Soviet pressures.35 
The lack of an invitation to Turkey to be a founding member of the Council of 
Europe on May 5, 1949, increased Turkey's feeling of abandonment. Although the 
Council of Europe was only a political organization, Turkey as a continuation of its 
institutional Westernization policy was eager to be a part of this organization. 
Exclusion from this European organization led to bitter criticisms in Turkey. "After 
much behind-the-scenes activity," on August 8, 1949, Turkey and Greece were 
invited to be members of the Council of Europe.36 
In 1950, Turkey was still in need of economic aid. Turkey, because of its 
proximity to the Soviet Union, maintained large armed forces which was a heavy 
burden on its budget which still amounted to nearly half of its national budget (35-
40%). Hence, it could not finance investment projects. On the other hand, the Western 
European countries were spending only small amounts of their budgets for defense. 
For instance, Belgium was spending 8% and France was spending between 18-20% of 
their budgets for national defense. Therefore, these countries could reach their prewar 
production levels and were continuing their economic development. However, Turkey 
still could not begin to start economic development projects. Obtaining US 
Congressional approval for aid was the main obstacle for Turkey. Because, it was not 
possible for the USA to provide direct military aid from its budget outside the existing 
military aid programs. Therefore, on February 1, 1950, Sadak suggested that the US 
35 Ibid., pp. 278-279. 
36 George Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 38; Mehmet Gonli.ibol-Haluk Ulman. et.al. .. Bloklarm Kurulu~u 
ve TUrkiye," in Olay/aria Tiirk D1J Politikas1, pp. 226-227: ilter Turan-Dilek Barias. --sati ittifakma 
109 
could furnish Turkey with some consumer goods for military use. Sadak argued that 
this would help Turkey's need in this field and would lighten the burden on its 
defense budget. However, this request was refused by the head of the Economic 
Cooperation Administration (ECA), Paul G. Hoffmann, who suggested that Turkey 
should look to the OEEC to get assistance of that kind. It was argued that Turkey 
should attract private investment and this would be the a permanent solution to 
Turkey's economic problems. Therefore, upon Turkey's request, Hoffmann, arranged 
appointments with American bankers. But, the proximity of Turkey to the Soviet 
Union was discouraging for the private investors. They required the guarantee of 
Turkish gold reserves for loans. This was of course refused by Sadak. However, 
because the Marshall Plan credits were decreasing Sadak, requested Hoffmann' s 
assistance to obtain the same aid conditions in the coming year by reiterating the 
immense burden on Turkey's defense budget. Sadak stated that even if Turkey could 
not get assistance, it would keep its army strong because it faced Soviet danger at its 
border. But, he did not know how this could be done without help. Hoffmann stated 
that he would do everything he could in order to promote a general understanding of 
Turkey. Harriman suggested that Turkey should include in its program for OEEC a 
request for consumer goods that were necessary to finance its investment and 
development programs under the ERP, and attract private investment by creating a 
climate which would encourage the flow of the American capital to Turkey. At that 
time, "the Turkish government introduced a bill to the Grand National Assembly 
guaranteeing foreign investments, their right to transfer reasonable profits out of the 
Dye Olmamn Tiirk Dt~ Politikas1 Dzerindeki Etkileri." in Faruk Sonmezoglu (ed.) Tiirk D1~· 
Po/itikas1m11 Analizi, (2'"1 ed.) (istanbul: Der Yaymlan. 1998). 
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country and offering other additional guarantees." But still the US capital was moving 
slowly to Turkey. 37 
Turkish economic policy was also criticized by the ECA Mission Chief in 
Turkey, Russell Dorr, who argued that the Turkish government was not making 
serious efforts to balance the budget and create internal financial stability. Dorr 
suggested to the Turkish government that it should undertake a development program 
within its financial capabilities, because, the ECA funds would be on a declining 
scale. It was anticipated that for the fiscal year beginning March 1, 1951, the 
budgetary deficit would be TL 250,000,000 in contrast to the fiscal year beginning 
March 1, 1950, of TL 155,000,000. And, balancing this amount by inflationary 
borrowing would undermine the objectives of the ECA program in Turkey. The 
Turkish budget was composed of two categories of expenditures: those for defensive 
purposes and for economic development. It was anticipated that there would not be a 
reduction in defense expenditures, and, therefore, Turkey had to curtail its economic 
development expenditures which meant limitation of the investment program for the 
fiscal year 1951.38 US military aid continued to Turkey during fiscal year 1950. 
Turkey would get 81 million dollars from a total amount of 265 million dollars aid for 
Greece and Turkey. This aid was in the form of material and training, effective in 
providing for the modernization of the Turkish army. Greater combat effectiveness 
with less number of men was achieved by this aid. But, the maintenance of the 
defense establishment still imposed a heavy burden on the Turkish economy which 
amounted nearly to 35-40% of Turkey's budgetary revenues. The direct Economic 
Cooperation Administration (ECA), assistance in fiscal year 1950 would be 59 
million dollars. For the fiscal year 1951, Turkey would receive 46 million dollars in 
37 FRUS, The Near East, South Africa, and Africa, 1950, Vol. V, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO. 1978), 
pp. 1224-1228. 
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direct ECA aid and 30 million dollars in drawing rights. These funds were utilized for 
purchasing modern agricultural equipment in order to enhance Turkey's agricultural 
production, to enlarge coal mines, to develop the transportation system, and power 
resources. However, the Under Secretary of State, James E. Webb, stated to the 
Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, Lay, that Turkey was still 
unable to overtake the economic burden to maintain modernization of its armed forces 
without direct US military aid and without the extention of economic aid through 
ECA. Therefore, Webb argued that the US aid to Turkey should be maintained.39 
On February· 15, 1950, Erkin proposed the establishment of a regional Near 
Eastern pact with the support of the USA. By proposing this pact, Erkin tried to 
extract some sort of a US security assurance to Turkey. But, he also argued that 
unilateral US assurance would also meet Turkish needs. Such an assurance could be 
in the form of a declaration by the American President which would put Turkey in the 
same category as members of the North Atlantic Pact. Such an assurance would also 
strengthen the Republican People's Party, (RPP) government before the coming 
Turkish elections.40 The Turkish government also suggested, while awaiting the 
decision for a US political commitment, that the General Staffs of the two countries 
could undertake discussions of common defense and assistance plans. However, this 
offer was refused by the USA on the ground that such planning could not be 
undertaken if there was not a prior political agreement.41 On March 20, 1950, the US 
government stated that under the present circumstances, the USA still could not 
consider extention of its formal security arrangements. However, General McBridge 
38 Ibid., pp. 1229-1230. 
39 Ibid., pp. 1236-1238. The US military aid made possible a reduction of the size of the Turkish armed 
forces from an estimated 500,000 men to less than 300,000 men in 1950. ''In fiscal year 1950, Turkey 
received 59 million dollars of direct ECA aid, of which 35 million was in the form of loans. plus a net 
figure of 46 million dollars of indirect aid in the form of drawing rights." Ibid. pp. 1317-1320. 
40 Ibid., p. 1232. 
41 Ibid., pp. 1236-1238. 
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accepted to give strategic military advice to Turkey within the limits of his authority. 
But, he also stated that such an advice would not mean that the USA would directly or 
indirectly commit itself to any future course of action.42 On March 26, 1950, the 
Army Chief of Staff, General Lawton J. Collins, stated to Inonu that in case of a war, 
there would be a tremendous strategic air offensive against the Soviet Union. Inonu 
requested more detail and asked whether the USA would bomb the Soviet Union if 
the latter attacked Turkey. General Collins answered, "if the Congress declared war 
the US would." It was his personal opinion that if the Soviet Union attacked Turkey, 
such an attack would be part of a world war.43 
The Turkish government could not achieve any American guarantee for its 
security, and was concerned over the revision of the Montreux Convention as 
suggested by the Soviet Union. Therefore, on April 27, 1950, Erkin, by pointing to the 
possibility of the Soviet Union to create a crisis in order to alter the Montreux 
Convention in 1951, suggested that the establishment of a Mediterranean security pact 
would enhance the confidence of Turkey as well as serve as a warning to the Soviet 
Union. Erkin requested his suggestions to be included on the agenda of the London 
meetings. For Erl<ln, it was not possible to provide the security of the Atlantic area by 
excluding Turkey and Greece, both of which would provide for the security of the 
Eastern Mediterranean region. However, during the London meetings, the principal 
item was making NATO operational, hence its enlargement was not discussed. The 
US government thought that the time was not ripe to make concrete commitments to 
the Middle East, because European needs required priority. In order to compensate for 
~ 1 Ibid., pp. 1239-1240. 
H Ibid., p. 1246. 
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Turkey's disappointment, jet aircraft and rehabilitation of air strips at Diyarbaktr, 
Kayseri, and Eski~ehir were added to the US aid program. 44 
Nearly one month after the election of the Democratic Party, the Korean War 
started on June 25, 1950. On July, 25 1950, the Menderes government, in order to get 
an advantage for Turkey's acceptance to NATO, announced its decision to send a 
4,500 man unit to the Korean War. The Turkish forces fought successfully, but 
Turkey was the country had the greatest casualties proportionally after the USA. 45 
However, even these losses were not enough to provide for Turkey's entrance to 
NATO. Since, in October 1950, General Omar Bradley in his article in Reader's 
Digest, argued that Turkey, Siam, Burma, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq were within the 
scope of potential 'local war' area. And, he stated, "we will refuse absolutely to allow 
local wars to divert us unduly from our central task. They must not be allowed to 
consume so much of our manpower and resources as to destroy our strength and 
imperil our victory in a world way."46 
What caused the alteration of American policy to consider Turkey as a 
candidate was its anxiety that Turkey without security guarantees, might choose 
neutrality in case of a war. This possibility was mentioned in the report of NSC by the 
director of NSC, Paul Nitze, in the Spring of 1950. The NSC68 called for more 
military expenditures by pointing to the Soviet Union's achievement of nuclear 
capability. It was stated that there was no room for neutrality and diplomacy was 
44 Ibid., pp. 1252-1253, 1264-1265, 1270-1271; Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p. 353; 
Feridun Cerna! Erkin, Dz§i§lerinde 34 Yzl, pp. 174-175. 
45 Ibid., pp. 1286-1320. "Out of 29,882 Turks who participated in three years of combat, there were 706 
dead and 2, 111 wounded with 168 missing, and 219 known to be prisoners which amounted to 66% of 
Turkish forces that were sent to the war." George McGhee, ABD-Tiirkiye-.\'.4.TO-Ortadogu. p.143. 
46 I A temur Klh9. Turkey and the World, p. 157. 
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regarded as a zero-sum game. Therefore, Turkey, Greece, and Iran which resisted 
Soviet pressures were territories vital to US security concerns.47 
On August 25, 1950, Erkin told the Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, George McGhee, that in Europe there were 
three important organizations which were the OEEC, the Council of Europe and 
NATO. He reiterated Turkey's desire to join NATO. Italy, France and Canada 
indicated that they would support Turkey's admission if the USA agreed. Erkin also 
argued that the real danger came from the Eastern Mediterranean hence, in order to 
provide the security of the Mediterranean, it should be defended from its east, which 
meant the inclusion of Turkey to NATO. Therefore, Erkin requested form the USA to 
follow a more active policy during the New York meetings of September.48 
However, the JCS on September 9, 1950, argued that the inclusion of Greece 
and Turkey to NATO could adversely affect the progress which was achieved. 
Because the inclusion of these states would cause a problem in concerting military 
planning and actions in the Mediterranean and the Middle East with those already in 
progress in Western Europe. Therefore, the JCS offered to give these countries 
associate status by which their representatives would participate in coordinated 
planning against any Soviet attack. The JCS also evaluated the other alternatives. The 
first alternative was granting to Greece and Turkey a consultative status in NATO. 
However, the JCS argued that granting a consultative status would be only a 
temporary expedient and its effectiveness would be mostly on the extent and nature of 
the consultations which would be held. The second alternative was the establishment 
of a regional pact in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East area. However, 
since with the possible exception of Turkey, the countries in the Near and Middle East 
47 Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. pp. 314, 356-357, 360: Thomas Etzold and John Lewis 
Gaddis, (eds.) Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950, pp. 383-442. 
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were militarily weak, the establishment of such an arrangement was militarily 
unsound. The third alternative was a unilateral, non-reciprocal declaration by the 
USA, or possibly a multilateral declaration with Great Britain and France so as to 
make clear that an armed aggression against Turkey, Greece, or Iran would not be 
tolerated. The JCS did not favor such a commitment because, the USA had made a 
military commitment, and it could not provide more military aid in the near future. 
The JCS argued that the USA, by joining with Great Britain and France, could 
informally assure Turkey that a Soviet attack would mean the beginning of a global 
war and the three powers would act accordingly. Such assurances would dispel the 
Turkish feeling of insecurity and compensate to some extent the possible 
disappointment in Turkey's failure to achieve full membership in NATO. However, 
the JCS stated that the defensive strength of NATO did not achieve the necessary 
improvement which would permit Turkey's membership. Therefore, it suggested an 
associate status in NATO so that the representatives could participate in coordinated 
planning without delay. At the same time, it supported the idea of offering Turkey and 
Greece full membership as soon as the defense of the members of NATO were 
reasonably guaranteed. Regarding Iran, the JCS did not offer either a consultative 
status or associate status in NATO. 49 
The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Robert Schuman, informed Erkin that 
France would support the inclusion of Turkey in NATO. However, the smaller 
members opposed the extention of the treaty to Turkey. Therefore, Schuman 
suggested that Turkey could look for the establishment of a regional pact which 
would include France, Britain, and the USA. However, Turkey rejected the idea of the 
establishment of a regional pact as a substitute for membership in NATO. Therefore, 
~8 FRUS, 1950, Vol. V, pp. 1301-1302; Feridun Cerna! Erkin, D1~i~·/eri11de 3./ }"1/. pp. 159-160. 
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Turkey insisted that it would like to be a member of NATO. Erk.in argued that the 
attitude of the great powers especially of the USA, would be the determining factor in 
this decision, and not of the small states. For Erk.in, the issue of granting full 
membership to Turkey was more urgent than the previous year, because Turkish 
people began to feel very dissatisfied by being treated as second rate members of the 
European society. And, they felt that they were abandoned in spite of the Truman 
Doctrine and US aid.50 On September, 12, 1950, President Celal Bayar stated to the 
US Ambassador to Turkey, George Wadsworth, that the exclusion of Turkey from 
NATO despite Turkey's forthright action during the Korean War, would seriously 
affect the public morale which could be used by the Soviet Union as a means of 
propaganda.51 Hence, Turkey required not only US military and economic aid but also 
its full political and military commitment within the framework of a defense pact. 
Despite these endeavors of the Turkish government, the Foreign ministers of 
France, the USA, and Great Britain at their meeting in New York on September 13, 
1950, decided not to associate Turkey and Greece with NATO defense planning in the 
Mediterranean area. 52 
The usual Soviet propaganda against Turkey continued but, there were no 
special instances of Soviet pressure against Turkey. The only exception was an article 
of the official organ of the Soviet Navy Ministry, Red Fleet, on April 19, which 
proposed revision of the Montreux Convention on the Straits. The Soviet claim was 
responded to on April 21, by the US Secretary of State, that the Soviet claim was 
unacceptable. This led to Turkey's insistence to be included to NATO or some other 
50 Ibid., pp. 1310-1311. 
51 Ibid., p. 1312. 
51 Ibid., p. 1315. 
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regional security arrangement under the guarantee of the USA and possibly other 
allied military support in case of an attack. 53 
On September 19, 1950, the North Atlantic Treaty Council began to display 
signs of recognizing the importance of Turkey's role in the free world and the Near 
East region, but it was argued that without achieving the necessary strength within the 
pact, it was not possible to extend it to Turkey. However, it was suggested that Turkey 
could associate itself with appropriate phases to NATO's military planning regarding 
the defense of the Middle East area. The USA again refused to make any unilateral 
commitments to Turkey since it had already too many commitments.54 The USA only 
supported to grant associate status to Turkey and Greece by which their 
representatives could participate in coordinated planning without delay. However, this 
was not satisfactory for Turkey since it desired the full-fledged security arrangement 
with the USA either on a bilateral or multilateral basis. But, in October 1950, the 
Turkish government accepted associate membership. 55 
Meanwhile, US economic aid to Turkey was being reduced. On October 13, 
1950, the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and 
African Affairs, Burton Berry, informed Erkin that the ECA aid to be allocated to 
Turkey would be reduced in the coming fiscal year as a result of substantial 
reductions in ECA appropriations. 56 
Since Turkey was not successful in any of its attempts to gain formal US 
military commitment in case of a war with the Soviet Union, on January 24, 1951, 
Erkin proposed the extention of the US security commitment to Turkey through 
adhering to the British-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1939. Erkin 
53 Ibid., pp. 1317-1320. 
5~ Ibid., pp. 1320-1322. 
55 George Harris, Troubled Allicmce, p. 41. 
56 FRUS, 1950, Vol. V, pp. 1325-1326. 
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argued that this would have some advantages. First, it would eliminate the protracted 
discussions which would grant full membership to Turkey in NATO or the 
establishment of a regional organization. Secondly, since it would not be a regional 
arrangement, its scope and purpose would be limited hence, no other country would 
ask for inclusion. Erkin suggested that by changing article 3 of this treaty, the security 
·-
of Greece could be included which had not been a party to that treaty. 57 However, 
this proposal had little significance to provide security to Turkey. 58 
Although Turkey was faced with reductions in US economic aid as well as the 
unwillingness of the USA to make any formal commitment for its security, on January 
27, 1951, it sent additional units to Korea. On February 5, 1951, Henry S. Villard, in a 
memorandum to the Director of the PPS, Paul Nitze, drew attention to the 
importance of Turkey in the defense of the Mediterranean area which was vital to US 
security concerns. Therefore, he suggested that a formal American commitment in the 
form of a written guarantee to Turkey was necessary. This "would confirm Turkey's 
faith in the US and would assure the US of a strong fighting ally on the Eastern 
Mediterranean flank." On the other hand the JCS was opposed to any formal US 
commitment. But, Villard argued that a limited guarantee of the USA or allied air or 
naval support would satisfy Turkey. Because, the unwillingness of the USA to make 
any commitment led to anxieties in Turkey that it was not within the primary defense 
perimeter of the USA. At that time, Turkey accepted associated membership status as 
a halfway step to full membership. Villard argued that Turkey would accept to be a 
member of a regional Mediterranean defense pact on the lines of NATO. This 
57 FRUS, The Near East and Africa,1951, Vol. V, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1982), pp. 1110-1112. 
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regional pact would contain all of the bordering countries on the Mediterranean from 
Gibraltar to Suez. This pact should include the USA or at least have US backing.59 
However, McGhee argued that until NATO could achieve real strength, the US was 
not prepared to make any formal commitments. 60 
On February 22, 1951, the Conference of Middle Eastern Chiefs of Missions 
was held in Istanbul. It was concluded that to attain US political, military objectives in 
Turkey and Greece, and in the entire region of Middle East, the USA should enter as 
soon as possible into reciprocal security arrangements with the two countries. By this 
way, Turkey's belligerency would be assured in case of a war which involved the 
USA.61 
The question of Turkey's policy in case of a war was the main reason for the 
USA and its allies' acceptance of Turkey's full membership to NATO. They feared 
that Turkey with a vital strategic importance, might be neutral in case of a war with 
the Soviet Union. Since it had no means to defend itself against a Soviet attack, it 
could even make concessions to the Soviet Union which would hamper the defensive 
policies of the USA and its allies. The best way to guarantee Turkey's alliance with 
the West was to include it into NATO with full membership status. 
On February 26, 1951, a national intelligence estimate evaluated the will and 
the ability of Turkey's alignment with the West in case of a war with the Soviet 
Union. Accordingly, it was assumed that Turkey would resist the Soviet Union since 
it was solidly aligned with the West. Turkey was trying to get formal US military 
commitment to secure itself in case of a Soviet attack. It was argued that "a shift in 
the US policy to one hemispheric defense would oblige Turkey to abandon its pro-US 
59 FRUS, 1951, Vol. V, pp. 1117-1119. 
60 FRUS, European Security and the German Question, 1951, (in two parts), Part I, Vol. III, 
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alignment and fall back on a policy of neutrality." It was assumed that if Turkey was 
cut off from the West through a Soviet conquest or absorption of Iran, Iraq, and 
Syria, it was expected to pursue a more cautious policy toward the Soviet Union. If 
Greece was attacked by the Soviet Union and if the USA failed to stop its invasion, it 
was estimated that Turkey's policy would depend on broader considerations. It was 
considered that Turkey's pro-US alignment would continue so far as America firmly 
maintained its support without causing doubts on the Turkish side. However, in case 
Turkey could not get American assurances, this would lead to adaptation of a 
neutrality policy. And, if land communications of Turkey were cut off with the West 
through a Soviet invasion of Greece in its western flank, and Iran, Iraq, and Syria, in 
its eastern flank, Turkey was expected to follow a policy of neutrality since it had no 
firm US commitment facing Soviet invasion. Hence, in time, it could even make 
some concessions to the Soviet Union. It was also estimated that Turkey, in case of a 
general war in which it was not attacked, would maintain the status of non-
belligerency while doing everything to facilitate victory of the West. 
It was stated that one of the main objectives of Turkish foreign policy was to 
obtain an US military commitment in case of an attack by the Soviet Union. American 
military and economic assistance to Turkey did not alter Turkey's desire to obtain a 
formal US guarantee for its defense. Turkey which was strategically more important 
than Greece, could provide bases to the USA, in return for a formal US military 
commitment. Because, Turkey being the strongest anti-communist country on the 
periphery of the Soviet Union, got its strength to resist to the Soviet pressures from 
two sources. First was its national unity where the majority of the public was united 
against Soviet demands and fully supported its government's policy of joining NATO. 
And, the second source of strength was its army. Despite the shortcomings of its 
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armed forces, economic weakness, and its geographical vulnerability, Turkey could 
resist any Soviet or satellite aggression. With its strategic importance to the USA, 
Turkey was expected to offer air bases for US air forces. It was argued that if Turkey 
altered its pro-US alignment, this would seriously affect US interests in the Near 
East. 62 
On March 1, 1951, Henry Villard argued to the Director of the PPS, Nitze that 
although the 1939 Treaty was not obsolete, it appeared weak for defense of the 
Eastern Mediterranean. Hence, Villard suggested that the USA could enter into some 
form of commitment to Turkey and Greece. 63 
On March 8, 1951, the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces in Southern 
Europe, Camey stated to Eisenhower, the Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, 
that in case of a war, Pakistan, Turkey, Greece, Italy, and Scandinavia would all 
contribute and, would assist in the defense of the Western Europe. Therefore, Carney 
suggested that the countries of the north shore of the Mediterranean should be 
considered as a part of SACEUR's right flank.. 64 
The smaller members of NATO resisted membership of Greece and Turkey. 
They regarded that it would be disadvantageous for their short and long term interests 
through extending their own financial commitment and security risk. This would also 
be disadvantageous for their long term economic and political interests.65 On the other 
hand, in May 1950, the British government was supporting the idea of establishment 
of a Middle East Command (MECO), consisting of the UK, the Arab League states, 
62 FRUS, 1951, Vol. V, pp. 1119-1126. 
63 Ibid., pp. 1126-1127. 
64 FRUS, I 95 I, Vol. III, pp. 480-481. 
65 Ibid., p. 506; Feridun Cemal Erkin, D1~~i.}leri11de 3./ rd, pp. 177-178. 
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Israel, Turkey, Persia, Greece and Egypt. The British governemnt was not supporting 
Turkay's membership to NATO. 66 
On the other hand, the American Ambassador in Greece, John E. Peurifoy, 
stated to Acheson that Greece and Turkey were assets rather than liabilities to NATO 
military capabilities. He argued that the question of whether Greece and Turkey could 
be identified with Western civilization so that they could be a member of NATO was 
a question of secondary importance. Because, at the present, participation in NATO 
did not involve a commitment to a political union since it was a military organization. 
He argued that broadening the Eastern Mediterranean pact was more difficult than 
extending NATO to Turkey and Greece. Since, the Near and Middle East countries 
were divided between themselves because of the Palestine issue. He proposed the 
formation of a four power pact between the USA, UK, Turkey, Greece to which 
France and/or Italy could join if they so desired, and to which Yugoslavia could 
ultimately adhere, as the best alternative to provide security for Turkey and Greece.67 
While these alternatives were being debated, and after the national intelligence 
estimate of February 1951, it became obvious that the best decision was the adherence 
of Turkey as well as Greece to NATO. Because, especially after its contributions to 
the Korean War, facing disappointment, Turkey could choose neutrality. In case of a 
war, the Soviet Union would occupy Turkey in order to prevent the use of 
strategically important bases by the USA. Then, the question was which had been 
asked by Sadak during his Washington visit in mid-April, 1949, "why should Turkey 
take such risks if the USA would not promise to defend it? Why provoke the Kremlin 
if the Soviets might otherwise avoid war with Turkey, as they had done during the 
66 Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United 
States, and Postwar Imperialism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 583. 
67 FRUS, 1951, Vol. III, pp. 509-510. 
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WW II?" 68 Therefore, George McGhee argued that only NATO membership could 
provide security to Turkey and Greece. Therefore, he refused the other alternatives 
which were, conjoining Turkey and Greece to NATO either as a separate regional 
group or directly by bilateral arrangements between the USA and Turkey, and the 
USA and Greece; making multilateral arrangements between the USA, UK, Turkey, 
and Greece; or by some other plan which would also take into consideration political, 
military and administrative problems.69 And, on May 15, 1951, the USA proposed full 
membership to Turkey and Greece within NATO to its allies. By joiningTurkey to 
NATO, the USA would tie Turkey firmly to its side. This would make possible the 
diversion of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe as well as utilization of Turkish air 
fields by NATO allies. 70 
Between May 16-24, 1951, discussions were held at Washington by the 
American and British officials related to command problems in the Atlantic, 
Mediterranean and Middle East regions. Britain wanted the establishment of a 
Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean, who would be British. Under this 
commander, there would be a Commander in chief who would be American, and 
would be responsible for all naval forces in the Mediterranean. Britain desired the 
establishment of a separate Middle East Command under a British Supreme 
Commander who would be responsible for the supply line from the NATO front to the 
Middle East. Britain was concerned with the protection of its interests in the Middle 
East. Therefore, it desired to form a Middle East defense organization which would 
include Arab states and Israel. Accordingly, Turkey would have a key role hence, 
Britain insisted that any plan offering membership in NATO to Turkey should be 
68 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 289-290; FRUS, 1949, Vol. IV, p.177; FRUS, 
1949, Vol. VI, 1651-1652. 
69 FRUS, 1951, Vol.III, pp.511-515. 
70 George Harris, Troubled Allia11ce, p. 42. 
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conditional on Turkey's cooperation with this arrangement. On the other hand, the 
USA desired a separate but interlocking Middle East command structure with NATO. 
At end of the discussions, no binding conclusion was reached. 71 
On June 8, 1951, a meeting was held in London, between the British Chief of 
Staff, William Slim, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Omar Bradley . 
.. 
The US government suggested that the Middle Eastern countries if they wished, could 
take their place on a Middle East Cooperative Defense Board. However, this was 
rejected by the British. The latter wanted that such a defense board should be drawn 
from countries who were full or associate members of NATO. Hence, according to 
the British proposal, Turkey and Greece should be part of the Middle Eastern 
Command Organization (MECO), which would be _linked with NATO. Although, 
General Bradley expressed his personal opinion that Turkey would not like to be 
under a British commander in the Middle East. The British government did not want 
to withdraw the British Mediterranean Fleet from that region. Because, such a 
withdrawal meant leaving the British bases in Gibraltar and Malta. Therefore, the US 
proposal was not a practical solution for the British. 72 The British government 
required, 
I. Under the British Supreme Commander, the Middle East, would be 
the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, who would 
command and operate all the British naval forces and bases 
throughout the Mediterranean to meet the naval requirements of the 
Middle East Command and any traditional allied requirements from 
British bases. 
2. Admiral Carney would be the Commander-in-Chief, Southern Flank, 
and would command and operate all US naval forces in the 
Mediterranean to meet the naval requirements of General 
Eisenhower. 
3. The British Naval Commander-in Chief and Admiral Carney would 
keep in very close touch and co-ordinate naval and maritime air 
operations throughout the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. They 
71 FRUS, 195 l, Vol. III, pp. 522-524, George Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 43. 
72 FRUS, 1951, Vol. III, pp. 528-530; Feridun Cerna! Erkin, D1JiJleri11de 3-1 l'zl. p. 215. 
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would also coordinate the activities of allied naval forces m the 
Mediterranean. 73 
On July 4, 1951, the British government gave its support for Turkey's 
membership to NATO. Foreign Minister Fuat Kopriili.i stated that Turkey was 
prepared to collaborate with the USA, UK and France in the defense of the area. 74 
British government accepted Turkey's entrance to NATO if it would be part of the 
"Middle Eastern theatre of operations under an integrated command, and provided 
that theatre, which would include Egypt and certain members of the Commonwealth 
in addition to Turkey and the three great Western Powers, be placed under a special 
military organism that assures its high level strategic direction. As far as Greece was 
concerned it would be attached to theatre of operations of Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe."75 
In July, 1951, British and American governments reached an agreement on the 
Command in the Mediterranean and Middle East issue. Accordingly, Greece and 
Turkey would be admitted as full members of NATO. The USA considered that it was 
desirable that Turkey should play a full part in the defense of the Middle East under 
an allied Middle East Command, and was prepared to urge this course upon Turkey as 
soon as it became a NATO member. The Middle East Command would not be a 
NATO Command. It would, however, be closely associated with NATO by virtue of 
the association of USA, UK, Commonwealth, French, and Turkish officers at its 
headquarters. The Commander of the Allied Middle East Command would be a 
British officer. The USA would use its good offices to make this proposal acceptable 
to the Turks. 76 
73 FRUS, l 951, Vol. III, pp. 530-531. 
74 Ibid., pp. 554-555. 
75 Ibid., p. 556. 
76 Ibid., pp. 563-564. 
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During the Ottawa meetings in September 15-20, 1951, Britain desired the 
assignment of Turkish and Greek forces to a British general. However, Turkey wanted 
that its forces would be under an American general and not to be part of the Middle 
East Command (MECOM) but part of the regular NATO European army. Turkey 
was invited to be a founding member of MECOM. On September 24, 1951, Foreign 
Minister KoprUlU declared the acceptance of the Turkish government in principle to 
be a founding member in the setting up of the Middle East Command. However, "the 
Turkish government believed that its NATO Command relationship must be worked 
first and that only after this has been done would it be able to consider what additional 
responsibilities it might be able to undertake in the Middle East Command."77 But, in 
October 1951, Egypt refused to take part into a Middle East Command, because, the 
Egyptian government was trying to break the links with the past and did not want to 
be under complete British control. The Egyptian government wanted the withdrawal 
of the British forces from the Suez Canal; however, this was refused by the British. 
The Wafd government denounced the treaty of 1936, which made the British presence 
illegal according to the Egyptian law. Therefore, it was unacceptable for Egypt to 
offer bases to the British. The Egyptian refusal to be part of such an arrangement put 
an end to the plans for MEC0.78 Hence, the British proposal of MECO came to 
nothing. A separate South European Command under an American general was 
created. And, on February 18, 1952, Turkey joined NATO as a full-fledged 
member.79 
Regarding the role of Turkey within NATO; certain units of Turkish Armed 
Forces, including army, navy, and air-force have been assigned to NATO. Command 
and control of these forces are exercised through the Command of Land Forces South 
77 Ibid., p. 613. 
iS Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East. 1945-1951. p. 710. 
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(COMLANDSOUTH), and Six Allied Tactical Air Force (SIXATAF), Command 
Naval Forces South (COMNAVSOUTH) according to published NATO operations 
orders and in coordination with Turkish Armed Forces authorities. 
79 George Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 44. 
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CHAPTER V CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, Turkey's reasons to join to NA TO are examined. Turkey desired to 
enter into NATO both because of external and domestic reasons. However, neither of 
the alliance theories can provide a sufficient answer to the question of "why Turkey 
allied with the Western bloc but not with the Soviet block or did not choose 
neutrality?" The realist and neorealist schools of thought emphasize only external 
factors which are external threats, existence of imbalances of power between states, 
systemic anarchy, structural polarity, distribution of military power among states, and 
opportunities for gain. However, these considerations do not explain the external 
reason of Turkey's balancing behavior by entering into NATO rather than 
bandwagoning, allying with the Soviet Union or staying neutral. It is commonly 
argued that because of the 'Soviet threat' Turkey joined NATO. However, there was 
no 'Soviet threat' against Turkey since the war weary Soviet Union had no aim of 
waging war against Turkey. However, there were demands of the Soviet Union over 
Turkey regarding the revision of the Montreux Convention in its favor. The foremost 
objective of the Soviet Union was to control the Straits and be a dominant power in 
the Mediterranean Sea. In order to realize this historic aim which came from the era of 
czarist Russia, the Soviet Union pursued a continuous 'war of nerves' against Turkey. 
Meanwhile, the Western powers viewed the Soviet Union as their war time ally 
therefore, during the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, the USA and Great Britain did 
not take a positive stand against the Soviet demands regarding the revision of the 
Montreux Convention which encouraged the Soviet Union and led to the 
intensification of its 'war of nerves' against Turkey. This 'war of nerves' which 
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consisted of Soviet radio and press attacks, demanding implicitly the Kars-Ardahan 
region by denouncing of the treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of 1925 as well as 
rumors of troop movements against Turkey. And, all these activities were aimed at 
bringing Turkey into bilateral talks to revise the Montreux Convention. The Soviet 
Union would desire the establishment of a 'friendly regime' in Turkey. However, 
there was no possibility for the Soviet Union to export Communism to Turkey. 
Because, after the ban of the Turkish Communist party by Atattirk in 1926, 
Communism became a solely intellectual exercise, supporters of which were 
composed of writers, artists, and academicians. Moreover, there was not a large 
proletariat class from where the Communist ideas could be empowered. The tenets of 
Communist were totally incompatible to Turkey which was an agricultural country, 
composed predominantly of peasants and Muslim people. Hence, no militant 
communist activities could grow in Turkey. 
Turkey, while facing this 'war of nerves', was trying to involve the USA and 
Great Britain. The nonchalant attitude of the USA, which regarded the Soviet policy 
toward Turkey as a problem to be solved by the Soviet Union and Great Britain as had 
been in the past, raised Turkey's fears that it could again be matter of a bargaining 
point which had been in the case of the Ottoman Empire, between these great powers. 
These two powers in October 1944, had drawn the Spheres of Influence Agreement 
by which they divided the Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe into spheres of 
influences. 80 This feeling of insecurity was the external reason for Turkey which led 
to its alliance with the Western bloc. Because, the Turkish statesmen coming the 
Ottoman tradition and having the experience of the Ottoman Empire concluded that 
the military and diplomatic isolation had cost too much. Therefore, Turkey as a newly 
established state and a weak power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Western countries, 
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was suspicious of all powers. Hence, this feeling of insecurity, and not the 'Soviet 
threat' is the external reason of Turkey's balancing behavior. Because, the Soviet 
government, facing the firm opposition of the USA and Great Britain after its note of 
August 7, 1946, did not officially raise the question of the revision of the Montreux 
Convention after the Fall of 1946. The only exception was the Soviet Navy's official 
publication, Red Fleet in April 1950 which argued that the revision of the Montreux 
Convention was necessary. Hence, when Turkey was insistent upon joining to 
NATO, while it was facing the reluctance of the USA and the resistance of the Great 
Britain as well as the European member states, there were even no Soviet demands 
over Turkey, let alone threats. 
Bearing in mind the historical experiences of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish 
decision-makers concluded that only by entering a military alliance with the Western 
powers, could it protect its security, and prevent itself from being a matter of 
bargaining point between the great powers. It could also feel secure in case of a 
renewal of Soviet demands or against any possible Soviet aggression it though there 
were no apparent signs of this. Therefore, the Leaming theory can explain the external 
reason of Turkey's balancing behavior, which was, as a small power, Turkey's leaders 
desired to tie itself as well as the Western powers into a military alliance to avoid 
from being a bargaining point between great powers, if it looks to the Turkish case 
from a longer historical perspective rather than only focusing on its formative 
historical experiences during systemic wars of WW I, and WW II. Another factor, 
that led to Turkey's balancing behavior lies in the fact that it was a satisfied state. 
Because, after the War of Independence, Atatlirk refused any adventurism in foreign 
policy and, set up this new state within the borders of the National Pact, (the Mosul 
case is an exception) and 'peace at home, peace in world' became the constant foreign 
so Bruce Kuniholm, The Origins (f tlie Cold War in the Near East. pp. I 09-125. 
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policy goal of Turkey. Hence, as a satisfied power, acted as a security maximizer just 
like the Western bloc states, and in order to protect the status-quo, Turkey chose 
balancing rather than bandwagoning. 
Turkey's entrance into NATO cannot be explained by external factors alone. 
The state policy of Westernization, plays a significant role as an internal reason for 
its balancing. Alliance theories that emphasize domestic factors to explain a state's 
alliance formation, are not applicable to the Turkish case, since the primary concern 
of these theories are with the Third World states. Since Turkey is not a Third World 
state, the domestic realities of these states do not correspond to Turkey. Turkey, has 
never been a colony of another state, nor it has been composed of peoples without a 
previous state. A Western type of modern state was established by Atati.irk. Also, 
unlike the Third World states, there were neither problems regarding the legitimacy of 
state leaders nor any social unrest within the state which would affect the state's 
alliance formation. 
The internal reason for Turkey's balancing choice was Westernization. The 
foremost goal after the War of Independence, was to divorce Turkey from the Arabic 
sphere of culture and tradition and to transform it into a Westernized nation. The 
objective was the full integration of Turkey into the Western world as a modern state. 
Because, for Atati.irk only by being a part of the Western world, could Turkey remain 
independent. Hence, Turkey's alliance with the Western bloc was a continuation of 
this state policy of Westernization. Turkey has always expressed willingness to join 
military, political, and economic organizations of the West. For instance the non-
invitation of Turkey as a founding member to the Council of Europe had led to 
criticisms of the Turkish government. Likewise criticisms abound today because 
,_·.-~· ''i" 
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governments failed to adjust legislation to meet European standards required to 
qualify for membership in the European Union. 
Another reason which was a part of the Westernization policy, was the goal of 
industrialization. Kemalist reforms were based on continuous adoption of Western 
improvements to Turkey which would provide the maintenance of Turkey's 
independence within the Western world. However, with its level of industrialization 
Turkey was far behind the Western countries. Hence, Turkey had to fill this huge gap. 
The concepts of economic development, industrialization and Westernization are all 
interrelated. Because, without achieving industrialization it was impossible to achieve 
Westernization, hence it was not possible to be totally independent. Therefore, 
industrialization became a major national goal to attain Westernization. The Turkish 
economy was not devastated by WW II, and moreover, it had 245 million dollar worth 
of gold reserves. But, it was holding these reserves back in case of a Soviet attack 
though there were no signs of this. Turkey had a two fold aim one of which was to 
maintain large armed forces which was a heavy burden on its budget, and secondly, 
industrialization. However, its economy was not up to materializing these goals 
simultaneously. Hence, Turkey was in need of foreign aid, which it was receiving 
through US military and economic aid. But, the amount and duration of such aid 
depended on US Congressional approval. After the establishment of NATO, Turkey 
was anxious because of the possibility of the reduction in the flow of US aid. It 
desired to distribute the costs of military expenditures to foreign allies (in this case 
the burden was shared with the USA) by which it could complete its industrialization 
program. Hence, Westernization policy and industrialization were the domestic 
reasons of Turkey's entrance into NATO. 
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It is beyond the scope of this thesis to make an evaluation of a cost and benefit 
analysis of Turkey's entrance into NATO. In this study, the reasons of Turkey's 
alliance with the Western bloc is examined only. However, because the beginning of 
Turkey's dependence on the USA started in this era, some mention to this matter 
should be made. Regarding the costs of alliance all alliance theorists accept that there 
are costs in entering into an alliance besides benefits. A small state by entering into 
an alliance, with a great power or powers, obtains economic and military aid as well 
as security, it has to pay the cost of losing autonomy to some extent. Turkey, by 
entering into NATO benefited from its security umbrella, it got continuous aid for 
defense, but the cost was the loss of autonomy to some extent. This loss of autonomy 
began by the July 1947 aid agreement which was concluded between Turkey and the 
USA. According to the 4th article of this agreement, Turkey could not use this military 
aid for purposes other than it was decided without the consent of the USA. This article 
was used against Turkey during the Cyprus crisis in 1964. The Johnson letter, by 
pointing to this article, argued that Turkey should ask the approval of the US 
government for using this military equipment. By entrance into NATO, Turkey 
provided military bases to the USA and i~~ NATO allies hence, the presence of 
foreign forces (air force units and military advisers) began. However, sometimes 
Turkish statesmen and high ranking army officers were not informed regarding the 
activities of these foreign forces while Turkish territories were being used by these 
forces as was in the case of the Lebanon landing in 1958 when the Incirlik base was 
used for a non-NATO operation, and U2 event in 1960. Also, during the Cuban 
Missile crisis in 1962, Turkey felt itself abandoned when it heard that Kennedy and 
Khrushchev agreed to remove Jupiter missiles, IRBMs from Turkey as a price for 
the removal of the SS-5 Soviet MRBMs from Cuba. During the Cyprus crisis in 1964, 
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President Johnson informed the Turkish government about the possibility of the 
interference of the Soviet Union, and in that case Turkey could be left alone by 
NATO allies. Moreover, in 1967 two incidents happened. Firstly, the Soviets forced 
downed a US military aircraft which carried the American chief of JUSMMAT, on 
board. Secondly, an American RB-47 reconnaissance aircraft crashed into the Black 
Sea and the Soviets notified Turkey of the accident. It looked as if it compromised the 
Turkish sovereignty. Whether the Turkish Prime Ministers and Chiefs of the General 
Staff knew about American reconnaissance flights over the Soviet border or not. This 
situation, became an embarrassment to Turkey when American aircraft were either 
downed by the Soviets or were involved in an accident. Even sometimes the Turkish 
Army Generals were not permitted to enter into these bases without a written 
permission from American authorities in Ankara. This asymmetrical dependence of 
Turkey on the USA, damaged the former's full independence, and hence, raised 
public resentment, and the deterioration of relations with the USA as of the 1960s. 81 
All these things happened in the 1960s, when there was no Soviet aggressive 
behavior towards Turkey. These negative events led to change in Turkish foreign 
policy, in that, it started to become multi-dimensional. Moreover, Turkey began to 
shed its psychology of alliance from total dependence on a powerful ally towards a 
healthier balancing of its Euro-Atlantic ties.82 
81 Nur Bilge Criss, "U.S. Forces in Turkey," in Simon W. Duke & Wolfgang Krieger, (eds.) U.S. 
Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years, 1945-1970, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp.346-
350; Nur Bilge Criss, "Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959-1963," The 
Journal of Strategic Studies 20:3 (September 1997), pp. 97-122. . 
8 ~ It is not a coincidence that in 1963 the Ankara Agreement was signed with the European 
Community, and went into effect the next year towards Customs Union and full membership. 
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